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ON NIETZSCHE’S GENEALOGICAL MODE OF INQUIRY 
 
by Allison M. Merrick     
 
The subject of this thesis is Friedrich Nietzsche’s methodology, the genealogical 
mode of inquiry, which came to fruition in On the Genealogy of Morals. The precise 
nature of the genealogy, as a mode of inquiry, is a site of contest amongst scholars, 
with the central debates pivoting around four questions which arise upon considering 
the methodology: (1) what is the critical import of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of 
inquiry? (2) What form of critique does it take? (3) To whom does Nietzsche address 
his reflections? And (4) what role, if any, does history play in Nietzsche’s 
genealogical narratives?  Accordingly, this thesis seeks to offer and to defend answers 
to the central questions that are generated by the consideration of Nietzsche’s 
methodology. 
  In order to get a foothold into these debates and to provide the boundary within 
which these disagreements occur the first chapter has as its object of inquiry an 
examination and evaluation of Nietzsche scholars’ responses to these issues.  In 
chapter two I defend my interpretation against these rival views, and contend that the 
genealogy takes the form of an immanent critique, and that it is intended, at least, to 
reach all of Nietzsche’s contemporaries.   
  The adage “genealogy is history correctly practiced” is treated in the remaining 
three chapters, in which I attempt to morph what appears to be at present an 
uninformative formulation into an informative one by arguing that for Nietzsche 
historiography is best seen as a form of artistry.  And, this I submit, serves to shed 
light upon the genealogical mode of inquiry, and to shape the boundary by which the 
equation of genealogy as methodology with history becomes instructive.          3 
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With the exception of the Untimely Meditations, which I cite using both section 
numbers and page numbers, all Nietzsche’s works in English are referred to by 
section number, and where applicable essay number, or title, as well.  So, for 
example, The Gay Science section 125 will be cited as (GS 125), while On the 
Genealogy of Morals, Essay III, section 27 will be cited as (GM III 27) and part 9 of 
the section of Twilight of the Idols entitled “Expeditions of an Untimely Man” will be 
cited as (TI “Expeditions” 9).   
   1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche diagnoses a dissolving Christianity: a world-view that has, 
on his account, broken itself into irreconcilable pieces through a “monstrous logic of 
terror” (GS 343). More pointedly, perhaps, he identifies that we have “outgrown 
Christianity and are adverse to it, and precisely because we have grown out of 
it…”(GS 377).  We have, Nietzsche claims, outgrown that which once sheltered us, 
and provided us with meaning.  And the growing pains are acute; for in maturing we 
must leave behind the adjoining comfort, stability, and support such a world-view 
furnishes us with.   Walking without the crutches of a theological or metaphysical 
world-view is, for many, painstaking and may lead to resignation.    
Yet, for Nietzsche, things seem to be different.  This event carries with it the 
potential of a “second innocence,” a possibility unparalleled in two millennia of 
history (GM II 20).  It ushers in its wake, according to Nietzsche, “happiness, relief, 
exhilaration, encouragement, dawn” (GS 343).  The event, the “news that ‘the old god 
is dead,” is met, by Nietzsche, with “gratitude, amazement, premonitions, 
expectation” (GS 343).  The event carries with it so much potentiality, a capacity for 
growth and development that we, Nietzsche simultaneously informs us, are 
squandering.  Nietzsche’s philosophical task then is to demonstrate how we are still 
wedded to Christian morality, how we stand squarely in the shadows of this world-
view, and why the event of the death of God should strike us, as it does him, as 
carrying with it so very much potential.   
Nietzsche’s task then is to convince those to whom he is writing of the 
momentousness and the potentiality of this event.  Yet, if the event is, in fact, so 
cataclysmic that it can, in effect, split humanity in two: ((1) those born before the 
deed and (2) those born after) then the question surfaces, how does Nietzsche go 
about relating the ramifications of this substantial cultural and historic event? (GS 
125) Or, to put the point another way:  How does Nietzsche attempt to demonstrate 
“what the event really means—and how much must collapse now that this faith has 
been undermined”? (GS 343) The answers lie, I submit, in Nietzsche’s methodology, 
which finds its most forceful demonstration in the text On the Genealogy of Morals.   2 
Much has been made of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals in recent 
years, attesting both to the complexity of the work, and to the acuity of Nietzsche’s 
insights.
1  Within the cover of the text one finds a wealth of penetrating 
psychological, historical and philosophical theses, in a style of great rhetorical 
sharpness. One also finds, I contend, a methodology that has come to fruition.  The 
subject of this thesis is Nietzsche’s methodology, the means by which he attempts to 
draw out the salient features of the momentous event, the ways in which he attempts 
to convince us of the ramifications of the event, and finally how he attempts to 
convince us, his readers, to take up the task of a re-evaluation of our most cherished 
values. 
 
1. The Form of the Argument  
 
The subject of this thesis is Nietzsche’s methodology: the genealogical mode 
of inquiry. Of methods generally, in The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche writes: “The most 
valuable insights are the last to be discovered; but the most valuable insights are 
methods” (AC 13).  Taking Nietzsche at his word, the object of this thesis is to 
provide a cogent and convincing account of Nietzsche’s method, “the most valuable” 
of insights.   
Though scholars have toiled to provide a decisive account of the methodology, 
disagreements abound. Martin Saar, for example, finds:   
Commentators on [Nietzsche’s] work especially during the last ten years have 
tried to elucidate the problem and have proposed a variety of interpretive 
suggestions but none of them has systematically and reconstructively put an 
end to the debate.  But the sense that genealogy is a central category in 
Nietzsche’s work persists.
2  
 
I contend that these disagreements pivot around four questions that arise when 
considering the methodology: (1) what is the critical import of Nietzsche’s 
genealogical methodology? (2) What form of critique does it take? (3) To whom does 
Nietzsche address his remarks? And, (4) what role, if any, does history play in 
Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives?  The aims of this thesis include contributing to 
this debate by providing answers to each of these questions. 
                                                 
1 In the last two years, for example, four book length treatments of the text have appeared: (1) Daniel 
Conway’s (2008) Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, (2) Lawrence Hatab’s (2008) Nietzsche’s 
On the Genealogy of Morality An Introduction, (3) Christopher Janaway’s (2007) Beyond Selflessness 
Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy, and (4) David Owen’s (2007) Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality. 
2 Saar, Martin (2002) p. 231   3 
In responding to the first two questions Tyler Krupp has recently commented:  
…self-styled Nietzscheans…have simply taken for granted that genealogy is 
inherently critical.  Some go so far as to equate critique as such with 
genealogy.  Remarkably little philosophical work has been done by these 
adherents to show how exactly genealogy is inherently critical.  Absent such 
philosophical clarification, the never-ending barrage of ‘critical’ genealogies 
becomes a bit tedious....
 3 
 
The first two chapters, accordingly, have as their object of inquiry, the critical import 
and the functionality of the methodology, and do not assume at the outset that the 
genealogical methodology possesses and inherently critical function.  In chapter one, I 
provide a foothold into the vast secondary literature on Nietzsche’s genealogical 
method by targeting the work of two scholars: Brian Leiter and Raymond Geuss.  I 
contend that their respective formulations fail, in the end, to offer the methodology 
with its most forceful and cogent articulation.  In chapter two, I provide an account of 
the shape of Nietzsche’s critique of “morality” and argue that it takes the form of an 
immanent critique of particular belief structures.
4 There, I also defend the view that 
Nietzsche, in the Genealogy, targets at least three pernicious forms of faith 
exemplified by, (A) the Christians who have faith in the Christian God. (B) The 
adherents of Christian morality after the death of the Christian God, and (C) those 
who are unreservedly committed to the unconditional value of truth.  And, this, in turn 
is to suggest that Nietzsche’s target-audience includes those who are “faithful,” and 
that Nietzsche is, at least in principle, targeting all of his contemporaries. 
                                                 
3 Krupp, Tyler (2008) p. 316 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, and in accord with contemporary Nietzsche scholarship, I employ the 
term “morality” to denote the following set of commitments:  
 
“(a) An identification of moral actions as unegoistic, that is, in terms of ‘selflessness, self-
denial, self-sacrifice, or sympathy and compassion.’ (b) An interpretation of suffering as 
punishment and, hence, the centrality of the mechanism of guilt to moral reflection. (c) A 
view of moral agency as composed of, and hence to be judged in term of, the intentional 
choices of actors characterized by freedom of the will. (d) The valuation of ‘slave’ values (e.g. 
obedience and humility) as intrinsic values and the devaluation of ‘noble’ values (e.g. 
commanding and boldness). (e) A conception of intrinsic values as unconditional and, hence, 
of moral obligation as unconditional. (f) A conception of morality as universally applicable.” 
Owen, David (2007) p. 69. 
   
For similar accounts see:  Geuss, Raymond (1999) p. 171, Leiter, Brian (2002) pp. 74-81 May, Simon 
(1995) pp. 104-107.   4 
  The final three chapters have as their object of inquiry the adage that 
“genealogy is history correctly practiced.”
5 At least from Human All Too Human 
onwards, Nietzsche is clear that we are in need of a “retrograde step” in order to make 
sense of ourselves (HH 20).  However, Nietzsche’s historical philosophy has not been 
adequately explored within the secondary literature.  What is common is the simple 
equation of genealogy, as a mode of inquiry, and history, and as Christopher Janaway 
has recently pointed out: “…This formulation [that genealogy is history, correctly 
practiced] may run the risk of being uninformative: there are notable differences 
between genealogy and other forms of history.”
6 As such the aim of the final three 
chapters is to shape the boundary by which the equation of genealogy with history 
becomes instructive.  Chapter three presents an answer to the question: what, for 
Nietzsche, is history correctly practiced?  Chapter four explores the claim that 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy is an interesting fable lacking historical veracity.  The worry 
here is that despite Nietzsche’s insistence to the contrary it nevertheless seems that 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy is not the product of serious archival research for it lacks 
annotation, or, to employ Foucault’s image, it appears anything but “grey, meticulous, 
and patiently documentary.”
7 After treating and dismissing the contention that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives represent nothing more than useful thought 
experiments which lack historical veracity, I turn in chapter five to argue that history 
correctly practiced for Nietzsche is a form of artistry.  That is, that the genealogist 
imposes a particular shape and form upon the historical and it is in this way that the 
equation of genealogy, as methodology, and history becomes informative. 
   
2. A Word on Source Materials 
 
Before embarking, a word on my use of Nietzsche’s texts is in order.  Two 
points are worth making here: the first point is in regard to periodization and the 
second point concerns the use of Nietzsche’s unpublished writings.  On the topic of 
periodization it is well known that Hans Vaihinger introduced the tripartite division of 
Nietzsche’s corpus. Accordingly and broadly construed, Nietzsche’s works from then 
                                                 
5 This expression, that “genealogy is history correctly practiced,” was first formulated by Alexander 
Nehamas  (1995) in Nietzsche: Life as Literature:  “Nietzsche does not, as Foucault does, contrast 
genealogy with history but insists that genealogy simply is history, correctly practiced” p. 246 fn. 1. 
6 Janaway, Christopher (2007) p. 10 
7 Foucault, Michel (1971) p. 130    5 
on have been divided into three periods: the early (1872-1876), the middle (1877-
1882), and the late (1883-1889), with priority given to Nietzsche’s mature works of 
1883-1889. Given the nature of this project and that Nietzsche’s most sustained 
discussion of history is found within the “early” period, I will use early work to help 
to illuminate Nietzsche’s mature conception of history. Though I will discuss the 
issue in greater detail in chapter three, for our purposes here Breazeale’s discussion 
will suffice:   
Not only did [Nietzsche] repeatedly recommend [his Untimely Meditations] as 
essential documents for understanding the development of his thought, but he 
also described them as—and, indeed claimed, that he had explicitly intended 
them to serve as—‘lures’ or ‘fish hooks’ for attracting and capturing the 
attention of the readers he was so desperately trying to reach….As mentioned, 
Nietzsche believed that the Untimely Meditations were also especially useful 
for providing his readers (once ‘hooked,’…) with essential insight into the 
development of his philosophy and with an understanding of what he was 
trying to accomplish in his later writings.
8   
 
Accordingly, I employ the conceptual distinctions found within the second of the 
Untimely Meditations, to shed light upon Nietzsche’s mature conception of and use of 
history. 
Turning to the second point, it is well established now that Nietzsche’s 
unpublished writing collected under the title of The Will to Power does not deserve 
the privileged position which Heidegger accords to the collection— namely, that the 
Will to Power represents Nietzsche’s “planned magnum opus” and his “chief 
philosophical work.”
9 Despite this widespread agreement concerning how the Will to 
Power should be regarded Bernd Magnus has pointed out Nietzsche scholars can still 
be roughly divided into two groups: “lumpers,” “who regard the use of Nietzsche’s 
Nachlass as unproblematic,” and “splitters,” “who “distinguish sharply between the 
published and unpublished writings.”
10  My approach to Nietzsche’s notebooks 
belongs in a third category.  Such a category would not simply view the use of 
Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks as unproblematic, nor would such a category 
simply neglect them entirely.  My approach to Nietzsche’s unpublished works, and it 
                                                 
8 Breazeale, Daniel (1997) pp. xxiv-xxv. 
9 Heidegger, Martin (1979) p. 7 and p. 3. Heidegger goes on to makes a stronger claim regarding the 
privileged position of the Will to Power.  Heidegger suggests that:  “…Nietzsche’s philosophy proper, 
the fundamental position on the basis of which he speaks in these and in all the writings he himself 
published, did not assume a final form and was not itself published in any book, neither in the decade 
between 1879 and 1889 nor during the preceding years.  What Nietzsche himself published during his 
creative life was always foreground.” pp. 8-9  
10 Magnus, B. (1986) pp. 82-83   6 
might be added not only those collected under the title The Will to Power, belongs to 
this third category.  I refer to the notebooks and employ them only to elucidate 
interpretive issues found within the published writings.  Thus, I do not base any of my 
interpretive claims, or reconstructions of Nietzsche’s positions, on the sole evidence 
of his unpublished writings. 
   7 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Contesting the Philosophical Function of the Genealogical Mode of Inquiry 
 
 
What is the critical import of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry?  What 
form of critique does it take?  To whom does Nietzsche address his critique?  These 
questions haves sparked much debate, and continue to fuel a division of opinion in 
Nietzsche scholarship.  Thus, for example, when considering the critical import of 
Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology, Raymond Geuss, Brian Leiter and Bernard 
Reginster have recently, and respectively, argued that the methodology is best seen as 
superfluous or incidental to Nietzsche’s critique of morality, whereas Martin Saar, for 
instance, finds the methodology indispensable to Nietzsche’s critical enterprise.
11 
Opinion regarding the form of Nietzsche’s critique is also divided. There are scholars 
who argue that Nietzsche’s genealogical method takes the form of an immanent 
critique, there are scholars that argue it takes the form of a transcendent critique,
12 and 
there are some scholars in the middle.
13  Concerning Nietzsche’s intended audience, 
disagreements also abound. Views here can be broadly broken down into four 
categories: (1) Nietzsche circumscribes his audience to those who are “predestined for 
his insights.” (2) Nietzsche restricts his writings to those who have faith in the 
                                                 
11See, for example, Bernard Reginster’s (2006) p. 199, Brian Leiter’s (2002) p. 177, and Martin Saar’s 
(2002) pp. 234-237 
12 On the immanent critique side of the divide see: Christoph Cox (1999) p. 243, David Owen’s (1995) 
“Genealogy as Immanent Critique” (pp. 39-41,) and Daniel Conway (1994). On the other side of the 
divide, I take Brian Leiter’s (2002) views to be representative of the position that attributes to 
Nietzsche’s genealogy the form of a transcendent critique. 
13 Gemes and Janaway (2005) provide a succinct illustration of how such an approach might operate: 
“One might claim that the structure of Nietzsche’s argument is two-tiered. At first he launches 
an internal critique of received moralities, as a means of undermining these moralities, then he 
introduces his own normative agenda to replace that of those moralities he has undermined 
through his internal critique” (p. 736). 
I take John Richardson’s (1996) conception of Nietzsche’s methodology to be representative of this 
“two-tiered” approach. For example, Richardson writes:  
“Nietzsche aspires not just to match his society’s view structure, even as it will be, but to 
improve it, and by a standard not just internal to those views themselves.  He views himself 
not just as discovering and announcing a momentum in our ideas; he presumes to shift them, 
under the warrant of a transcending view.  He aspires to see and judge his neighborhood—this 
perspectival locale—not just from inside but from a stance (by a standard) that is true of all 
life: by the essential value of power or health. He speculates that power is the basic aim of all 
wills, so that all are subject to a basic evaluation as healthy or sick; he hopes that any better 
view than his own—even from outside our society, even from outside our species—would 
concur in this standard he mainly employs.  Indeed, I think Nietzsche aspires to a transcending 
view not just in how he evaluates social wills but in his framing conception of society as 
consisting of such wills” (p. 282).   8 
Christian God. (3) Nietzsche targets solely the atheists. Or, (4) Nietzsche intends his 
writings to appeal to all of his contemporaries.
14 Given the vast expanse of differing 
responses to the fundamental questions that arise when considering Nietzsche’s 
genealogical mode of inquiry a foothold into these debates is vital. 
I take up this task by focusing upon the work of two scholars: Brian Leiter and 
Raymond Geuss.  Despite their ostensibly differing accounts of the purpose of 
Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry, I draw out two fronts of disagreement 
between their respective formulations and my own.
15  The first site of contest is the 
functionality of the genealogical mode of inquiry insofar as both Leiter and Geuss 
take Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations to be incidental to Nietzsche’s critique of 
morality.  The second point of conflict concerns the circumscription of Nietzsche’s 
target audience.  These clashes represent a fundamental dispute concerning the 
functionality, the objectives of the methodology, as well as the projected audience of 
Nietzsche’s narratives, and as such, the stakes are high. 
Accordingly, I begin by sketching Leiter’s conception of the genealogical 
mode of inquiry as an incidental feature of Nietzsche’s critique of morality. Here, 
Brian Leiter is not alone in his assessment of the genealogical mode of inquiry, and as 
a result I tease out a connection between the work of Leiter and that of Bernard 
Reginster on the grounds that both scholars reach the same conclusion from 
                                                 
14 According to this classification the arguments for these respective conclusions can be found within 
the works of the following scholars:  
(1)  Brian Leiter (2002) concludes that:  “[Nietzsche] has nothing to say to those readers who 
don’t share his evaluative tastes.” p. 176 fn. 9 See also (2002) pp. 153-155 and (2000) 
esp. p. 291 
(2)  Raymond Geuss (1999) writes: “…Christianity will dissolve itself and Nietzsche’s 
genealogy will contribute to that process.  That genealogy is experienced by the Christian 
as a form of criticism need not imply that is how it looks from the perspective of the 
genealogists” p. 21   
(3)  Christopher Janaway (2007), for example, finds:  “Nietzsche’s attacks seem better 
addressed to the non-religious (or not especially religious) person who clings to a 
conception of morality inherited unthinkingly from Christianity” p.  7 Ken Gemes (2006) 
too finds:  “The question of exactly who Nietzsche’s intended audience for the Genealogy 
is extremely complex.  In the text he sometimes refers to ‘we knowers’ (GM P:1), 
sometimes to ‘modern humans, that is, us’ (GM  II:7).  If we take as our model, liberal, 
secular intellectuals I do not think that we will be far off the mark of his ‘knowers’ and 
‘modern humans’” p. 206 fn. 2 Aaron Ridley (2007) also notes: “Nietzsche’s primary 
target-audience, like the madman’s, is not Christian believers, but self-proclaimed 
atheists, those who do not need to be convinced that God is dead, but who do need to be 
convinced that the consequences of that fact are, or should be, momentous.” p. 92 
(4)  David Owen (2007), for instance, writes: “On the reconstruction that I have proposed, 
Nietzsche is concerned to offer internal reasons to reject ‘morality’ to…the entire body of 
his contemporaries.” p. 135  
15 I will present my positive account of the methodology in chapter two below.   9 
Nietzsche’s statement of his objectives in the Preface to the Genealogy.  I then turn to 
an examination of Leiter’s claim that the genealogical method takes the form of 
transcendent critique.  In response, I argue that Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of 
inquiry cannot legitimately be seen to function as transcendent mode of critique. I 
then tease out a connection between the work of Leiter and of Geuss on the grounds 
that both scholars, despite their otherwise dissimilar accounts, argue that there is no 
explanatory power in considering the genealogical mode of inquiry as 
methodologically similar to the tracing of a pedigree.  Lastly, I turn to my assessment 
of Geuss’ formulation of the critical function the genealogical mode of inquiry and 
suggest that the methodology has more critical import than Geuss’ interpretation 
indicates.   
Before embarking we should recall Nietzsche’s pithy discussion in the second 
of his Untimely Meditations concerning the state of his contemporary intellectual 
climate: 
The work never produces an effect, only another ‘critique’: and the critique 
itself produces no effect either, but again only a further critique.  There thus 
arises a general agreement to regard the acquisition of many critiques as a sign 
of success, of few or none as a sign of failure.  At bottom, however, even 
given this kind of ‘effect’ everything remains as it was: people have some new 
thing to chatter about for a while, and then something newer still, and in the 
meantime go on doing what they have always done (HL V 87). 
 
Heeding Nietzsche’s diagnosis, the aim of this chapter is not to engage in the 
ceaseless reduplication of critique by means of further critique.  Rather, the aim of 
this chapter is to argue that one of Nietzsche’s central methodological objectives is to 
produce an effect, in the non-pejorative sense.  Thus, the objective of this chapter is to 
chart a set of possible ways of viewing the critical import and the functionality of the 
methodology as well as noting some preliminary answers to the question concerning 
the intended audience of Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives. I contend that these 
respective formulations fail to represent the methodology with its most cogent 
articulation. As a result Nietzsche’s methodology is left in the precarious position of 
being ineffectual in the sense that Nietzsche warns against in the second of the 
Untimely Meditations.  Put slightly differently:  Even if Nietzsche’s genealogical 
mode of inquiry is successful, along the methodological lines charted by, for example, 
Leiter and Geuss, their respective formulations fail to take into account the most 
salient features of the methodology.  Engaging the Genealogy in the manner in which   10 
they describe then leaves in its wake the greater possibility that people may 
nevertheless “go on doing what they have always done” (HL V 87). 
  In view of that I shall begin my analysis by charting and evaluating the 
responses of Leiter and Reginster to the question: what is the critical import of the 
genealogical mode of inquiry? 
 
1. On the Critical Import of the Genealogical Mode of Inquiry 
 
  As previously mentioned, the critical import of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode 
of inquiry is a site of contest in the secondary literature.  The fronts of disagreement 
are represented in the following two positions: (1) the genealogy, as a mode of 
inquiry, is superfluous to Nietzsche’s critique of morality.  In other words, the fact 
that Nietzsche’s critique of morality occurs whilst he offers a genealogy of our moral 
constructs is an incidental rather than an essential feature of his critique. (2) 
Nietzsche’s genealogical method is indispensable and inseparable from his critique of 
morality.  Put slightly differently, Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry is itself a 
critical enterprise.  The motivation for viewing Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of 
inquiry as distinct from a critique stems from the worry that if Nietzsche’s 
genealogical narratives are inherently critical, then he may commit the genetic fallacy, 
the fallacy of stating that the origins of a practice tell us something about its current 
value.  To ward off the undesirable conclusion that Nietzsche’s methodology commits 
such a fallacy, and to lend credence to my claim that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
narratives are a critique, I begin by addressing the work of Bernard Reginster and 
Brian Leiter.  Both of these scholars have argued that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
methodology is but one means towards a critique of our moral valuations, and hence 
that the genealogy, as methodology, is not in virtue of that fact a critique.  Hence, 
their respective arguments present a serious scholarly challenge to the thesis that I 
wish to advance, and, accordingly I will examine their arguments carefully before 
offering an alternative reading. 
 
1.1 Genealogy as “One Means Among Many:” The Reginster/Leiter Objection 
   11 
Is there a genetic fallacy lurking in Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations 
into the origins of our morals? In conducting a genealogical investigation into the 
origins of morals does Nietzsche commit the methodological fallacy of suggesting 
that the origins of a set of valuations illuminate their current value? Or, as Robert 
Solomon succinctly puts it:  “Is the ‘genealogy’ in fact nothing but a sophisticated 
version of the genetic fallacy…?”
16 In response to these sorts of questions several 
scholars have argued that Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations into the origins of 
morality must be distinct from a critique. In this section I will highlight two such 
interpretations found within the works of Bernard Reginster and Brian Leiter.  Both 
scholars are committed to the claim that Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations into 
the origins of our moral frameworks are different from a critique of the varying moral 
frameworks that emerge from such an investigation, and accordingly, Nietzsche’s 
methodology bypasses the charge of committing the genetic fallacy.
17   
Scholars, for some time now, have attempted to salvage Nietzsche’s 
genealogical investigations from the charge of a lurking genetic fallacy. The work of 
Reginster and Leiter is no exception.
18  Both scholars cite textual evidence in which 
Nietzsche clearly demonstrates an acute awareness of the fallacy and from this, both 
Reginster and Leiter contend that Nietzsche’s historical investigations into the origins 
of morality do not commit such a fallacy.
19 The first piece of evidence both scholars 
cite is found within The Gay Science where Nietzsche writes: “Even if a morality has 
grown out of an error, the realization of this fact would not as much as touch the 
problem of value” (GS 345).  While the second is a contemporaneous note from the 
Nachlass:    
The inquiry into the origins of our evaluations and tables of good is in 
absolutely no way identical with a critique of them, as is so often believed: 
even though the insights into some pudenda origo certainly brings with it a 
                                                 
16 Solomon, Robert (1994) p. 97 
17 For Reginster’s argument see (2006) pp. 197-200; for Leiter’s argument see (2002) pp. 177 
18 See for example:  Daniel Conway’s (1994) “Genealogy and Critical Method,” David Couzens Hoy’s 
“Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method,” Paul Loeb’s  “Is There a Genetic Fallacy in 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals;” and Alexander Nehamas’ (1985) pp. 107-110.   
19 Interestingly, as Paul Loeb (1995), notes “the phrase ‘genetic fallacy’ was not coined until 
1914…and most importantly, the phrase did not become an influential term of art until 1938, when it 
was introduced to characterize what was widely regarded as an epistemological mistake of the newly 
formed discipline ‘sociology of knowledge’…In sum, the charge of a genetic fallacy was deployed 
very recently, outside of logic proper, and at least in part to combat the influence of Nietzsche’s 
genealogy of morality” p. 128.   12 
feeling of a diminution in value of the thing that originated thus and prepares 
the way to a critical mood and attitude towards it (WP 254).
20 
 
From these passages both Leiter and Reginster conclude that Nietzsche has an acute 
awareness of the genetic fallacy and his genealogical investigations into the pudenda 
origo of morality are distinct from a critique of morality. Though such investigations 
prepare the way for a critique they are not in themselves critiques.  Reginster 
explicitly makes this point: “Genealogical inquiry into the origin of morality provides 
the sort of knowledge that is required for critique of it, but is not itself such a 
critique”
21 Nevertheless, both scholars are at the same time committed to the claim 
that: “Even to produce a ‘feeling of diminution’ and to ‘prepare the way’ for a critique 
is to already accomplish a project of some importance.”
22  Thus, on this view, 
Nietzsche’s genealogies serve the function of creating suspicion regarding our 
valuations, but the genealogy as a mode of inquiry does not serve as a critique of 
those valuations.  Given that for Leiter and Reginster the genealogical mode of 
inquiry functions in this particular way, Nietzsche escapes the charge of the genetic 
fallacy because his methodology “forbids any direct critical inference from 
genealogical inquiry....”
23 
     In contrast to these accounts I will present a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s 
methodology that does not fall prey to the charge of a genetic fallacy and places 
emphasis upon the critical function of the genealogical mode of inquiry.  I begin my 
reconstruction with a reading of Nietzsche’s Preface to the Genealogy, particularly 
section 5, in order to tease out a distinction between the Reginster/Leiter view and my 
own.  Secondly, I place a significant amount of explanatory weight upon Nietzsche’s 
“major point of historical method” presented in the Second Essay of the Genealogy 
(GM II 12).  In so doing, I argue Nietzsche’s historical methodology explicitly 
excludes any direct inference from the origins of a concept through to its present day 
purpose, and, hence, value. Thus, with Nietzsche’s methodological insights placed at 
                                                 
20 Nietzsche also demonstrates an “awareness” of the fallacy in Daybreak: “the more insight we 
possess into an origin the less significant does the origin appear” (D 44).  
21 Reginster, Bernard (2006) p. 198 
22 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 179 Similarly Reginster argues that:  “Presumably a certain value judgment is 
not necessarily objectionable because it is found to have an objectionable origin (‘pudenda origo’).  At 
best, such a discovery might make us suspicious towards it, but it is not itself a criticism—it only 
‘prepares the way to a critical mood and attitude towards it’” pp. 197-198. 
23 Reginster, Bernard (2006) p. 198   13 
the forefront of my interpretation, the charge of a genetic fallacy is rendered 
misleading, and the critical import of the genealogical mode of inquiry is maintained.  
 
1.2 Nietzsche’s “Real Concern:” Reading GM Preface 5 
 
     Both Reginster and Leiter point to the Preface of the Genealogy where 
Nietzsche makes the following declaration: “Even then my real concern was 
something much more important than hypothesis-mongering, whether my own or 
other people’s, on the origin of morality (or more precisely:  the latter concerned me 
for the sake of a goal to which it was only one means among many)” (GM P 5). Leiter 
employs this passage to substantiate his rendering of the genealogical mode of inquiry 
as incidental to Nietzsche’s critique of morality in the pejorative sense, and also to 
demonstrate that Nietzsche’s critique of morality does not depend upon a genealogy 
of it.
24  For example, Leiter insists:  
The genealogy of morality…is but one instrument for arriving at a particular 
end, namely a critique of morality.  This should alert us to the possibility that 
the critique of morality does not depend on the genealogy of morality, though 
the genealogy may help us arrive at it.
25  
 
While Reginster takes this passage to prove the following point: 
…[I]n the Preface, [Nietzsche] declares quite explicitly that the genealogical 
investigations upon which he is about to embark are ‘only one means among 
many’ to carry out his critique of morality.  One might instead simply attend 
to the effects the prevalence of a certain moral code has on culture here and 
now.
26 
 
Reginster, like Leiter, takes the genealogical mode of inquiry to be an incidental 
feature of Nietzsche’s critique of morality because one is tracking the effects of a 
particular moral code.
27  Further, Reginster suggests that instead of looking to the 
history of our moral codes, as the genealogist does, one could simply attend to the 
                                                 
24 Hereafter, and in following Leiter, I shall use the acronym MPS to stand for “morality in the 
pejorative sense.” 
25 Leiter, Brian (2002) pg. 177  
26 Reginster, Bernard (2006) p. 199.  It should be noted that Richard Schacht too finds:  “This, 
[Nietzsche’s] professed ‘real concern’ from the time of Human, All-Too-Human to that of the 
Genealogy and beyond, ‘was something much more important hypothesis-mongering…on the origin of 
morality.’ The issues to which he addresses himself is that of the ‘value of morality,’ to the treatment 
of which such reflections were ‘only one means among many.’” Schacht (1983) p. 421   
27 For example, Leiter maintains that the “effects” we are meant to track are the effects MPS has upon 
the flourishing of higher human beings.    14 
“effects the prevalence of a certain moral code has here and now.”
28 Reginster thus 
renders Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations superfluous for we can simply 
concentrate upon the effects a certain moral code has for us, here and now, instead of 
looking for the manner in which such practices were provided with meaning within 
varying systems of purposes. 
  There are two related problems with this rendering. These worries stem from 
the claim that no genealogical insight is needed to ascertain the effects a prevalent 
moral code has here and now.  Firstly historiography correctly practiced, for 
Nietzsche, methodologically excludes any direct inference from the points of origin to 
the present day employment of the concept (GM II 12).  In the Second Essay of the 
Genealogy Nietzsche introduces his “major point of historical method” as follows: 
“the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and 
place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart” (GM II 12). Nietzsche’s 
methodological insight, here, highlights the myriad of interpretations that have been 
arbitrarily welded together to formulate the “meaning” of our present day concept.  
Insofar as Nietzsche’s methodology places emphasis upon the here and now, he 
demonstrates that we have become, and, perhaps currently are, wedded to one 
interpretation of a concept to the exclusion of other possible meanings. Understood in 
this way Nietzsche’s historical methodology employs the past as a means to 
understand the present, particularly how we have become committed to one mode of 
evaluation at the expense of others. Thus, contra Reginster, Nietzsche’s historical 
methodology places an emphasis upon the effects a moral code has here and now, and, 
as such, Reginster’s alternative suggestion concerning how we could go about 
investigating our moral codes is not, in fact, an alternative. For Nietzsche’s historical 
methodology, understood as an employment of the past to understand and evaluate the 
present, already achieves the task set by Reginster’s alternative suggestion. Further, it 
is also worth noting here Nietzsche’s historical methodology explicitly rules out any 
direct inference from the point of origin to the present day implementation of a 
concept; his methodology is not liable to the charge of a genetic fallacy. 
The second problem concerns the rendering of the genealogy as a superfluous 
exercise, which carries with it no critical import.  As abovementioned, Reginster’s 
and Leiter’s respective assessments hang upon a particular reading of the Preface of 
                                                 
28 Reginster, Bernard (2006) p. 199   15 
the Genealogy, section 5, in which they claim that Nietzsche’s investigations into the 
origins of morality are one means among many.  Both Reginster and Leiter take this 
to signify that genealogy is one mode of inquiry among many. Nietzsche’s point, 
however, is twofold.  The first and more minor point is that an investigation into the 
origins of morality can be conducted with varying degrees of methodological success.  
As both Reginster and Leiter concede, Nietzsche clearly thinks that one can 
methodologically investigate morality in a number of ways.
29 Accordingly, Nietzsche 
offers a distinct methodological approach to the investigation into the origins of 
morals, a methodology, which Nietzsche repeatedly suggests improves upon that of 
his contemporaries.
30  And (2) the methodology is intended to create the framework 
within which we can take up the task of calling into question “the value of morality,” 
more pointedly, “the value of the ‘unegoistic,’ the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, 
self-sacrifice…” (GM P 5).  In the following section of the Preface Nietzsche 
expresses the salient points as follows: 
This problem of the value of pity and of the morality of pity…seems at first to 
be merely something detached, an isolated question mark; but whoever sticks 
with it and learns how to ask questions here will experience what I 
experienced—a tremendous new prospect opens up for him, a new possibility 
comes over him like a vertigo, every kind of mistrust, suspicion, fear leaps up, 
his belief in morality, in all morality, falters—finally a new demand becomes 
audible.  Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral 
values, the value of these values themselves must first be called into 
question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and 
circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and 
changed…(GM P 6)   
 
Three interrelated methodological points are made here: (1) the problem of the value 
of our moral values produces the need for a total critique. A critique, in other words, 
of morality as such. (2) A total critique requires knowledge of the conditions, the 
circumstances, in which the values we assume to be universally binding evolved and 
changed. The problem Nietzsche identifies here is that our values have always been 
taken unreflectively in the manner they present themselves: as universally binding, as 
transhistorical and “as given, as factual, as beyond all question…” (GM P 6). 
                                                 
29 For example, Nietzsche presents a number of ways in which the “naïve genealogists” have conducted 
their misguided investigations into the origins of morality.  Such methodologically misguided 
investigations include:  (1) assuming that the origins of a practice are meant to tell us something about 
its current value (WP 245) and (2) as in the case of Rée presenting both a historically untenable and a 
psychologically implausible account.  Accordingly one can investigate the origins of morality with 
varying degrees of methodological success. 
30 See for example: (GM P 7), (GM I 1-2), (GM II 4) and (GM II 12-13)   16 
Accordingly, (3) the new demand, then, is simultaneously a demand for both an 
historical knowledge and a total critique that feeds off of such knowledge.  If this 
reading is persuasive, then it follows that the genealogical method is not detached 
from total critique.  And, as abovementioned, total critique requires the calling into 
question the value of “morality as such,” through recourse to a particular kind of 
historical knowledge.  We must, in other words, “stick with” Nietzsche in order to 
“learn” that the genealogical mode of inquiry simultaneously serves these functions 
(GM P 6). Furthermore, if this reading is cogent, then we are in the position to part-
company with Reginster and Leiter on the grounds that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
mode of inquiry is a total critique, and as such the methodology serves a critical 
function. 
   There is one further issue worth pursuing that relates solely to Leiter’s 
formulation of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry. From the foregoing it 
should be clear that Leiter contends that Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives “produce 
a ‘feeling of diminution’ and…‘prepare the way’ for critique;’” they are not 
simultaneously a critique.
31  Nevertheless, Leiter argues that Nietzsche “employs his 
genealogical method in order to critique morality (more precisely, MPS).”
32  The 
subject of the following section will be Leiter’s reasons for this assessment.  More 
pointedly, Leiter offers a version of the genealogical method that takes the form of a 
transcendent critique, and so the subject of the following section is an examination 
and an evaluation of this claim. 
 
2. Leiter:  Genealogy and Transcendent Critique 
 
It has been argued that: “Brian Leiter (2002) offers the most comprehensive 
account of the Genealogy’s contribution to the critique of morality.”
33  Given that, the 
                                                 
31 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 179 
32 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 173 
33 Reginster, Bernard (2006) p. 292 (fn. 36) It is worth noting that Reginster goes on to express a worry 
regarding Leiter’s formulation of Nietzsche’s genealogical method:  “[Leiter’s] account of the 
genealogical method, however, remains somewhat tentative.” On this point Reginster’s is not, as it 
were, a lone voice in the wilderness.  Ken Gemes and Christopher Janaway (2005), in their critical 
review of Leiter’s Nietzsche on Morality, express some reservations regarding Leiter’s characterization 
of the genealogical mode of inquiry (see esp. pp. 736-737).  Aaron Ridley (2005) and David Owen 
(2007) each, respectively, note that Leiter, in order to sustain his interpretation of the genealogical 
mode of inquiry, is forced to usher in “a somewhat desperate tactic” to sidestep the “problem of 
authority,” a tactic which, for both Ridley and Owen, ultimately collapses (Ridley, Aaron 2005 p. 180 
and Owen, David 2007 pp. 132-134).  Though, as noted, many scholars have expressed concerns 
regarding the exegetical cogency of Leiter’s formulation of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry,   17 
aim of this section is to explore Leiter’s contention that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
method functions as a transcendent critique. A transcendent critique operates by 
assessing a framework from a standpoint outside of the world-view under analysis, 
and Leiter is unabashedly committed to the claim that Nietzsche’s critique of morality 
takes this form.  For example, he writes: “…morality is criticized from a broadly 
‘scientific’ and ‘truth-seeking’ standpoint which is not internal to Christian morality, 
but which Christian morality helped produce.”
34  Leiter’s reasons for this assessment 
hang upon what he takes to be the central objective of Nietzsche’s genealogical 
method: “…to free…nascent higher types from their ‘false consciousness,’ i.e. their 
false belief that the dominant morality is, in fact, good for them.”
35  In order to 
achieve this particular objective, Nietzsche’s genealogical method, accordingly, 
proceeds in three stages: (1) Nietzsche demonstrates that the “point of origin of a 
morality has special evidential status as to the effects (or causal powers) of that 
morality, for example, as to whether morality obstructs or promotes human 
flourishing”
36  (2) Nietzsche exposes the pernicious causal powers of morality in the 
pejorative sense, by uncovering the fact that these causal powers belong to the 
“permanent” element of morality.
37 (3) Nietzsche in exposing the effects of adopting 
MPS provides independent reasons, reasons external to MPS, for his target audience, 
the “nascent higher human beings,” to “stand ready to revisit (indeed, revalue) MPS 
given what he has shown them about its origin and its effects.”
38  Thus, Leiter 
concludes that: “…morality is criticized from a broadly ‘scientific’ and ‘truth-
seeking’ standpoint, a standpoint which is not internal to Christian morality…”
39   
This formulation of the functionality of the genealogical mode of inquiry as 
transcendent critique runs into two exegetical difficulties both of which pivot around 
Leiter’s central claim that the causal powers of an evaluative practice belong to the 
permanent element of MPS.  As such, both of these objections hang upon a particular 
reading of Nietzsche’s major point of historical method.  Hence, the place to start is 
with a close examination of Nietzsche’s “major point of historical method” as 
                                                 
there remains neither a systematic reconstruction of Leiter’s conception of how the genealogical mode 
of inquiry is to operate nor a refutation of his formulation.  This section will offer both.  
34 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 175 fn. 7   
35 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 28  
36 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 177 
37 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 178  
38 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 179 
39 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 175 fn. 7   18 
presented in the Second Essay of the Genealogy. In the section that follows I engage 
in a detailed reading of sections twelve and thirteen of the Second Essay, and argue 
that though Leiter’s reading of the passages in question begins with a great deal of 
promise it ultimately succumbs to exegetical confusion thus rendering his claims 
concerning the functionality of the genealogical mode of inquiry unacceptable. 
 
   
2.1. “Stability” in Nietzsche’s Historical Methodology:  Reading GM II 12-13 
 
It is widely assumed that in the Second Essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche 
engages in a discussion of his “major point of historical method,” and that this 
discussion is meant to tell us something about his genealogical methodology, about 
genealogy correctly practiced (GM II 12).  The example Nietzsche uses to elucidate 
his major point of historical method is the concept of punishment. Leiter suggests, and 
I concur, that this discussion is important “primarily for what it tells us about the 
practice of genealogy generally, hence about the genealogy of morality.”
40  Nietzsche 
argues in this section that the recognition that must guide historical inquiry, and his 
genealogical investigations, is “the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual 
utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart” 
(GM II 12).  The salience of this point, as Leiter rightly puts it, is this: 
…the genealogist of punishment does not view the present purpose of 
punishment as having evidential value regarding the origin of punishment:  at 
the point of origin, punishment may have had a wholly other purpose.  Indeed, 
throughout its history, punishment may have had multiple purposes 
(meanings), as appropriated by different peoples and historical epochs, so that 
its present purpose is but the latest ‘functional meaning’ imposed upon the 
practice.
41  
 
In other words, Nietzsche’s methodological point is predicated upon the avoidance of 
the error of “seeking out some ‘purpose’ in punishment, for example, revenge or 
deterrence, then guilelessly plac[ing] this purpose at the beginning as the cause of 
origin” (GM II 12). This methodological error leads the naïve genealogist to deduce 
that the procedure of punishment was invented for the purpose of revenge or 
deterrence; and, in its most circular form, such a methodological blunder yields the 
                                                 
40 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 171 Or, as Leiter puts the point elsewhere, Nietzsche “uses the opportunity to 
articulate (and illustrate via a case study) what is distinctive of genealogy.”   
41 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 169   19 
tautological conclusion “that punishment was devised for punishing” (GM II 12).  
There is another point worth making here, a point absent in Leiter’s assessment of the 
passage: Nietzsche’s reflections on historical methodology serve to expose the error 
of assuming that the “concept” of punishment is stable.  The error is the assumption 
that there is a fixed, stable definition of a concept.  More positively, Nietzsche, here, 
is demonstrating his own anti-essentialist commitments.  In other words, Nietzsche’s 
reflections on the correct practice of history are at the same time a demonstration in 
how to avoid the “essentialist temptation to think there is a ‘concept’ of 
punishment.”
42   
  The omission of Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism, as methodologically relevant, 
leads Leiter to afford the stability of an evaluative practice an elevated status in 
Nietzsche’s historical methodology.  This particular issue arises out of Nietzsche’s 
refinement of his major point of historical method in section thirteen of the Second 
Essay.  There, in returning to the topic of punishment, Nietzsche writes: 
…one must then distinguish in it two sorts of things: first that which is 
relatively permanent in it, the practice, the act, the ‘drama,’ a certain strict 
sequence of procedures; on the other hand that which is fluid in it, the 
meaning, the purpose, the expectation tied to the execution of such procedures 
(GM II 13).
43   
 
Leiter takes this passage to have the following significance: 
 
Genealogy, then, presupposes that its object has a stable or essential 
character—its Brauch—that permits us to individuate it intelligibly over time.  
What the genealogist denies is that this stable element is located in the object’s 
purpose or value or meaning (its Sinn): it is precisely that feature which is 
discontinuous from the point of origin to present-day embodiment.
44 
 
Leiter here curiously changes Nietzsche’s claim regarding the “relative permanence” 
of the practice into a claim concerning the “stable or essential character” of the 
practice.  Where Nietzsche explicitly attributes to the practice a relative permanence 
Leiter, assigns to the practice a stable and essential character, thus morphing 
Nietzsche’s clearly qualified statement into an absolute one.  And this slippage poses 
additional problems at the exegetical level because it forces Leiter to maintain that 
                                                 
42 Ridley, Aaron (1998) p. 111 
43 Following Leiter I have quoted the Cambridge translation. 
44 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 170   20 
only the meaning, “precisely that feature,” is “discontinuous from the point of origin 
to present-day embodiment.”
45    
  Nietzsche’s methodological point, contra Leiter, is that the practice is also 
changeable, though to be sure, to a lesser degree than the meaning or the purpose 
ascribed to the practice.  Hence, for Nietzsche, practices are not absolutely permanent.  
An example may be useful here. Consider the “old German punishments,” or to be 
more precise the old German “practices,” as Nietzsche presents them in the Second 
Essay: “stoning…breaking on the wheel…piercing with stakes, tearing apart or 
trampling by horses... [and] boiling the criminal in oil or wine” (GM II 3). The 
practice of stoning, the strict sequence of procedures associated with stoning, for 
example, has enjoyed relative permanence, though, to be sure, the meanings ascribed 
to the practice have changed dramatically over time.  If we consider the practice of 
boiling the criminal in oil or wine, for example, then we note that the same degree of 
permanence found in the practice of stoning is absent in the latter case. Hence, 
Nietzsche’s claim:  “The form [the custom, the act, the drama, the strict set of 
procedures] is fluid, the meaning even more so” (GM II 12, 13).  In light of 
Nietzsche’s point, Leiter’s assertion that only the meaning is “discontinuous from the 
point of origin to present-day embodiment” is exegetically unsound.
46     
  This particular exegetical confusion has consequences for Leiter’s construal of 
the genealogical method, because it leads him to claim that there is an essentially 
permanent element of MPS that the genealogist is meant to uncover. The candidate 
that Leiter puts forth as the enduring element of MPS is the causal powers, or the 
effects, of adopting this particular evaluative practice. Thus, Leiter claims that 
Nietzsche’s central methodological objective, in conducting his genealogical inquiry, 
is to demonstrate the pernicious causal powers, the insidious effects of adopting MPS 
as an evaluative practice, upon the flourishing of human excellence. And this Leiter 
claims is perfectly consistent with Nietzsche’s historical methodology. A point he 
elucidates as follows: 
This idea—that the origin of MPS sheds evidential light on the causal powers 
of MPS—is still compatible with the genealogical hypothesis that the meaning 
or purpose of morality is fluid over time. The causal powers belong, as it were, 
to the ‘permanent’ element of MPS, but it is perfectly intelligible that some 
objects might have stable causal powers, but very different meaning or value 
                                                 
45 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 171   
46 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 171   21 
for different people at different times.  Thus, for example, the causal powers of 
the sun have been stable over time, yet its ‘meaning’ or ‘purpose’ as 
understood by human beings has been remarkably various.
47 
   
Again, Leiter takes the causal powers, the effects of adopting MPS as an evaluative 
practice, to be stable. And this, in turn, makes sense of Leiter’s analogy. By 
employing the analogy of the sun Leiter’s argument implies that MPS, like the sun, 
possesses constant causal powers, powers that are “stable over time.” Leiter’s reading 
then, at least implicitly, suggests that Nietzsche’s genealogical method seeks to 
uncover, as it were, “the factum brutum,” the stable causal powers, denuded of all 
interpretation (GM III 24).
 48   
  Leiter draws a weak analogy here.  There is a clear difference between the 
sun’s causal powers and the “causal powers” of an evaluative practice, like MPS, for 
example.  The sun possesses stable causal powers independently of the “meaning” or 
“purpose” ascribed to the causal powers by human beings.  In other words, in virtue 
of being a brute natural object, the sun has such “stable causal powers.” An evaluative 
practice, MPS, by contrast, has causal powers only in so far as it is garnished with 
such powers within a system of purposes.  That is to say, it possesses such powers 
only in virtue of the “meanings,” or “purposes” ascribed to the practice within a 
system of purposes. So if, for example, one adopts MPS as a means of judging oneself 
and others, and accordingly judges actions in terms of “the intentional choices of 
actors characterized by freedom of the will,” then this adherence to MPS may 
“causally” prevent one’s flouring if one is a nascent higher human being.
49 Yet, here 
the causal powers are mediated through the meaning ascribed to the practice within 
this system of purposes. Accordingly, an evaluative practice is garnished with stable 
causal powers by human beings, whereas the sun is not.  
Leiter’s version of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry is rendered 
problematic by the account of Nietzsche’s “major point of historical method” that I 
have presented above. Nietzsche explicitly rules out the kind of stability of our 
practices, or the form that Leiter’s formulation of the genealogical method requires.  
                                                 
47 Leiter, Brian (2002) p. 178 
48 It is worth noting that in the Nachlass Nietzsche writes:  “‘Things that have a constitution in 
themselves’—a dogmatic idea with which one must break absolutely” (WP 559).  In the following note 
Nietzsche argues:  “That things possess a constitution in themselves totally apart from interpretation 
and subjectivity is a totally futile hypothesis:  it presupposes that interpretation and subject-being are 
not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing” (WP 560). 
49 Owen, David (2007) p. 69   22 
This claim is evidenced in Nietzsche’s assertion that: “The form is fluid the meaning 
even more so” (GM II 12), as well as by Nietzsche’s claim, previously discussed, that 
the act, the drama, the practice, a strict set of procedures, is only relatively permanent 
(GM II 13).  Rather than suggesting that practices are enduring, Nietzsche is pointing 
to the embededness of our practices within systems of purposes. Understood in terms 
of Nietzsche’s mini-genealogy of punishment the point I want to stress is this: instead 
of attempting to uncover the fundamental causal powers of a practice, a genealogical 
inquiry explores the varying systems of purposes within which the practice has been 
employed and asks: which interests has the practice, of boiling the criminal in oil and 
wine, for example, been made to serve?  Which of the varying systems of purposes, if 
any at all, best serves our interests?  These sorts of genealogical questions remind us 
that practices become welded to particular interests and these interests are in turn 
embedded within a system of purposes. Through his mini-genealogy of punishment 
Nietzsche demonstrates the impossibility of uncovering a singular causal power of a 
practice.  In so doing Nietzsche provides us with the tools to understand how 
throughout the course of history our practices, like the meanings that we ascribe to 
them, have been malleable. If this interpretation is correct, then it seems that a 
genealogical inquiry would yield something rather different then the grand 
proclamation that our practices possess “stable causal powers.” 
In this section I have argued that Nietzsche’s refinement of his historical 
methodology, in section thirteen of the Second Essay, claims that the practice has 
relative permanence whilst the meaning is far more changeable.  I argued that this 
point renders exegetically unsound Leiter’s account of Nietzsche’s major point of 
historical method.  Moreover, I suggested that Leiter’s misreading of Nietzsche’s 
historical methodology makes his account of Nietzsche’s genealogical method 
problematic.  I have not, as of yet, connected these worries up with Leiter’s claim that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical method takes the form of a transcendent critique.  In the 
following section I will elucidate this connection.  In so doing I will argue that Leiter 
is not only mistaken in ascribing to Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry the 
form of a transcendent critique, but I will also suggest that this error leads Leiter to 
conclude that genealogy is an incidental feature of Nietzsche’s critique of morality. 
 
2.2 Nietzsche’s Transcendent Critique of MPS 
     23 
A transcendent critique functions by assessing a framework from a standpoint 
outside of the world-view under analysis, and it is Leiter’s contention that Nietzsche 
mounts such an attack on MPS.  Leiter puts the point this way: “…morality is 
criticized from a broadly ‘scientific’ and ‘truth-seeking’ standpoint which is not 
internal to Christian morality, but which Christian morality helped produce.”
50 For 
Leiter, Nietzsche’s transcendent critique of morality proceeds from the assumption, or 
“the thesis that the causal powers of the object are stable over time.”
51  From this 
thesis Nietzsche, through recourse to the genealogical mode of inquiry, demonstrates 
that MPS has the effect of thwarting the flourishing of human excellence. Or, as 
Leiter claims:  “only the genealogy in conjunction with the thesis that the causal 
powers of an object are stable over time supports the claim that MPS in fact has the 
pernicious effects Nietzsche attributes to it.” Thus, according to Leiter, Nietzsche’s 
genealogical method demonstrates, from a “scientific” or “truth-seeking” standpoint, 
that MPS, in fact, has this particular effect upon the flourishing of nascent higher 
human beings. It is worth noting that because Nietzsche’s objective is to examine 
these pernicious causal effects his genealogical narratives are incidental to his critique 
of MPS.  Hence Leiter writes: “no recourse to the genealogy of MPS is required to 
establish this causal claim.”
52    
  There are two problems with this rendering of Nietzsche’s genealogical 
method.  The first problem stems from Leiter’s claim that the external assumption that 
guides Nietzsche’s transcendent critique is “the thesis that objects possess stable 
causal powers over time.”  This thesis requires clarification.  According to Leiter the 
object that possesses these stable causal powers is the practice of evaluating oneself 
and others.  And this formulation is clearly problematic.  In the previous section I 
argued at length that this formulation runs afoul of Nietzsche’s major point of 
historical method: namely Nietzsche does not attribute to our practices an absolute 
stability.    
The second worry stems from the first problem.  It is Leiter’s contention that 
the genealogy, as a mode of inquiry, is incidental to Nietzsche’s critique of MPS 
because Nietzsche is investigating the “causal powers” of MPS.  And, as such, there 
are many ways in which one could go about investigating such a causal claim. Or, as 
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Leiter puts the point: “An additional virtue of this reading of the connection between 
genealogy and critique is that it explains why Nietzsche describes the genealogy as 
‘one means among many’ towards a critique of morality…”
53 As previously 
discussed, it remains far from clear that Nietzsche takes the genealogical mode of 
inquiry to be “one means among many.”  Rather, one of Nietzsche’s points here 
seems to be that one can methodologically investigate the origins of morality with 
varying degrees of methodological success.  And this is a point Leiter, at least, 
implies in introducing the salient features of the genealogical mode of inquiry.  For 
example, Leiter writes that a genealogical inquiry is “different” from the tracing of a 
family pedigree.  A pedigree is often conducted with the intention to positively 
valorise one’s origins, thus showing that one is of a distinguished origin.  Yet, this 
type of an investigation into origins is not, according to Leiter, a genealogy.  If this is 
correct then it seems that any investigation into the origins of a person, an institution, 
or a practice is not ipso facto a genealogical investigation. After all, one can 
hypothesize about the origins of morality in a variety of distinct ways.  One can, for 
example, claim, along with the “English psychologists” that the present function or 
value picks out the original function or value.  This hypothesis concerning the origin 
of morality, Nietzsche tells us, is naïve (GM I 1-3, GM II 12). Thus, when Nietzsche 
claims that “hypothesizing about the origin or morality” is but “one means among 
many” he is not making the stronger claim that a genealogical inquiry is “one means 
among many.”  
There is one additional point worth making here.  In the Preface Nietzsche 
tells us that “we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves 
must first be called into question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the 
conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they changed and 
evolved” (GM Preface 6). Leiter’s assessment of the genealogical inquiry as 
incidental to Nietzsche’s critique of morality forces him to make the following claim:  
“In fact, as we shall see, ‘need’ is too strong:  a genealogy is one way of getting at the 
critique, but it is not, strictly speaking, necessary for it.”
54 Thus, Leiter concludes that 
Nietzsche overstates his point in arguing that having historical knowledge about the 
“conditions and circumstances in which [our moral values] grew, under which they 
changed and evolved” is essential to his critique of those values.  Yet, if the 
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interpretation of Nietzsche’s Preface that I have offered is cogent, then we need not 
follow Leiter to this undesirable conclusion. 
Given the forgoing we should reject Leiter’s conception of Nietzsche’s 
genealogical method as a form of transcendent critique for three related reasons.  
First, Leiter’s rendering of the genealogical method rests upon a misreading of 
Nietzsche’s major point of historical method.  Second, this particular misreading leads 
Leiter to erroneously conclude that “practices” for Nietzsche are stable or essential. 
And, third, this commitment leads to Leiter’s assessment that the genealogy is an 
incidental feature of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, which is directed solely towards 
those who are predisposed to Nietzsche’s evaluative tastes.  The final clause, no 
doubt, requires clarification, for as mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter the 
intended audience of Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives is a contested issue in the 
secondary literature.  Accordingly, I now turn to an examination and evaluation of 
Leiter’s argument for circumscribing Nietzsche’s intended audience to a handful of 
interlocutors. 
 
2.3 Leiter on Nietzsche’s Audience 
 
Brian Leiter claims: “[Nietzsche] has nothing to say to those readers who 
don’t share his evaluative tastes.”
55 Put slightly differently, he asserts that Nietzsche 
circumscribes “his audience to those who share his evaluative taste:  to those for 
whom no justification would be required, for those who are simply ‘made for it,’ 
‘those whose ears are related to ours,’ who are ‘predisposed and predestined for 
Nietzsche’s insights.”
56  Leiter’s reasons for this assessment are as follows, and I 
quote at length: 
…[Nietzsche] is quite concerned to circumscribe his audience.  As he puts it 
most simply at the beginning of The Antichrist: ‘This book belongs to the very 
few;’ in particular Nietzsche’s ideal reader is marked by ‘Reverence for 
oneself’ (A Pref)—one of the defining traits, he tells us elsewhere, of the 
‘noble’ person (BGE: 287). Similarly, in his autobiography Nietzsche says 
regarding ‘the air of my writings’ that ‘[o]ne must be made for it’ (EH Pref: 
3). He claims, too, that, ‘Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things 
including books, than he already knows (EH III: 1; cf. BGE: 87)…. Now if we 
assume that Nietzsche, in the revaluation, is simply giving expression to the 
evaluative taste of a certain type of person—a ‘higher’ or ‘noble’ 
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person…then it would, indeed, make sense for Nietzsche to want to 
circumscribe his audience to those who share Nietzsche’s evaluative taste, 
those for whom no justification would be required…
57    
 
Leiter’s central thesis is that Nietzsche’s project of re-evaluation simply expresses, or 
brings to the fore, the evaluate taste of a particular type of person, a higher or noble 
person, and given that, he must methodologically circumscribe his audience to those 
who already share his evaluative tastes.  There is without a doubt much textual 
evidence to support Leiter’s argument. Yet, I take it that this evidence may be 
misleading. 
Firstly, there is additional textual evidence, which points to the opposite 
conclusion.  In Book Five of The Gay Science, Nietzsche describes us as “the heirs of 
Europe’s longest and bravest self-overcoming” (GS 357).  We are heirs of this longest 
and bravest self-overcoming insofar as we recognize “…what it was that really 
triumphed over the Christian god:  Christian morality itself, the concept of 
truthfulness that was understood more rigorously, the father confessor’s refinement of 
the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated into scientific conscience, into 
intellectual cleanliness at any price” (GS 357). And in the penultimate section of the 
Genealogy, Nietzsche reiterates the salience of this point as follows: 
All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-
overcoming…In this way Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own 
morality; in the same way Christianity as morality must now perish, too: we 
stand on the threshold of this event.  After Christian truthfulness has drawn its 
most striking inference, its inference against itself; this will happen, however, 
when it poses the question ‘what is the meaning of all will to truth?’…As the 
will to truth thus gains self-consciousness—there can be no doubt of that—
morality will gradually perish now:  this is the great spectacle in a hundred 
acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe—the most terrible, most 
questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all spectacles—(GM III 
27). 
 
Here, Nietzsche is clear:  Christianity is suffering from an incurable internal 
contradiction.  Moreover, the self-overcoming of this internal contradiction is 
manifested in three ways: (1) through the self-overcoming of Christianity as dogma, 
(2) through the self-overcoming of Christian morality, (3) through the self-
overcoming of the belief in the unconditional value of truth.  Thus, this passage 
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suggests that Nietzsche’s target audience is not limited to those who share his 
evaluative tastes.     
Secondly, Nietzsche’s claim that “all things bring about their own destruction” 
is hard to settle with Leiter’s contention that the genealogy, as a mode of inquiry, 
takes the form of a transcendent critique (GM III 27).  Leiter’s staunch and misguided 
commitment to viewing the genealogy as a transcendent critique thus leads him into 
the uncomfortable position of circumscribing Nietzsche’s target audience to those 
who are predestined for Nietzsche’s insights. Leiter’s account of the methodology 
cannot explain Nietzsche’s rendering of the genealogical method as a means which 
can contribute to the “self-overcoming” of Christianity.   
I have argued that in circumscribing Nietzsche’s target audience to a handful 
of predestined interlocutors Leiter’s reading runs into two problems: (1) Leiter’s 
reading cannot account for why Nietzsche, in the Genealogy, contends that the self-
overcoming of morality can be manifested in relationship to the overcoming of at 
least three distinct commitments. And (2) that Leiter’s account cannot adequately 
explain how Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry is meant to contribute to these 
sorts of overcomings.  As a result, it seems that Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries are 
directed to a larger group of interlocutors than solely those who are already 
predestined for his insights. 
At this point it may be useful to begin to sketch a connection between Leiter’s 
formulation of the genealogical mode of inquiry and the account of the methodology 
offered by Raymond Geuss.  Both scholars, despite their ostensibly dissimilar 
accounts, are committed to the claim that there is no exegetical advantage in viewing 
the genealogical mode of inquiry as a kind of pedigree: a topic to which I now turn.  
 
3. Genealogy as Pedigree 
 
There is a debate in the scholarship surrounding whether or not Nietzsche’s 
genealogical mode of inquiry is best seen as a type of pedigree.  As abovementioned 
Leiter and Geuss, despite their differing accounts concerning the functionality of the 
genealogical mode of inquiry, are nevertheless both committed to the claim that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology is radically distinct from the tracing of a 
pedigree.  Hence, in contrast with scholars such as Nickolas Pappas who argue that   28 
Nietzsche’s genealogy “traces the pedigree of modern institutions and practices” and 
Paul Loeb who contends:  
…‘[G]enealogy’ is a kind of ‘history’ of family pedigrees, and it is used to 
determine the legitimacy or value of a person by tracing his line of 
descent…Metaphorically applied to altruistic values, therefore, Nietzsche’s 
notion of genealogy is meant to suggest the history of plebeian ancestry that 
proves their disvalue from an aristocratic standpoint.
 58   
 
both Leiter and Geuss assert that Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry differs in 
every respect from the tracing of a pedigree. Rather than rejecting the commonplace 
equation of genealogy and pedigree out of hand, I argue that there is some exegetical 
advantage in interpreting Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry as a type of pedigree. More 
specifically I argue that for Nietzsche, an important aspect of the genealogical mode 
of inquiry, often overlooked in the secondary literature, is the ability of the 
methodology to assess an ideal in terms of its own internal standards.  Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that in suggesting that one of the most salient features of the 
genealogical exercise is brought to the forefront in viewing the genealogical mode of 
inquiry as a type of pedigree, I am not, at the same time, making the stronger claim 
that Nietzsche’s genealogical exercise should be solely viewed and understood as a 
type of pedigree. 
Leiter’s argument against viewing the shape of Nietzsche’s genealogy as a 
pedigree takes the following form: 
In the standard dictionary definition, ‘genealogy’ is the study of family 
pedigree... In the genealogy of morality, his aim is critical not positive, and he 
is concerned precisely to break the chain of value transmission by showing 
that the value or meaning of the genealogical object is discontinuous over 
time…
59    
 
Whereas Geuss’ argument is premised on a similar assertion:  “Giving a ‘genealogy’ 
is for Nietzsche the exact reverse of what we might call ‘tracing a pedigree.’”
60  As 
such, Geuss elucidates the objectives of a pedigree as follows: 
(1) In the interests of a positive valorization of some item (2) the pedigree, 
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starting from a singular origin (3) which is an actual source of value (4) traces 
an unbroken line of succession from the origin to that item (5) by a series of 
steps that preserves whatever value is in question.
61 
 
Thus, both Leiter and Geuss conclude that the genealogical mode of inquiry forbids 
any direct inference from the point of origins to the current value. To suggest 
otherwise, they rightly contend, would violate Nietzsche’s major point of historical 
method. Consequently, they argue that Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry is distinct 
from the tracking of a pedigree. 
Despite the obvious merits of these formulations I will nevertheless suggest 
that we should be careful in hastily dismissing the explanatory power of an analogous 
connection between a certain type of pedigree, and Nietzsche’s methodological aims.  
An example may be useful here.  Suppose a person attempts to claim the estate of a 
deceased, albeit estranged, relative.  In order to claim the right to the property that 
person needs to demonstrate a very specific linkage.  In this case, due to the elevated 
position the person is claiming, and in order to be held as a proper candidate for the 
assets, the tracing of a pedigree, i.e. being a legitimate heir, is crucially important.  If 
their pedigree is found suspect, then as a result, they have no right to the property. 
Similarly, Christianity professes an esteemed pedigree. The claim to a revered 
pedigree is manifested in the assertion that “…the things of the highest value must 
have another, peculiar origin—they cannot be derived from this transitory, seductive, 
deceptive, paltry world, from this turmoil of delusion and lust” (BGE 2).  Nietzsche 
undermines this self-proclaimed position by demonstrating the conditional and 
contingent circumstances from which it arose. By tracing the pedigree that 
Christianity has claimed for itself, Nietzsche demonstrates that the appropriation of an 
esteemed origin is unwarranted.  Nietzsche challenges the presumption that “…the 
higher must not be allowed to grow out of the lower, must not be allowed to have 
grown at all…Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui.  Origin in 
something else counts as an objection, as casting a doubt on value” (TI ‘Reason’ 4). 
As such, Nietzsche seizes upon the pedigree that Christianity has offered in order to 
legitimize itself and thus mounts an immanent critique of the framework.   
Given the foregoing it should be clear that viewing the genealogical mode of 
inquiry as elucidating a certain type of pedigree has a limited explanatory power.  To 
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be clear, the particular pedigree that is traced is not one Nietzsche himself offers.  
Rather, Nietzsche explores the pedigree offered by Christianity to disvalue the 
privileged claims it offers in order to legitimize itself.  In this way, Nietzsche can be 
seen as calling into question the pedigree, the authoritative backing, immanent to a 
particular system of purposes.  The tracing of this particular kind of pedigree is an 
essential component of Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry. 
There is one further issue worth exploring here that pertains solely to Geuss’ 
formulation of the genealogical mode of inquiry.  Geuss’ dismissal of the explanatory 
power of the particular kind of pedigree elucidated above, leads him to exclude as 
methodologically relevant, the authority upon which a particular system of purposes 
presents itself as based.   Geuss makes the following set of claims: 
To be sure a genealogy can undermine various beliefs about the origins of 
different forms of valuation.  If I have a certain form of valuation I may need 
to believe certain things—if I am a Christian I may need to believe certain 
things about the origin of Christian forms of valuation. So if those beliefs are 
undermined, I may feel my values undermined, too, but this is as it were my 
problem, not part of the intention of the genealogy.”
62   
 
Geuss sketches the salience of this methodological point as follows: 
 
It is a particular and idiosyncratic problem of Christianity that it cultivates 
truthfulness and introspection and is a form of valuation which requires its 
devotees to make claims and have beliefs that won’t stand up to truthful 
introspective scrutiny (such as that moral actions arise from altruistic sources).  
This means that Christianity dissolves itself (GM III. 27, FW §357) and 
Nietzsche’s genealogy will contribute to that process.
63 
 
There are two problems with this rendering of the genealogy as a mode of inquiry.  
First, Geuss limits the scope of Nietzsche’s target audience to those who profess a 
faith in Christian morality. Nietzsche’s target audience, to be sure, includes the 
Christians, but it also includes those who profess a faith in Christian morality without 
the attending faith in a Christian God as well as those who have faith in the 
unconditional value of truth. Second, the power of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of 
inquiry lies in its ability to call into question such systems of purposes.  And one way 
in which Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry can achieve this methodological 
aim is to question the authority upon which a particular institution presents itself as 
based.   In other words it is my contention that the undermining of our inherited 
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values is an intention of the genealogical mode of inquiry and moreover that the 
genealogy may succeed in this endeavor. Or, as Ruth Abbey puts the point: “Geuss 
claims that the exposure of origins is irrelevant to Nietzsche’s assessment of the value 
of goods, it seems [contra-Geuss] that the power of the genealogy to loosen the hold 
of values will depend upon how any morality presents itself, how it gives itself 
authority.”
64 The authority upon which a particular institution presents itself as based 
is of tremendous importance to Nietzsche’s genealogical exercise.  Bernard Williams, 
for example, writes: 
…a genealogy in terms of actual history is almost bound to be critical to some 
extent…The idea…that the concepts or values under explanation are likely to 
claim an authority which rejects the appearance of contingency, and so resist 
being explained in real terms at all.  But this is true to a greater extent of some 
values and institutions than others.  As Nietzsche remorselessly pointed out, it 
is true to a much greater extent of the morality system than of other ethical 
formulations, because of its desperate need to be self-sufficient.
65  
  
Accordingly, Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry can be seen as a kind of 
pedigree in the following sense:  Nietzsche calls into question the authority upon 
which a particular system of evaluation operates.  Moreover, he challenges the notion 
that such systems of purposes are self-sufficient, which is evidenced in their claims to 
a distinguished origin: that “…everything of the first rank must be causa sui” (TI 
‘Reason’ 4). Thus, a central aspect of the genealogy as a mode of inquiry is explained 
through recourse to the explanatory power of this particular kind of pedigree.   
  There is one further issue that deserves some critical reflection.  Geuss argues 
that genealogy is critique: a claim I support.   Yet, the manner in which Geuss 
unpacks the claim leaves something to be desired.  In the next section, through a 
description and an evaluation of Geuss’ argument, I substantiate this claim. 
 
4. Geuss:  Genealogy as Critique 
 
Geuss claims that the genealogical mode of inquiry serves a critical function.  
The objective of Geuss’ investigation is to discern precisely which form of critique 
genealogy as methodology takes.  Geuss begins by formulating three “basic types of 
critique:” (1) the ordinary everyday use of the term critique, (2) the Kantian form of 
                                                 
64  Abbey, Ruth (2000) p. 6  
65 Williams, Bernard (2000) p. 159   32 
critique, and (3) critique as a way of “problematising something” or as “putting into 
question.”
66   He concludes by arguing that the genealogical mode of inquiry takes the 
form of a problematising critique, and that it is Foucault’s use of the method of 
genealogy that most directly exemplifies the critical function of the methodology.  
Thus, Geuss contends it is in the work of Foucault, rather than that of Nietzsche, that 
we witness the uncompromising and immanent critique that ultimately overcomes the 
Kantian formulation of critique.   After explicating and reconstructing the three forms 
of critique abovementioned I argue that Geuss is correct to conclude that Nietzsche’s 
genealogical mode of inquiry takes the form of a problematising, or immanent, 
critique, yet his predilection for the Foucaldian critique is rendered, at best, tenuous. 
 
4.1 The Everyday Use of Critique 
 
Geuss argues that the term critique when employed in conventional parlance 
possesses an  “unambiguously negative connotation.”
67 When one is critical in this 
general sense, one must be engaged in an activity of nay saying.  Further, one must 
provide reasons for one’s rejection of a particular position, and these reasons, Geuss 
contends, are language-game specific. This differentiates the justification of a 
position, which includes the presentation of positive reasons, from the critique of a 
given position, which is the presentation of negative reasons or grounds.
68 Geuss 
contends that Nietzsche’s genealogy, as a mode of critical reflection, does not take 
this form of critique.  He substantiates this assertion by referring us to the first section 
of Book Four of The Gay Science where Nietzsche asserts that:  “Let looking away be 
my only negation!...for I wish only, one day, simply to be a Yes-sayer” (GS 276).
69  
Here, it is worth noting that it is far from obvious that Nietzsche is adopting the 
sustained methodological objective of looking away as his only viable mode of 
negation.  
Nevertheless, I take it that Geuss’ point is that the genealogical mode of 
inquiry as a form of critique is more nuanced than the everyday use of the term 
implies.  Geuss puts the point in this way:  “A genealogy is …not a critique in the 
everyday sense…it does not automatically imply the rejection of what is subjected to 
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genealogical analysis.”
70 As such a genealogical investigation is not ispo facto a 
critical exercise.  To suggest otherwise, Geuss contends, would “conceal the relevant 
genealogical questions.”
71  In other words, to view the genealogical mode of inquiry 
as solely a critical enterprise would obscure an important feature of the methodology:  
that of calling into question particular systems of purposes by investigating why 
particular concepts, such as “‘contrition,’ ‘sin,’ ‘punishment,’ and ‘church’ come to 
be binding and universally applied…” within a particular framework.
72 Geuss 
concludes that genealogy does not take the form of critique in this everyday sense, 
and he explores a second option, which he again renders implausible. 
 
4.2 The Kantian Critique 
    
  Geuss concludes his argument regarding the tenability of viewing the 
genealogical mode of inquiry as taking the form of Kant’s transcendental critique in 
this way: “…the programme of transcendental grounding is obsolete and should 
therefore be abandoned.”
73  This claim is substantiated by the following analysis of 
the Kantian formulation of the objectives of critique: 
Kant believed that there was nothing of relevance outside the competence of 
pure reason, that it was impossible to undermine reason itself by calling it into 
question; or more precisely:  that the very attempt to do so would logically 
lead to the sort of transcendental reflection that reveals the absolute and 
universal validity of the rationality implied in science, morality and the 
associated language game of grounding and justification.
74 
 
Geuss contends that the Kantian critique reifies the value of reason by establishing the 
transcendental conditions by which reason is universally valuable within the systems 
of science and morality.  Given that Geuss’ objective in the essay is to illuminate 
Foucault’s objection to the Kantian mode of critique, and to post-Kantian uses of this 
mode of critique, he is silent concerning Nietzsche’s opposition.  I propose the 
following reconstruction on his behalf. 
  In the Preface of the First Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
elucidates his objectives as follows: 
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…to call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, 
that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason 
its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic 
decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws.  This 
tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason.
75   
 
Accordingly, Kant’s aim is to employ the methodology of critique by placing reason 
before the court of reason itself, in order to accomplish the most difficult of all its 
undertakings:  the task of self-knowledge. In employing this methodology Kant is in 
the position to dismiss “all groundless pretensions” and “despotic decrees” and is 
able, more positively, to determine the limits and the scope of reason. Of his 
methodology, Kant tells us: 
…[I]t is nothing but the inventory of all our possessions through pure reason, 
systematically arranged.  In this field nothing can escape us.  What reason 
produces entirely out of itself cannot be concealed, but is brought to light by 
reason itself immediately the common principle has been discovered.
76 
 
The critique of reason, by pure reason, is a total critique insofar as “nothing can 
escape” its field of inquiry, and immanent, insofar as the critique of pure reason is 
entirely of itself and by itself.  For Kant, critique is intended to be both immanent and 
total.  And the treatise, itself, is presented as a “treatise on the method.”
77  Yet, I argue 
that Nietzsche takes issue with the methodology of Kant’s critique on both fronts, and 
contends that Kant failed to usher in both an immanent and a total critique. 
  If Kant fails to usher in an immanent critique, then the obvious question to ask 
is:  On what grounds does his project fail? To begin to sketch an answer to this 
question we would do well to look to the 1886 Preface to Daybreak, where Nietzsche 
poses a set of questions: “…[I]s it not peculiar to demand of an instrument that it 
should criticise it own usefulness and suitability? That the intellect should ‘know’ its 
own value, its own capacity, its own limitations?  Was it not even a little absurd?” (D 
P 3)  Paradoxically, Nietzsche points out, the faculty of reason is incapable of 
accomplishing “the most difficult of all its tasks,” as set by Kant. Kant makes reason, 
as Deleuze puts it: “both the tribunal and the accused; [he constitutes reason] as judge 
and plaintiff, judging and judged.”
78 In other words, for Deleuze: 
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Kant lacked a method which permitted reason to be judged from the inside 
without giving it the task of being its own judge.  And, in fact, Kant doesn’t 
realize his project of immanent critique.  Transcendental philosophy discovers 
conditions which still remain external to the conditioned.  Transcendental 
conditions are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis.
79   
 
Kant’s project of formulating an immanent critique fails because he lacks the method 
that would provide him with the framework within which he could call into question 
the value of values immanent to a particular system of purposes.  Or, as Nietzsche 
puts the point, the instrument of reason that Kant employs is “an 
instrument…incapable of judging itself” (D P 3). 
  Accordingly, the second point of contention grows out of the first.  Kant’s 
inability to judge competing claims based upon reasons immanent to a system of 
purposes leads him to fail to usher in a total critique. The problem, according to 
Nietzsche, is that Kant’s methodology does not permit him to call into question the 
value of our moral values: “There are questions in which man is not entitled to a 
decision about truth and untruth; all the highest questions, all the highest value 
problems, lie beyond human reason ... To comprehend the limits of reason—that alone 
is truly philosophy...” (AC 56)   In other words, the lack of a methodology that 
permits him to call into question claims immanent to a system of purposes forces Kant 
to reify the value of entrenched values.  In so doing Kant fails to achieve a total 
critique.  Deleuze puts the point in the following way: 
Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception 
which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to 
knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force 
which should be brought to bear on all claims of morality, but not on morality 
itself.
80  
 
In taking the “value of these ‘values’ as given, as factual, as beyond all question…” 
Kant reifies the value of truth, knowledge and morality “in support of popular 
prejudice” (GM P 6, GS 193).  More pointedly, for Kant, and all “metaphysicians,” 
this prejudice is expressed, philosophically, in the presupposition that “the things of 
the highest value must have another peculiar origin—they cannot be derived form this 
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transitory, seductive, deceptive, paltry world…Rather from the lap of Being, the 
intransitory, the hidden god, the ‘thing-in-itself’—there must be their basis, and 
nowhere else” (BGE 2).  For Nietzsche, the failure of the Kantian project lies in 
Kant’s inability to usher in a total critique because of a failure to question the value of 
our values.  Nietzsche, by contrast, calls into question “the value of these values” and 
hence formulates a total critique (GM P 6). 
  For Nietzsche, Kant’s greatest of tasks, the task of self-knowledge, remains to 
be completed—“we are unknown to ourselves we men of knowledge” (GM P 1).
81  In 
failing to call into question the value of knowledge, truth, and morality, Kant, at the 
same time, fails to ask the types of questions that, in their harvest, may yield such 
knowledge.  In order to achieve self-knowledge we need a total critique, for we must 
call into question the value of our esteemed values by tracing the living 
crystallizations of the very systems of purposes through which we have made sense of 
ourselves.  In other words, Nietzsche conceives of critique as both immanent and 
total.    
  The foregoing has been an aside.  A departure that, I hope, has served to lend 
credence to Geuss’ contention that Nietzsche’s critique is markedly distinct from 
Kant’s implementation of critique.  If the foregoing is cogent, then we are in the 
position to follow Geuss in examining the final mode of critique: a problematising 
critique. 
 
4.3 The Problematising Critique 
 
                                                 
81 For example in Daybreak Nietzsche writes; 
….under the appearance of attaining a full and final knowledge of the past, the movement as a 
whole set in general below feeling and –in the words Kant employed to designate his own 
task—‘again paved the way for faith by showing knowledge its limitations.’ Let us breath 
freely again: the hour of danger has passed! And strange: it is precisely the spirits the 
Germans so eloquently conjured up which have in the long run most thwarted the intentions of 
their conjurers—after appearing for a time as ancillaries of the spirit of obscurantism and 
reaction, the study of history, understanding of origins and evolutions, empathy for the past, 
newly aroused passion for feeling and knowledge one day assumed a new nature and now fly 
on the broadest wings above any beyond their former conjurers as new and stronger genii of 
that very Enlightenment against which they were first conjured up.  This Enlightenment we 
must now carry forward…(D 197)  
Here Nietzsche is claiming that the project of the Enlightenment must be carried a step further by the 
correct application of the history, and the study of origins and evolutions.  In light of our discussion, it 
may be added, that in order to “fly on the broadest wings above and beyond [the] former conjurers,” we 
need both an historical knowledge of the circumstances under which our values changed, an historical 
knowledge, and a total critique, which calls into question the value of our most esteemed values. 
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  The term “problematising” refers “to the specific ways in which a topic is 
constituted as an issue for reflection and action within particular systems of 
judgments.”
82 A problematising critique operates by identifying the system of 
purposes that consequently furnishes an issue with meaning.  Geuss puts the point this 
way: “the principle targets of this problematising approach are the apparently self-
evident assumptions of a given form of life and the (supposedly) natural or inevitable 
and unchangeable character of given identities.”
83  The problematising approach may 
thus be understood as a means of conducting an immanent critique of a given 
framework by challenging the seemingly “inevitable and unchangeable” self-evident 
assumptions immanent to that system.  
  Geuss provides us with the following example.  Consider the Ecclesiastical 
Court of the Middle Ages.  The success of such courts depended upon the functioning 
of a range of beliefs regarded, at the time, as self-evident: the absolute truth of the 
Christian Gospel and its saving message; the necessary division of all human beings 
as Orthodox Christians (proper Catholics) as Heretics, or as Pagans.  Geuss points out 
that traditional theistic philosophical discussion, whether critical or Apologetic, 
investigates the truth or the potential justification of the traditional Christian doctrine 
and this is “to tacitly presuppose something like Christianity already exists as unified 
and internally coherent.”
84  This obscures the relevant genealogical question: how did 
these assumptions come to be universally binding?
85   
Further Geuss argues that Foucault’s work exemplifies the genealogical 
method as a form of problematising critique.  Foucault is concerned with arguing that 
“x is dangerous” rather than “x is bad” or “x is false,” and, further, Geuss finds this to 
be far superior to the Nietzschean recommendation of “looking away.”
86 Geuss states:   
The dangerous is what we must pre-eminently concentrate attention upon, 
what we must before all else take care to consider.  The dangerous can indeed 
be attractive or even valuable, but in cases of acute danger the aforementioned 
Nietzschean attitude of ‘looking away’ is not always the best strategy.  
Genealogy as pursued by Foucault, on the other hand, is a way of 
concentrating attention on a given situation in the context of an imminent 
danger.
87   
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Here, Geuss concludes that Nietzsche’s proclamation found within Book Four of The 
Gay Science is an expression of his sustained methodological objectives and he 
further contends that this renders the Foucauldian application of the methodology 
superior to the Nietzschean use of the mode of inquiry.    
However, it is far from clear that Nietzsche in the Genealogy is recommending 
a “looking away” stance towards the troubles of modernity.  Recall, Geuss’ 
assessment of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry rests upon Nietzsche’s 
pronouncement that “looking away” shall be his only negation.  I quote the passage, 
which is entitled “For the New Year,” at length: 
    Today everyone permits himself the expression of his wish and his dearest 
thought; hence I, too, shall say what it is that I wish for myself today, and 
what was the first thought to run across my heart this year—what thought shall 
be for me the reason, warranty, and sweetness of my life henceforth.  I want to 
learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in all things; then I 
shall be one of those who makes things beautiful.  Amor fati:  let that be my 
love henceforth!  I do not want to wage war against what is ugly.  I do not 
want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse.  Looking away 
shall be my only negation.  And all in all and on the whole:  some day I wish 
to be only a Yes-sayer (GS 276).    
 
Perhaps the first thing that strikes the reader of this passage is the very intimate 
expression of Nietzsche’s resolution: he aims, at the dawn of a new year, to let 
“looking away be his only negation.” In spite of this ambition and his pronouncement 
that he does “not want to wage war against what is ugly.  [He does] not want to 
accuse…[not even]…those who accuse,” Nietzsche does “wage war against what is 
ugly” in his subsequent books.  Nietzsche calls Twilight of the Idols a “grand 
declaration of war” and in Ecce Homo, he tells us:  “I am warlike.  To attack is among 
my instincts…to attack is with me a proof of good will” (TI Forward, EH “Why I Am 
So Wise” 7). Lastly, in Ecce Homo, amid a discussion of Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche informs us that:   
The task for the years that followed now was indicated as clear as possible.  
After the Yes-Saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for 
the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great 
war—conjuring up a day of decision (EH ‘BGE’ 1). 
 
Though Nietzsche sought to, “some day,” “let looking away be [his] only negation” it 
is clear that this is not a sustained methodological aim. Michael Tanner puts the point 
this way:     39 
…that Nietzsche, our arch-diagnostician, could never look way, and that we 
would have lost much of his most valuable writing if he had, does something 
to mitigate the accusation that he never became only a Yes-sayer, and the fact 
that three of his last five books are attacks, two on Wagner and one on Christ, 
the only affirmative one about himself.
88   
 
As Tanner’s point makes clear the extraordinary emphasis that Geuss places on the 
pronouncement that “looking away” shall be Nietzsche’s only “negation” is 
misplaced, as this is not Nietzsche’s sustained methodological objective.  Given the 
foregoing we can conclude that Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry takes the 
form of a problematising, or immanent critique, and that Geuss’ predilection for the 
Foucauldian critique rests upon a misreading of Nietzsche’s sustained methodological 
objectives.     
 
5. Conclusion 
 
  In exploring the vast terrain of contemporary Nietzsche scholarship, guided by 
the work of Bernard Reginster, Brian Leiter and Raymond Geuss, it is clear that there 
is much debate concerning the import, functionality and projected audience of 
Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives.  In an attempt to map out the territory within 
which these debates occur I have highlighted some of the responses to the most 
relevant questions that arise when considering Nietzsche’s methodology, and 
throughout this chapter I have examined and offered correctives to the work of these 
scholars. For example, I argued that Geuss is correct in asserting that the Nietzsche’s 
genealogical mode of inquiry takes the form of a critique and furthermore he is 
correct to note that the mode of critique is a problematising, or an immanent critique 
which can criticize particular entrenched narratives. Nevertheless, I argued that 
Geuss’ formulation of the genealogical mode of inquiry stumbles over two hurdles.  
The first, and perhaps more minor falter occurs when Geuss states that Nietzsche’s 
sustained methodological objective is to let looking away be his only negation, and 
hence Geuss opts to for the Foucaludian critique as the paradigmatic example of a 
probematising critique. The second slip occurs when Geuss circumscribes Nietzsche’s 
target audience to those who believe in the Christian God. Whereas, to be sure 
Nietzsche’s projected audience includes the Christian it also includes a larger set of 
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interlocutors than solely the Christian.  Similarly, contra Leiter, I argued that 
Nietzsche’s target audience is not limited to those who share his evaluative tastes. 
Further, I argued that Leiter is also mistaken about the functionality of Nietzsche’s 
genealogical mode of inquiry insofar as Leiter’s rendering of the genealogical method 
rests upon a misreading of Nietzsche’s major point of historical method.  This 
misreading leads Leiter to erroneously conclude that “practices” for Nietzsche are 
stable or essential.  Thus, Geuss’ and Leiter’s respective formulations of the 
genealogical mode of inquiry fail to present the methodology with its most cogent 
formulation.  
If the foregoing analysis of these respective positions is cogent, then the 
central questions, which arise when considering Nietzsche’s genealogical method, 
still await suitable answers.  Chapter two will be devoted to presenting a conception 
of the methodology that avoids the pitfalls described above by providing another set 
of answers to the fundamental questions which arise when considering the 
methodology.  
      41 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Genealogy as Critique 
 
Nietzsche is not the first philosopher to engage in critique, nor is he, as he 
makes clear, the first philosopher to take up the task of conducting a genealogy of 
morals.
89  Though, at least in his estimation, his methodology breaks in decisive ways 
from the attempts made by his predecessors.  The objective of this chapter is to also 
break with the accounts of the genealogical mode of inquiry offered in the first 
chapter. In so doing I argue that the functionality of the methodology may be cashed 
out as a form of immanent critique, and the target audience of Nietzsche’s reflections 
capture a wide-ranging set of interlocutors.  Accordingly, the argument of this chapter 
is presented in two parts. First I present my account of Nietzsche’s genealogical mode 
of inquiry and argue that it takes the form of an immanent critique. Second I argue 
that given the embeddedness of an immanent critique, that is the intimate relationship 
between this mode of critique and the system that it criticizes, one must be mindful of 
Nietzsche’s audience.  In other words, if an immanent critique functions by assessing 
a framework in terms of its own internal standards, then delimiting the framework 
under analysis is of methodological relevance.  As a result, I conduct a “typology of 
the faithful” in order to elucidate the ways in which Nietzsche aims his critical work 
towards the systems of belief and faith held by, at least, three distinct groups.   
It may be useful at this juncture to briefly say something about how I employ 
the concepts of “transcendent critique” and “immanent critique.”  As previously 
discussed, in chapter one, a transcendent critique judges the position under analysis by 
an external benchmark.  Transcendent criticism “attacks a theory from without, 
proceeding from assumptions or presuppositions which are foreign to the theory 
                                                 
89 Amidst a lengthy discussion of Nietzsche’s style Michel Haar, for example, writes that the 
genealogical mode of inquiry is  “[the] critical method discovered by Nietzsche himself…” (p. 7).  Yet, 
this assessment, I take it, is too strong. Nietzsche references the naïve genealogists throughout the 
Genealogy, so, if there are such “naïve genealogists”, then it stands to reason that there is a 
genealogical method that they employ naively.  See for example (GM I 1-2), (GM II 4), and (GM II 12-
13).  Further Nietzsche, in the Preface, claims “The first impulse to publish something of my 
hypothesis concerning the origin of morality was given my by a clear, tidy, and shrewd—also 
precocious—little book in which I encountered for the first time an upside-down and perverse species 
of genealogical hypothesis…” (GM P 4)  Here Nietzsche discusses Paul Rée’s The Origin of Moral 
Sensations.  He points out that Rée is guilty of formulating an “upside-down” genealogical hypothesis, 
and that his methodology is intended to improve upon Rée’s formulation:  “…to [perhaps] replace the 
improbable with the more probable…” (GM P 4).   42 
criticized.”
90 Methodologically a transcendent critique can proceed by either: (1) 
rejecting the premises or the assumptions of a given position because a criterion 
outside the framework demonstrates that one or more of the premises is false, or (2) 
claiming that the conclusion of a given framework is unacceptable. And, as I 
mentioned in chapter one, Brian Leiter advocates the latter formulation of external 
critique as representative of Nietzsche’s methodological objectives, insofar as he 
insists that Nietzsche judges, from a position outside of Christian morality, that 
Christian morality has insidious effects upon the flourishing of higher human beings.
91   
As the term immanence suggests reference only to what exists, similarly, 
immanent critique maintains that the basis of criticism is contained within that which 
is criticized. Hence, immanent critique draws its resources from within the framework 
under analysis.  Karl Popper effectively describes the objectives of immanent critique 
in arguing: 
…the theory under analysis is not merely a system of assumptions, dogmas, 
conjectures, or what not; it is an attempt to solve a problem.  Therefore it can 
be immanently criticized as, for example failing to solve its problems, or 
succeeding no better than its competitors, or as merely shifting the problem 
solved, etc.
92 
 
Drawing on Popper’s explanation concerning the shape of immanent critique, I take 
the form of Nietzsche’s immanent critique to proceed in two stages.  First, Nietzsche 
seeks to identify the basic propositions or assumptions that are taken as fundamental 
within a specific world-view or an actual system of purposes. As such an immanent 
critique traces the contingent historical formulation of the institution under analysis.
93  
Second, Nietzsche evaluates the system of purposes, judging it by its own explicit or 
implicit standards.  Nietzsche attempts to demonstrate the inadequacies or 
contradictions within the particular system of purposes in question, thereby Nietzsche 
seeks to destabilize the system of purposes under analysis.  In the sections that follow 
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93 Against this particular methodological objective John Richardson (1996), for example, argues: “This 
is not how Nietzsche mostly and most tellingly carries out such critique (exposes a view as a ‘mere 
perspective’)” (p. 290).  I want to be clear: in stating that one element of a successful immanent 
critique is to demonstrate the historically contingent formulation of a systems of purposes which claims 
for itself a special epistemic status I am not suggesting that this stage is the only aspect of an immanent 
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I elucidate how Nietzsche’s immanent critique of morality functions, how it takes this 
particular form, and to whom Nietzsche’s remarks may be intended. 
 
2. The Euthanasia of Christianity (D 92) 
 
Nietzsche is clear that the dominant mode of evaluation is losing its grip on us. 
The prevailing picture by which we have made sense of ourselves is on its last legs, 
and in Daybreak Nietzsche takes us to the “deathbed of Christianity:”  
Really active people are now inwardly without Christianity, and the more 
moderate and reflective people of the intellectual middle class now possess 
only an adapted, that is to say a marvellously simplified Christianity.  A god 
who in his love arranges everything in a manner that will in the end be best for 
us; a god who gives to us and takes from us our virtue and our happiness, so 
that as a whole all is meet and fit and there is no reason for us to take life 
sadly, let alone to exclaim against it; in short, resignation and modest demands 
elevated to godhead—that is the best and most vital thing that still remains of 
Christianity.  But one should notice that Christianity has thus crossed over into 
a gentle moralism:  it is not so much ‘God, freedom, and immortality’ that 
have remained, as benevolence and decency of disposition will prevail: it is 
the euthanasia of Christianity (D 92). 
 
According to Nietzsche we are witnessing a shift.  The benchmark constructs of 
Christianity are shifting from the metaphysical commitments to “God, freedom and 
immortality”
94 into a kind of gentle moralism with its correlative commitments to 
benevolence and to decency of disposition. The euthanasia of Christianity consists in 
abandoning the metaphysical commitment to the Christian God and forsaking the 
consequent metaphysical commitments of freedom and immortality of the soul, while 
nevertheless remaining steadfastly committed to the benchmark virtues of Christian 
morality: the modest demands of resignation, benevolence, and decency of 
disposition. So here, Nietzsche is aiding in the mercy killing of a framework that is 
                                                 
94 Nietzsche here is referencing Kant’s claim that moral behavior requires the res fidei “God, freedom 
and immortality.”  In the Third Critique Kant (1987) puts the point thus:   
“As for objects that we have to think a priori (either as consequences or as grounds) in 
reference to our practical use of reason in conformity with duty, but that are transcendent for 
the theoretical use of reason: they are mere matters of faith.  One such object is the highest 
good in the world that we are able to achieve through freedom.  We cannot prove the concept 
of this good, as to whether it has objective reality, in any experience that is possible for us, 
and hence adequately for the theoretical use of reason.  But since practical pure reason 
commands us to use this concept in order to achieve that purpose as best we can, we must 
assume it as possible.  This commanded effect, together with the sole conditions conceivable 
by us under which that effect is possible, namely, the existence of God and the immortality of 
the soul, are matters of faith (res fidei), and they are moreover the only objects whatsoever 
that can be called matters of faith.” p. 362 (469)   44 
already itself diseased and dying by pointing out that the authoritative backing of our 
gentle moralism is no longer viable. In Daybreak Nietzsche forewarns us: Christianity 
is suffering from an incurable internal contradiction.   
By Book Three of The Gay Science the euthanasia of Christianity is complete: 
“God is dead” (GS 108,125). The passing, however, goes oddly unlamented (GS 125).  
Though “the madman’s” interlocutors have themselves “wiped away the entire 
horizon,” and “unchained the earth from its sun” the magnitude and profundity of the 
killing remains unappreciated. The atheists, the “madman’s” interlocutors, remain 
unreservedly committed to making sense of themselves by reference to a boundary 
that no longer exists. They have failed to acknowledge the profundity of the 
momentous historical and cultural event.  In Book Five of The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
teases out the implications of this passing.  There, he alerts us to the fact that the 
primary animating force in the culture of Western societies has become 
“unbelievable:”  
The greatest recent event—that ‘God is dead,’ that belief in the Christian god 
has become unbelievable—is already beginning to cast its first shadows over 
Europe. For the few at least, whose eyes—the suspicion in whose eyes is 
strong and subtle enough for this spectacle, some suns have set and some 
ancient and profound trust has been turned into doubt…But in the main one 
may say:  The event itself is far too great, too distant, too remote from the 
multitude’s capacity for comprehension even for the tidings of it to be thought 
of as having arrived as yet.  Much less may one suppose that many people 
know as yet what this event really means—and how much must collapse now 
that this faith has been undermined because it was built upon this faith, 
propped up by it, grown on it; for example, the whole of European morality.  
This long plenitude and sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin, and 
cataclysm that is now impeding—who could guess enough of it today to be 
compelled to play the teacher and advance proclaimer of this monstrous logic 
of terror, the prophet of a gloom and an eclipse of the sun whose like has 
probably never yet occurred on earth? (GS 343)  
 
It is the crisis of legitimacy, the loss of transcendent authority, which in its wake 
leaves behind a bankrupt model of self-understanding.  So it is not only the authority 
but also the content of morality that must be reconsidered.   Christoph Cox puts it 
best:  “…we soon learn that this event is not brought about from the outside, by some 
external cataclysm; nor is it some chance occurrence.  Rather, the ‘momentous logic 
of terror’ set in motion by the ‘death of God’ is brought about from the inside,   45 
through a critique necessitated by the very presuppositions of European thought.”
95 In 
Ecce Homo, Nietzsche calls this process “the self-overcoming of morality, out of 
truthfulness…” (EH ‘Destiny’ 3).  
  Given the foregoing we are in the position to consider how Christianity 
emerged and took hold as the dominant framework. Nietzsche tells us that 
methodologically: “In former times, one sought to prove that there is no God – today 
one indicates how the belief that there is a God could arise and how this belief 
acquired its weight and importance: a counter-proof that there is no God thereby 
becomes superfluous” (D 95). Through a typology of morals Nietzsche seeks to 
demonstrate how the dominant framework acquired its weight and importance, 
because as he claims: “One cannot refute Christianity; one cannot refute a disease of 
the eye” (CW “Epilogue”). Accordingly, I turn now to an examination of Nietzsche’s 
typology of morals. 
 
2.1 A Typology of Morals 
 
Nietzsche disentangles the worldviews, the systems of ideas, or the systems of 
purposes that have most distinctly shaped our self-understanding by offering a 
typology of morals. In order to ground the claim that “morality is only an 
interpretation of certain phenomena, more precisely a misinterpretation,” Nietzsche 
seeks to unsettle the view that Christian morality is the only type of morality (TI 
‘Improvers’ 1). However, the roots of this interpretation are mature and as such 
tangled.  They are knotted by the subtle and complex changes in valuation over the 
course of two thousand years.  Thus, in order to disentangle them and to draw out the 
most recurrent forms of valuation, Nietzsche engages in what he labels a typology of 
morals.  The first hint of this methodological objective is in Human All Too Human 
(HH 45),
96 though it finds its most forceful articulation in Beyond Good and Evil 
where Nietzsche argues: 
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96 There Nietzsche writes:  
Twofold prehistory of good and evil—The concept good and evil has a twofold prehistory: 
firstly in the soul of the ruling tribes and castes. He who has the power to requite, good with 
good, evil with evil, and also actually practices requital—is, that is to say, grateful and 
revengeful—is called good; he who is powerless and cannot requite counts as bad…Our 
present morality has grown up in the soil of the ruling tribes and castes (HH 45).   46 
One should own up in all strictness to what is still necessary here for a long 
time to come, to what alone is justified so far: to collect material, to 
conceptualize and arrange a vast realm of subtle feelings of value and 
differences of value which are alive, grow, beget and perish—and perhaps 
attempts to present vividly some of the more frequent and recurring forms of 
such living crystallizations—all to prepare a typology of morals (BGE 186). 
 
A typology of morals traces the different modes of evaluation that served within 
different systems of purposes in order to bring to the forefront the most vivid, salient, 
and recurring features of that system. In addition a typology of morals demonstrates a 
curiosity and historical awareness that Nietzsche finds lacking in philosophical 
investigations which attempt to provide a stable foundation for morality. Nietzsche 
continues: 
Just because our moral philosophers knew the facts of morality only very 
approximately in arbitrary extracts or in accidental epitomes—for example, as 
the morality of their environment, their class, their church, the spirit of their 
time, their climate and part of the world—just because they were poorly 
informed and not even very curious about different peoples, times, and past 
ages—they never laid eyes on the real problems of morality; for these emerge 
only when we compare many moralities.  In all ‘science of morals’ so far one 
thing was lacking, strange as it may sound: the problem of morality itself; 
what was lacking was any suspicion that there was something problematic 
here.  What philosophers called ‘a rational foundation for morality’ and tried 
to supply was, seen in the right light, merely a scholarly variation of the 
common faith in the prevalent morality; a new means of expression for this 
faith; and thus just another fact within a particular morality; indeed, in the last 
analysis a kind of denial that this morality might ever be considered 
problematic—certainly the very opposite of an examination, analysis, 
questioning, and vivisection of this very faith (BGE 186). 
 
Hitherto, Nietzsche claims, philosophers have treated the morality of their specific 
historical situation as universally binding and, without questioning this 
presupposition, sought to provide it with rational justification.
97 Accordingly, 
Nietzsche suggests that such philosophers have a faith in conventional morality. 
Nietzsche contrasts this methodologically myopic approach with his own, one of 
“examination, analysis, questioning and vivisection of this very faith” (BGE 186).    
In contradistinction to this methodologically short-sighted approach 
Nietzsche’s own methodological objectives in conducting a typology of morals 
become clear: by “wandering through the many subtler and coarser moralities which 
have so far been prevalent on earth, or still prevalent” Nietzsche informs us that he 
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“found that certain features recurred regularly together and were closely associated—
until [he] finally discovered two basic types of morality.  There are master morality 
and slave morality…” (BGE 260).  A typological inquiry highlights certain aspects of 
a system of purposes at the expense of other features in order to bring to the fore the 
most salient characteristics. Again, in contrast to the philosophers who demonstrate a 
faith in the morality of their particular historical situation, “their climate and part of 
the world,” those who are poorly informed, those who lack historical sense, Nietzsche 
demonstrates that only through comparing many different forms of morality can one 
highlight the problems with the dominant form of morality.   
The relationship between a typology of morals and an immanent critique of a 
particular framework is also brought out in Beyond Good and Evil: 
…[O]ne may doubt, first, whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly 
whether these popular valuations and opposite values on which the 
metaphysicians put their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground estimates, 
only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from 
below, frog perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression painters use.  For 
all the value that the true, the truthful, the selfless may deserve, it would still 
be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be 
ascribed to deception, selfishness, and lust.  It might even be possible that 
what constitutes the value of these revered things is precisely that they are 
insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these wicked, seemingly 
opposite things—maybe even one with them in essence.  Maybe! (BGE 2) 
  
Here, Nietzsche is holding up the metaphysician’s own provisional perspective as 
well as the metaphysician’s uncritical commitment to the true and to selflessness, and 
arguing the oppositions are assumed in this metaphysical picture: the true as opposed 
to the false, selfless acts as opposed to selfishness.  Nietzsche claims that these strict 
oppositions are unwarranted.  Consequently, Nietzsche’s technique here is clearly to 
criticize the system by exposing the provisional perspectives and the uncritical 
commitments of the system.  In other words Nietzsche need not take recourse to 
elements of theories or metaphysical positions outside of this picture in order to 
expose its own shortcomings. 
Nietzsche continues this typological investigation in the Genealogy, albeit 
under a different methodological heading.  Ridley puts the point this way:  “In Beyond 
Good and Evil the method for exposing… [how historical, local and contingent our 
values are]…is described as a ‘typology.’ But in Nietzsche’s next book—said on its 
title page to be ‘A Sequel to My Last Book…, Which It Is Meant to Supplement and   48 
Clarify’—the ‘typology of morals’ has become the ‘genealogy of morals.’”
98  
Nietzsche’s genealogical, typological inquiry, renders the claim that there is one 
morality which has always applied universally both historically unjustified and 
ultimately untenable. Additionally, Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry renders 
problematic the dictatorial structure of Christian morality that precludes other 
interpretations. In this way, Nietzsche’s typology, at the same time, serves as “…a 
counter-force [to the totalitarian command of morality] which is a constant reminder 
that there is no such thing as a morality with an exclusive monopoly of the moral, and 
that every morality that affirms itself alone destroys too much valuable strength and is 
bought too dear” (D 164).   The sway of an absolutely dominant morality is so 
cherished and so captivating because such a standardized interpretation of morality 
provides a hegemonic explanation of our moral values.  In virtue of that fact, this 
picture of morality, robs us of the vigour and strength to, as Nietzsche puts the point 
in The Gay Science, take the necessary steps towards self-governance and towards 
self-maturity (GS 335).
99  In demonstrating that the commitment to a dictatorial 
conception of morality requires a resignation of personal responsibility, Nietzsche 
opens up the space for alternative perspectives and different modes of evaluation.  He 
encourages us to “be able to stand above morality—and not only to stand with the 
stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and falling at any moment, but also to float 
above and play” (GS 107). 
The typology of morals, or a genealogy of morals, is the methodological seed 
of Nietzsche’s immanent critique that grows and is manifested in three distinct ways 
with respect to at least three types of audience. I turn now to the audience of the 
genealogy. 
 
3. Nietzsche’s Audience:  A Typology of the “Faithful” 
 
    Nietzsche clearly stresses the methodological advantages of conducting a 
typology or genealogy of morals.  He claims that through tracking the living 
crystallizations of certain modes of evaluations, recurrent trends are brought to the 
forefront.  Retaining the methodological objectives of a typology of morals, I argue 
that we can similarly track the most vivid and recurring forms of Nietzsche’s intended 
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audience by constructing a typology of the faithful. I argue that Nietzsche is 
addressing his immanent genealogical critique to at least three types of interlocutors.  
Others, however, have suggested that Nietzsche’s audience is far more limited in 
scope.  As previously mentioned, in chapter one, Brian Leiter, for example, claims 
Nietzsche circumscribes “his audience to those who share his evaluative taste:  to 
those for whom no justification would be required, for those who are simply ‘made 
for it,’ ‘those whose ears are related to ours,’ who are ‘predisposed and predestined 
for Nietzsche’s insights.”
100 Or as Leiter most strikingly puts the point: “[Nietzsche] 
has nothing to say to those readers who don’t share his evaluative tastes.”
101  By 
contrast, I also discussed Raymond Geuss’ argument for the inverse; insofar he 
identifies solely the Christian, that is, those who believe in the Christian God, as 
Nietzsche’s audience.
102 Against these narrow versions, which restrict the intended 
audience of Nietzsche’s genealogy to a handful of interlocutors, I argue that 
Nietzsche’s audience can be rather broadly understood as the “faithful.” The term 
“faithful” applies to, at least, three distinct assemblies of parishioners: (1) The 
Christians who have faith in God. (2) The atheists who have “faith” in Christian 
morality even without a Christian God.  And (3) the scientists who have “faith” in 
science as a viable and self-sufficient alternative to the ascetic ideal.
103 Despite their 
differing manifestations of faith, each requires a voluntary “closing [of] one’s eyes 
with respect to oneself for good and all so as to not suffer from the sight of incurable 
falsity” (AC 9).    
     Given that I am painting with broad-brush strokes in attributing a prominent 
explanatory power to “faith,” and that I am employing the corollary concept of the 
“faithful” to pick out Nietzsche’s audience, much hinges here on what Nietzsche 
means by “faith.” So, a word on usage is in order.  In Human All Too Human 
Nietzsche discusses the origin of faith and I quote this discussion at length: 
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The fettered spirit takes up his position, not for reasons, but out of habit; he is 
a Christian, for example, not because he has knowledge of the various 
religions and has chosen between them; he is an Englishman, not because he 
has decided in favour of England: he encountered Christianity and Englishness 
and adopted them without reasons, as a man born in a wine-producing country 
becomes a wine-drinker.  Later, when he was a Christian and Englishman, he 
may perhaps have also devised a couple of reasons favourable to his habits; 
but if one refutes these reasons one does not therewith refute him in his 
general position.  Oblige a fettered spirit to present his reasons for opposing 
bigamy, for example, and you will discover whether his holy zeal for 
monogamy rests on reasons or on acquired habit.  Acquired habituation to 
spiritual principles without reasons is called faith (HH 226).     
 
Nietzsche maintains that all too often we unreflectively assume certain guiding 
principles based upon habit or upon the customs of our culture and not upon critical 
reflection.  Thus, in certain cases one can be offered clear reasons to reject one’s 
custom, yet nevertheless dogmatically retain such a custom as one’s guiding principle.  
This for Nietzsche is faith: the adoption of guiding principles without reason.  
 Nietzsche targets those who are unreservedly and uncritically faithful. As 
such, I argue that Nietzsche offers each congregation of parishioners immanent 
reasons based upon the type of faith they profess to forsake their uncritical devotion. I 
elaborate Nietzsche's audience below so as to provide paradigmatic accounts of 
Nietzsche's emphasis on critique as immanent and to further demonstrate the effective 
use of genealogy as a methodology. 
 
3.1 Faith in the Christian God 
 
            As I mentioned the scope of Nietzsche’s audience is debatable.  Where some 
scholars, such as Raymond Geuss, see Nietzsche in direct dialogue with those who 
have faith in the Christian God, others, such as Christopher Janaway, think that there 
are good reasons to regard this highly selective view of Nietzsche’s audience as 
mistaken.  Janaway’s argument proceeds as follows: 
The Genealogy—subtitled Eine Steitschift, ‘A Polemic’—devotes much of its 
energy to a diagnosis of the origins of Christianity (Nietzsche describes it in 
these terms in his retrospective assessment in the section of Ecce Homo 
entitled ‘Genealogy of Morals’) and presents a many-sided critique of the 
influence of Christianity’s values on contemporary European thought and 
culture.  But is the Genealogy well calculated to persuade genuine Christians 
out of their faith?  Are Christians its main target audience?  There is a second-
hand anecdote that tells of Nietzsche imploring an elderly believing Catholic 
of his acquaintance not to read his books because ‘there was so much in them 
that was bound to hurt her feelings’; and he would have been right to think   51 
that some Christians might be more offended than persuaded by the 
Genealogy.  Some might laugh or just turn away.  But a Streitschift should do 
more than insult or provoke rejection—and if Nietzsche had been solely or 
primarily concerned to influence Christian believers, his book might seem a 
miscalculation.  Nietzsche’s attacks seem better addressed to the non-religious 
(or not especially religious) person who clings to a conception of morality 
inherited unthinkingly from Christianity.
104 
 
Janaway’s central thesis indeed enjoys textual support.  Consider, for example, what 
Nietzsche tells us about Christian faith in The Gay Science: 
Believers and their need to believe—How much one needs a faith in order to 
flourish, how much that is ‘firm’ and that one does not wish to be shaken 
because one clings to it, that is a measure of degree of one’s strength (or, to 
put the point more clearly, of one’s weakness).  Christianity, it seems to me, is 
still needed by most people in old Europe even today; therefore it still finds 
believers.  For this is how man is:  An article of faith could be refuted before 
him a thousand times—if he needed it, he would consider it ‘true’ again and 
again, in accordance with that famous ‘proof of strength’ of which the Bible 
speaks (GS 347). 
 
Here, Nietzsche is arguing that if a Christian needs their faith, then no amount of 
persuasion let alone a direct refutation could possibly prompt the Christian to 
renounce their faith.  And this point, on the face of it, seems to suggest that Nietzsche 
is not addressing those who profess a belief in Christianity.  Yet, Nietzsche, in the 
same passage, goes on to problematize precisely this reaction on the part of the 
Christian.  He indicates that such a faith arises out of the need for a “thou shalt,” a 
command.  Accordingly Nietzsche writes:  “Once a human being reaches the 
fundamental conviction that he must be commanded, he becomes ‘a believer’” (GS 
347).  Nietzsche then suggests this need for a ‘thou shalt’ can be satisfied by either 
appealing to an external source or though the “pleasure of self-determination” (GS 
347).
105  The believer can follow the “thou shalt” of self-determination rather than the 
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the disinterested choice to obey or disobey the moral law. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant 
describes the moral law in this way:   
“…the moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, or pure reason, a fact of 
which we are a priori conscious, even if it be granted that no example could be found in which 
it has been followed exactly.  Thus the objective reality of the moral law can be proved 
through no deduction, through no exertion of the theoretical, speculative, or empirically 
supported reason; and, even if one were willing to renounce its apodictic certainty, it could not   52 
“thou shalt” of “a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma or party 
conscience” (GS 347).  Accordingly, Nietzsche obstructs the believer’s need for an 
external command and argues that this need can be satisfied by creating one’s own 
“thou shalt”.            
Thus, while it is certainly true that Nietzsche’s books may appear to the 
faithful, particularly upon first glance, as offensive and rather nasty, it nevertheless 
may be the case that the faithful have this reaction because Nietzsche does not allow 
them to escape from the dictates of their own system.  While Janaway insists that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives are too abrasive for the seriously faithful, it is my 
claim that this abrasion is the reason we can clearly identify them as included in 
Nietzsche’s audience. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche insists, “Blindness to Christianity is 
the crime par excellence—the crime against life” (EH ‘Destiny’ 7).  Though one 
could argue that the “blindness” to which Nietzsche refers is nothing more than the 
inability of the atheist, the non-religious person, to see that they are still wedded to 
Christian morality, another equally plausible account is that Nietzsche is exposing the 
inability on the part of the Christian to see a conflict within their own world-view.  
Contrary to scholars who insist that Nietzsche’s aim is to speak to those who share his 
evaluative tastes and contrary to those who suggest that Nietzsche’s audience consists 
solely of atheists, I argue Nietzsche is clearly speaking to at least some of those for 
whom Christianity still holds sway.  These interlocutors are still persuaded by 
Christianity’s claim to epistemic authority as well as to the morality that derives from 
                                                 
be confirmed by any experience and thus proved a posteriori.  Nevertheless, it is firmly 
established of itself” p. 48 (47) 
For Kant, as Richard White (1997) puts the point: “we experience the fact of obligation; as rational 
creatures we find ourselves commanded by the moral imperative, and in the decision to obey or 
disobey we discover the possibility of our freedom” p. 36    
Nietzsche critique of Kant’s formulation of self-determination is, in short, that Kant’s 
conception of autonomy, as the ability to self-legislate, relies upon an account of the moral law, as a 
universal obligation or commandment.  Thus, on Nietzsche’s account of Kant’s moral law, one is 
forbidden from generating one’s own imperative, and hence is not autonomous. For example, in 
Daybreak Nietzsche writes that there are “so many experiments to be made,” and one such experiment 
is with the idea that one may “submit only to the law which I myself have given, in great things and in 
small” (D 187).  This is markedly distinct then from that Kantian conception of self-determination, 
which Nietzsche chastises as “blind, petty, and frugal” (GS 335).  Nietzsche, by contrast, argues that 
we may displace Kant’s maxim with the following:  “each one of us should devise his own virtue, his 
own categorical imperative” (AC 11).  As Nietzsche, in The Gay Science, writes:  “one could conceive 
of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take 
leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial 
ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses.  Such a spirit would be the free spirit par 
excellence” (GS 347).  So, for Nietzsche self-determination is the ability to self-legislate, and this 
requires that one leave all faith, the obedience to an external “thou shalt,” behind.   53 
this commitment.  I argue that Nietzsche renders this faith problematic in one of two 
ways and in so doing offers the faithful internal reasons to forsake their commitments.  
 
3.1.1 Power  
 
   The first way one can argue that Nietzsche renders the Christian framework 
internally untenable is through a diagnosis of the role power plays in adopting a 
particular world-view.  Reginster raises this as a viable candidate for what he terms 
the “internalist strategy of revaluation,” and describes how Nietzsche’s evocation of 
the concept of power could serve as the catalyst for an internal challenge:
106  
[Nietzsche’s genealogical] investigations would aim to show that the Christian 
condemnation of power (and the corresponding valuation of equality and 
neighborly love) have their ‘origin’ in the very desire for power they 
ostensibly condemn (see Z II 7, GM III 18, WP 179). Nietzsche would then 
invoke this fact to show that the Christians have a stronger commitment to the 
value of power than they themselves are prepared to acknowledge, a 
commitment that could even be strong enough to ground an internal challenge 
against those values they proclaim to be their highest.
107 
 
Two points are worth making here.  The first is a rather general comment concerning 
the role “power” plays in Nietzsche’s philosophy.  The second point concerns the 
manner in which, for Reginster, “power” can serve as the grounds for an internal 
challenge.   
  First, Nietzsche’s use of the concept of power, as well as Nietzsche’s 
proclamations concerning the “will to power” has received a fair bit of scholarly 
attention.  Given that, the aim of my discussion is not to treat the scholarly reception 
and subsequent debate concerning the role of the “will to power.” Rather, the aim of 
this discussion is to illuminate Reginster’s suggestion that power can be employed to 
ground an internal challenge of Christian morality.  Accordingly, Reginster concludes 
his lengthy discussion of the role the will to power plays within Nietzsche’s corpus by 
arguing that the “will to power…is a will to the very activity of overcoming 
resistance.”
108 For Reginster, then, the will to power is not simply the will to control 
or the will to domination. Rather, the will to power is the will to the activity of 
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overcoming resistance that has the by-product of increasing one’s power.
109  As such 
the will to power is the “spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, reinterpreting, 
reordering, form-giving forces…” through which the feeling of power is then 
manifested (GM II 12).  
Second, and using Reginster’s definition of power, Nietzsche’s immanent 
critique of Christian morality becomes clear. Nietzsche demonstrates to the Christian 
that despite an ostensible condemnation of power, that they are nevertheless wedded 
to a particular form of power understood as the activity of overcoming resistance.
110  
The structure of Nietzsche’s immanent critique may proceed, according to Reginster, 
as follows: (1) Nietzsche demonstrates that the “origin” of the Christian world-view 
finds its roots in the need for a feeling of power. (2) Nietzsche suggests that the 
subsequent condemnation of power on the part of the Christian is also an expression 
of this same need, though ostensibly condemned. (3) Via this demonstration the 
Christian is wedded to a desire for power to a greater extent then they acknowledge. 
(4) Thus, if the desire for power is a sufficiently motivating force, then such a 
demonstration could prompt the Christian to re-evaluate their commitments.       
  Yet, power when employed as a means to unpack Nietzsche’s immanent 
critique of Christian morality, though plausible, does not carry the force that could 
prompt the Christians to forsake their belief.   If the Christian’s need for power is 
attained through a re-evaluation of noble morality, for example, then why would the 
Christian be prompted to forsake his particular set of commitments given that his 
particular need for a feeling of power has been satisfied? Though I agree with 
Reginster that the will to power, the will to impose a particular form upon content 
through the activity of overcoming resistance is an important feature of Nietzsche’s 
account, I nevertheless do not think that it is the most profitable way of viewing the 
grounds of Nietzsche’s immanent critique of Christianity.  Rather, following Owen, I 
take the will to power to serve as the link between varying projects of re-evaluation.  
Owen puts the point this way:  “The continuity between the motivation for the 
Christian re-evaluation of the values of antiquity and for Nietzsche’s proposed re-
evaluation of Christian values is, thus, that both are understood as expressions of will 
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to power.”
111 So understood, the will to power serves to explain the form-giving 
forces present in re-evaluations and not the re-evaluations themselves.  Power is not 
the concept that prompts the Christian to re-evaluate their commitments. Rather, for 
Nietzsche, the will to power is the will to impose form and to re-order by overcoming 
a particular kind of resistance.  As such the will to power is operating in any re-
evaluation. 
Given that the desire for power is not sufficiently strong to serve as the 
grounds for an immanent critique of Christianity I will offer another candidate that 
may possess this strength. 
 
3.1.2 Truth  
 
    The Christian commitment to truth, and the cognate truthfulness, in 
contradistinction to the desire for power discussed above, may be a sufficiently robust 
commitment to prompt the Christian to forsake his belief.  In Daybreak Nietzsche 
problematizes the Christian’s particular commitment to truth: 
What is truth? —Who would not acquiesce in the conclusion the faithful like to 
draw: ‘Science cannot be true, for it denies God.  Consequently it does not 
come from God; consequently it is not true—for God is the truth.’ It is not the 
conclusion but the premise which contains the error: how if God were not the 
truth and it were precisely this which is proved? If he were the vanity, the lust 
for power, the impatience, the terror, the enraptured and fearful delusion of 
men? (D 93) 
 
As Nietzsche points out, there is nothing structurally wrong with the argument 
provided by the Christian; it is perfectly valid.  Nietzsche raises the soundness of the 
argument as a potential problem and targets the assumption that “God is truth.”  
    Nietzsche renders this faith, the adoption of guiding principles without reason, 
problematic insofar as his investigations seek to demonstrate that at least two 
quintessentially Christian commitments are dubious: (1) the Christian commitment to 
truthful introspection of beliefs and (2) the Christian commitment that it is the only 
system through which we can make sense of ourselves.  Prompting the Christian to 
acknowledge the improbability of both of these claims relies upon the fact that the 
Christian commitment to truthfulness is sufficiently motivating. 
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    In Daybreak Nietzsche takes up the first of these commitments and argues that 
Christianity does not retain its ostensive commitment to the truthful contemplation of 
belief. Nietzsche puts this point as follows: 
Doubt as sin— Christianity has done its utmost to close the circle and declared 
even doubt to be sin. One is supposed to be cast into belief without reason, by a 
miracle, and from then on to swim in it as in the brightest and least ambiguous 
of elements: even a glance towards land, even the thought that one perhaps 
exists for something else as well as swimming, even the slightest impulse of 
our amphibious nature—is sin! And notice that all this means that the 
foundation of belief and all reflection on its origin is likewise excluded as 
sinful. What is wanted are blindness and intoxication and an eternal song over 
the waves in which reason has drowned! (D 89)
112 
 
Rather than promoting reflection upon the reasons why one maintains belief in 
Christianity, Nietzsche points out that Christianity demands the reverse: blindness and 
absolute obedience.  Any reflection upon the structure of belief, whether it takes the 
form of historical investigations regarding the origins of the system or an 
investigation of the suspicion that there may be something other than this system that 
will provide meaning is rendered sinful. Christianity is a closed system. It demands 
unreflective faith “in which reason is drowned.”   
        Furthermore Christianity presents itself as the only system and Nietzsche 
renders this presentation problematic. Christianity is merely one system amongst 
others and this renders the dictatorial structure of Christianity untrustworthy.  
Nietzsche frames the issue in this way: 
Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality—in other words, as we 
understand it, merely one type of human morality besides which, before 
which, and after which many other types, above all higher moralities, are, or 
ought to be, possible.  But this morality resists such a ‘possibility,’ such an 
‘ought’ with all its power: it says stubbornly and inexorably, ‘I am morality 
itself, and nothing besides is morality’ (BGE 202). 
 
Christian morality postures as the only picture, and Nietzsche, through his typology of 
morals renders this claim questionable.  
  In the Anti-Christ Nietzsche ties these two treads together: 
[W]hat … is to be prevented above all is the continuation of experimenting, 
the perpetuation in infinitum of the fluid condition of values, tests, choices, 
criticizing of values.  A two-fold wall is erected against this: firstly revelation, 
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that is the assertion that the reason for these laws is not of human origin, was 
not sought and found slowly and with many blunders, but, being of divine 
origin, is whole, perfect, without history, a gift, a miracle, merely 
communicated…Then tradition, that is, the assertion that the law has already 
existed from time immemorial, that it is impious, a crime against the 
ancestors, to call it into question (AC 57).   
 
Faith in Christianity erects a two-fold wall around investigations concerning the 
values to which it ascribes, as well as any possible critique of the value of those 
values.  Here the wall forbidding access to the “truthful” introspection of the Christian 
framework is constructed out of a faith in revelation and tradition. Faith in revelation 
forecloses historical investigations insofar as the values of Christianity are taken to be 
“prefect, without history, a gift, a miracle, merely communicated” (AC 57).  Whilst 
faith in tradition fortifies Christianity as a closed system, a system that “has already 
existed from time immemorial,” and buttresses the claim that Christianity is the only 
system by which we can make sense of ourselves.  Given the fortification of the 
Christian framework, behind the walls of revelation and faith, Nietzsche realizes that 
an external attack upon the framework will not penetrate the walls.  Accordingly, 
Nietzsche must attack the superstructure from within.  
Thus, the Christian commitment to truthfulness is invoked, by Nietzsche, to 
demonstrate that the Christian’s belief structure is inherently problematic.  If this 
commitment on the part of the Christian is sufficiently strong, then his belief in 
Christianity may be undermined in two ways.  First, Nietzsche points out that the 
commitment to the truthful examination of beliefs, allegedly encouraged by 
Christianity, requires one to scrupulously examine one’s commitments.  Yet, 
according to Nietzsche, upon such an examination one finds that Christianity is a 
closed system, which relies upon belief without reason. Or, to put the point another 
way, Christianity demands the inverse of the ostensive claim to the truthful 
introspection of beliefs: faith, in which the call for the truthful introspection of one’s 
belief is “drowned” (D 89). Second, Nietzsche demonstrates that the privileged 
position Christianity claims for itself does not stand up to truthful historical inquiry. If 
the Christian cultivation of truthfulness is suitably rigorous, then Nietzsche offers the 
faithful immanent reasons to forsake their beliefs.  As Geuss puts the point:  
It is a particular and idiosyncratic problem of Christianity that it cultivates 
truthfulness and introspection and is a form of valuation which requires its 
devotees to make claims and have beliefs that won’t stand up to truthful 
introspective scrutiny (such as that moral actions arise from altruistic sources).    58 
This means that Christianity dissolves itself (GM III 27, GS 357) and 
Nietzsche’s genealogy will contribute to that process.
113 
 
Christianity can dissolve itself, on Nietzsche’s account, in virtue of the fact that the 
Christian commitment to truthfulness prompts the faithful to forsake their 
commitments once it is recognized that Christianity’s claims do not stand up to 
reflection.  Thus, Nietzsche’s immanent critique of Christianity attempts to illuminate 
precisely this disconnect and as such may contribute to the process of the self-
overcoming of Christianity.   
  Yet, as I mentioned in the introduction to this section, Nietzsche targets other 
faiths as well, and the subject of the following section will be the faith in Christian 
morality.     
 
3.2 Faith in Christian Morality 
 
    The second congregation of the faithful that Nietzsche targets through an 
immanent critique of their belief structure is the atheists who are allegiant to Christian 
morality even without belief in a Christian God.  These addressees have forsaken the 
commitment to the Christian God, yet nevertheless remain unwaveringly committed 
to Christian morality.  They are committed to a secular “Christian” morality without 
the religious rationale that legitimizes it. This, for Nietzsche, is a peculiar and 
pernicious brand of faith.  
    Nietzsche introduces the philosophy of Schopenhauer as a paradigmatic case of 
this particular brand of faith (GS 357).  Though Schopenhauer is commended for his 
“integrity,” that is his “unconditional and honest atheism,” Nietzsche nevertheless 
employs Schopenhauer’s philosophy as an example of ardently maintaining a faith in 
traditional Christian morality void of the Christian God. Nietzsche describes 
Schopenhauer as “one who denies God and the world but comes to a stop before 
morality…” (BGE 186). Schopenhauer rejects Christian dogma but not Christian 
morality.
114  He remains “under the spell and delusion of morality” (BGE 56) insofar 
as he has faith in the “morality of pity;” a faith that suffering ought to be abolished 
(GM Preface 5). In expressing this brand of faith, God is not vanquished. Rather, we 
find ourselves in the “shadow of God” (GS 108).  
                                                 
113 Geuss, Raymond (1999) p. 21 
114 Interestingly in Human, All Too Human Nietzsche explicitly connects Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
with Christianity. See (HH 26)   59 
In order to prompt this particular kind of faithful interlocutor to re-evaluate 
their allegiance to Christianity morality Nietzsche exposes a contradiction within their 
commitments.  A point made strikingly in Twilight of the Idols: 
When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives oneself of the right to 
Christian morality.  For the latter is absolutely not self-evident: one must make 
this point again and again, in spite of the English shallowpates.  Christianity is a 
system, a consistently thought out and complete view of things.  If one breaks 
out a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the whole thing 
into pieces: one has nothing of consequence left in one’s hands…Christian 
morality is a command: its origin is transcendental; it is beyond all criticism, all 
right to criticize; it possesses truth only if God is truth (TI “Expeditions” 5). 
  
When one gives up the belief in God, one must, at the same time, abandon the 
morality that remains underwritten by such a belief. The absence of otherworldly 
grounding and sanctioning leaves Christian morality void of it justificatory 
underpinnings.  And, under conditions such as these, Nietzsche contends, Christian 
morality cannot be sustained.  The atheists have abandoned the belief in the Christian 
God, but nevertheless remained wedded to Christian morality despite the loss of its 
underpinnings. This is a faith in the unconditional value of Christian morality to 
which the atheist, as Nietzsche’s argument makes clear, is not entitled to given their 
commitment to forsaking a belief in the Christian God.  In other words the atheist has 
failed to draw the penultimate inference, that they have no “right” to Christian 
morality upon the removal of its underpinnings, and the failure to draw this inference 
creates a justificatory void, hence causing the entire superstructure to crumble.    
In order to prompt this kind of faithful interlocutor to forsake their belief, 
Nietzsche relies upon their commitment to atheism.  If the atheist’s commitment is 
sufficiently strong then Nietzsche can demonstrate that Christian morality claims a 
form of transcendental justification that contradicts the central tenets of atheism.  As 
such Nietzsche points out that the uncritical acceptance of Christian morality 
necessitates a belief in a metaphysical perspective in which these values are garnished 
with an authority independently of us.  And this point should be sufficiently 
abominable to the atheist to prompt them to forsake their uncritical commitment to 
Christian morality.  
In The Anti-Christ Nietzsche tells us: “Everyone knows [that God is dead]: 
and everyone nonetheless remains unchanged” (AC 38).  And this, for Nietzsche, is 
outrageous.  It is shocking that the atheists fail to draw the appropriate inference, to   60 
determine that they are not entitled to Christian morality without the underpinnings of 
the Christian God, and hence remain “unchanged.” Yet equally distressing is the sight 
of Christian morality being propped up by “majestic moral structures” (D P 3).  The 
superstructure of Christianity is becoming unbelievable, more pointedly, the “belief in 
the Christian god has become unbelievable,” and this, Nietzsche tells us, is “casting 
its shadows over Europe” (GS 343).  In the wake of this cataclysmic event, which, at 
least according to Nietzsche, ought to leave in its passing the over-coming of 
Christian morality out of truthfulness, is rather greeted by a different set of responses.  
Philosophers, who note the crumbling foundations of Christian morality, have set 
about propping up this form of morality by other means.  One such example is the 
design of “majestic moral structures,” architected by Kant, to buttress morality from 
its impending self-overcoming.  Accordingly, I now turn to an examination of Kant’s 
efforts to reinforce Christian morality, as well as Nietzsche’s argument against such 
an elegant attempt, which seeks to seat another transcendental placeholder in the spot 
vacated by the Christian God.   
 
3.2.1 Christian Morality Buttressed by “Majestic Moral Structures”
115 
                                                 
115 There are other ways, Nietzsche enumerates, in which one can reinforce Christian morality by 
providing the superstructure with further fortification.  For example, in The Gay Science Nietzsche 
writes:   
“These historians of morality (particularly, the Englishmen) do not amount to much: usually 
they themselves unsuspectingly stand under the command of a particular morality and, 
without knowing it, serve as its shield-bearers, for example, by sharing that popular 
superstition of Christian Europe which people keep repeating so naively to this day, that what 
is characteristic of morality is selflessness, self-denial, self-sacrifice, or sympathy and 
compassion” (GS 345). 
Here Paul Rée, is criticized for reifying the morality of “selflessness, self-denial, self-sacrifice, or 
sympathy and compassion” (GS 345).   And Rée’s work according to Nietzsche, a manifestation of the 
“contemporary Europe[an]…prejudice that takes ‘moral,’ ‘unegoistic,’ désintéressé to be concepts of 
equivalent value already rules today with the force of a ‘fixed idea’ and brain-sickness” (GM I 2).  It is 
in this prejudice that Nietzsche identifies a connection between Rée’s work and Christian morality. 
Though Nietzsche’s objection, as elucidated in the Genealogy, to Rée’s project is twofold: (1) it is 
historically inaccurate, and (2) it is psychologically untenable (GM I 2-3), the point I want to 
emphasize here is that Rée, despite his naturalistic commitment to formulating a conception of morality 
which does not lean upon the crutches of metaphysical and transcendental explanations, nevertheless 
marches in line with the popular prejudices of his day, by remaining unreflectively committed to the 
elevated status of selflessness and self-denial.  In so doing, he does not vanquish the shadow of God, 
but rather stands squarely in his shadow. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Janaway (2007) pp. 
8-10 and pp. 74-89 
To highlight another example of “the echo of Christianity in morality” consider utilitarianism. 
Nietzsche’s critique of utilitarianism is multifaceted.  The salient issue for the purposes of this section 
is how, in Nietzsche’s estimation, the utilitarian are guilty of propping up Christian morality. Or, put 
slightly differently, how systems such as these “outchristian Christianity” (D 132). Mill (2004), in 
Utilitarianism, for example writes:   61 
 
  No doubt some of Nietzsche’s most rhetorically charged attacks are aimed at 
Kant.
116 And, if buttressing the crumbling superstructure of Christian morality is 
nearly as objectionable as Nietzsche states, then we can see why Kant is the recipient 
of some of Nietzsche’s most pointed insults. One such instance may be found in The 
Gay Science where Nietzsche writes:   
Kant’s joke—Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumfound the 
common man, that the common man was right: that was the secret joke of his 
soul. He wrote against the scholars in support of popular prejudice, but for 
scholars and not the people (GS 193).   
 
Kant sought to garnish Christian morality with independent sanction, and in so doing 
reify the ethical principles of Christianity, the belongings, Nietzsche tells us, of 
popular prejudice.  The irony according to Nietzsche then is that Kant sought to 
buttress the trapping of Christian morality in a manner that would dumfound the 
common man. Yet, the fundamental problem that Nietzsche identifies here is not one 
of style.  Rather the worry is that Kant acknowledges the fragile nature of the 
superstructure of morality and instead of questioning the value of those moral values 
seeks to provide the crumbing morality with the reinforcement of rational 
justification.  
  To tease out the ramifications of buttressing the crumbling superstructure of 
morality with a form of rational justification, Nietzsche poses the following question:  
                                                 
“I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to 
acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in 
conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.  As between his own 
happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a 
disinterested and benevolent spectator.  In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the 
complete spirit of the ethics of utility.  To do as you would be done by, and to love your 
neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.” p. 15 
Here Mill is committed to two claims:  (1) utilitarianism, as he understands it, takes into account the 
happiness of all concerned, and (2) utilitarianism, so understood, is perfectly consistent with the 
teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. Nietzsche’s critique of Mill’s formulation is that Mill provides the 
collapsing edifice of Christian morality with secular support. In Daybreak Nietzsche writes:  “…in 
England [it was] John Stuart Mill who gave the widest currency to the teaching of the sympathetic 
affects and of pity of the advantage of others as the principle of behavior” (D 132). And Nietzsche, 
there, further claims that:  “…men today feel sympathetic, disinterested, generally useful social action 
to be the moral actions—this is perhaps the most general effect and conversion with Christianity has 
produced in Europe…”(D 132).   Thus, Nietzsche’s critique is that instead of calling into question the 
value of selflessness, and pity Mill out-Christians Christianity in formulating a secular version of 
Christian morality by formulating a version of utilitarianism which requires the moral agent to be a 
“disinterested and benevolent spectator.” And, as John Skorupski (1989) writes: “Nietzsche considers 
impersonal benevolence to be the sterile hangover of Christianity” p. 36 
116 See, for example, (HH 25), (GS 335), (AC 11),  (TI ‘Reason” 6) (TI  ‘Germans” 7) and (EH “The 
Case of Wagner” 2).   62 
“Why is it that from Plato onwards every philosophical architect in Europe has built 
in vain?” (D P 3) The answer to the question, Nietzsche tells us, is that “all 
philosophers were building under the seduction of morality, even Kant—“ (D P 3).   
Kant, in Nietzsche’s estimation, was “apparently aiming at certainty, at ‘truth,’ but in 
reality at ‘majestic moral structures’: to employ once again the innocent language of 
Kant” (D P 3).  Indeed, in the First Critique Kant writes:   
But though the following out of these [moral] considerations is what gives to 
philosophy its peculiar dignity, we must meantime occupy ourselves with a 
less resplendent, but still meritorious task, namely to level the ground, and to 
render it sufficiently secure for moral edifices of these majestic dimensions.  
For this ground has been honeycombed by subterranean working which 
reason, in its confident but fruitless search for hidden treasures, has carried out 
in all directions, and which threaten the security of the superstructures.
117 
 
Here, Kant claims that given the fact that the superstructure of morality has been 
undermined by the inappropriate and misguided use of reason, the object of his 
inquiry, accordingly, is to secure the foundation of the “moral edifices of these 
majestic dimensions.”
118 So, Kant, in Nietzsche’s estimation, was correct to note that 
Christian morality is, in fact, in crisis. Yet, Kant goes wrong in attempting to fortify 
morality, instead of calling into question the value of Christian morality, the slave 
mode of moral reasoning. And as a result, Nietzsche informs us “Kant’s success is 
merely a theologian’s success” (AC 10) or, as he puts the point elsewhere, “Kant…in 
the end [is] an underhanded Christian” (TI ‘Reason” 6).  To tease out the 
ramifications of the latter point we would do well to examine Nietzsche’s critique of 
Kant’s “elegant attempt” as presented in the Third Essay of the Genealogy. 
It is well known that Kant found it necessary “to deny knowledge, in order to 
make room for faith,”
119 and, of this Nietzsche writes: “‘There is no knowledge: 
consequently—there is a God”: what a new elegantia syllogismi!  what a triumph for 
the ascetic ideal!—“ (GM III 25). According to Nietzsche then Kant’s attempts to 
fortify one kind of moral reasoning concurrently represents a triumph for the ascetic 
ideal.  But how do Kant’s world-view and his adjoining form of moral reasoning 
represent such a victory?  The answer to this question is found in the Third Essay of 
the Genealogy, in which Nietzsche informs us that Kant’s transcendental project is 
but one of the latest manifestations of the ascetic ideal:  
                                                 
117 Kant, Immanuel (1965) pp. 313-314 (A 319/ B 376) 
118 Kant, Immanuel (1965) p. 314 (A319/B376) 
119 Kant, Immanuel (1993) p. 29 (B xxx)   63 
Does one still seriously believe (as theologians imagined for a while) that 
Kant’s victory over the dogmatic concepts of theology (‘God,’ ‘soul,’ 
‘freedom,’ ‘immortality’) damaged that ideal? —it being no concern of ours 
for the present whether Kant ever had any intention of doing such a thing.  
What is certain, is that, since Kant, transcendentalists of every kind have once 
more won the day—they have been emancipated from the theologians: what 
joy!—Kant showed them a secret path by which they may, on their own 
initiative and with all scientific respectability, from now on follow their 
‘hearts desire’ (GM III 25). 
 
Kant’s alleged victory over the dogmatic concepts of theology is represented in the 
claim that “there is a realm of truth and being but reason is excluded from it” (GM III 
12).  This claim, according to Nietzsche, opens up the “secret path” back to the ascetic 
ideal, and back to the matters of faith:  God, soul, freedom, and immortality.  And the 
path provided by Kant, Nietzsche tells us, is a “divine way out” (GM III 25). A means 
by which one may profess allegiance to the ascetic ideal behind the masks of 
“knowledge” and “scientific respectability” (GM III 25).  In other words, one may pay 
their respects to the noumena, to the realm of truth and being, rather than to the 
traditional dogmatic concepts of theology, and, as so liberated, one is again free to 
“follow their ‘hearts desire,’” back to the realm of “truth and being.” In this way Kant 
renders the moral realm, the realm of truth and being, unassailable. As Nietzsche puts 
the point in Daybreak:  
…to create room for his ‘moral realm’ [Kant] saw himself obliged to posit an 
undemonstrable world, a logical ‘Beyond’—it was for precisely that that he 
had need of his critique of pure reason!  In other words: he would not have had 
need of it if one thing has not been more vital to him than anything else: to 
render the ‘moral realm’ unassailable, even better incomprehensible to 
reason— for he felt that a moral order of things was only too assailable by 
reason! (D P 3)  
 
In rendering the “moral realm” unassailable, as a logical Beyond, Kant reintroduces 
the concepts of “God,” “soul,” “freedom,” and “immortality,” as matters of faith.      
And this, Nietzsche tells us, represents “a triumph for the ascetic ideal” (GM 
III 25). It is a victory for this mode of evaluation because we are again thrust back 
into a “closed system of will, goal, and interpretation” (GM III 23).  A system that 
posits the categorical imperative as the rational foundation of morality and claims that 
it is the only means by which we can make sense of ourselves.  And this Nietzsche 
points out assumes and exhibits a pernicious faith in the ascetic ideal.  So, Kant’s 
buttressing of morality is a deeper and more insidious faith than the faith exhibited by   64 
the atheists who fail to draw the appropriate inferences, given that they have forsaken 
their belief in the Christian God.  It is more pernicious because in buttressing morality 
from its impeding self-overcoming, Kant provides this mode of evaluation with the 
cover of “knowledge” and “scientific respectability.”  In so doing, Kant precludes the 
possibility that there are other ways in which we can make sense of ourselves as 
ethical agents (GM III 25).   
There is one additional way in which faith serves as a fortress behind which 
the ascetic ideal maintains its privileged position as the only mode of evaluation 
through which we can make sense of ourselves.  Accordingly, I turn now to the last 
congregation of the faithful, those who profess a faith in the unconditional value of 
truth, as manifested in scientism. 
 
3.3 Faith in Science
120 
 
Quite famously Nietzsche, towards the end of the Third Essay of the 
Genealogy, informs us that those who profess a faith in science, or more pointedly 
scientism, are not opponents of the ascetic ideal but rather they are “the best ally the 
ascetic ideal has at present”(GM III 25).  They “certainly believe they are as 
completely liberated from the ascetic ideal as possible” (GM III 24), but Nietzsche 
points out that this self-assessment is mistaken, for the faith they hold in the 
unconditional value of truth represents the “kernel” of the ascetic ideal. However, 
upon first glance all of this sounds rather odd, as science rejects both metaphysical 
and theological explanations.  And, given these commitments how can science then 
represent the “kernel” of the ascetic ideal?  Further, as David Owen points out, “the 
arguments of both the first two essays of the Genealogy could be accepted, at least in 
principle, by scientific atheists….” So, in light of these considerations, we need to 
determine precisely the nature of the connection between an ardent commitment to 
scientism, to the unconditional value of truth, and to the ascetic ideal.
121 
Nietzsche takes up this task by describing the current intellectual terrain: 
The ascetic ideal has decidedly not been conquered: if anything, it became 
stronger, which is to say, more elusive, more spiritual, more captious, as 
science remorselessly detached and broke off wall upon wall, external 
additions that had coarsened it appearance (GM III 25). 
                                                 
120 Again, I am using the conception of a “the faith in science’ as a category that is not limited to those 
who are faithful in scientism.  Rather, such a category captures all those who profess a faith in the 
unconditional value of truth.  
121 Owen, David (2007) p. 126   65 
 
Nietzsche is clear:  the acetic ideal has not been conquered.  Rather the ideal is 
becoming both stronger and more elusive.  Accordingly, then, Nietzsche’s objective is 
“…to disclose to them what they themselves cannot see—for they are too close to 
themselves: this ideal is precisely their ideal, too…—They are far from being free 
spirits: for they still have faith in truth” (GM III 24).   
Nietzsche’s most succinct argument for contending that scientism is not the 
antithesis of the ascetic ideal but rather its latest, strongest, and most elusive 
manifestation is contained within Book Five of The Gay Science section 344, a 
passage to which he directs our attention in the Genealogy. There, Nietzsche tells us 
scientism reflects a faith in the unconditional will to truth.  In the section under 
analysis, Nietzsche begins by telling us that the unconditional will to truth can be 
manifested in two distinct ways: (A) In the will not to allow myself to be deceived or 
(B) in the will not to deceive.  Nietzsche tells us that the former does not adequately 
explain the unconditional will to truth, for it assumes that it is harmful, dangerous, 
and calamitous to be deceived.  Nietzsche renders this claim groundless by virtue of 
the fact that both truth and untruth are, or at least can be, useful. The unconditional 
will to truth does not depend upon a prudential principle, a principle, that is, of utility 
and harm.  Thus, Nietzsche concludes “the faith in science, which after all exists 
undeniably, cannot owe its origin to the calculus of utility,” and as such the will to 
truth does not mean the “will not to allow myself to be deceived” (GS 344).  We must, 
therefore, try to tread the second path.     
Accordingly, Nietzsche tells us that the unconditional will to truth is 
manifested in the latter case, in the “will not to deceive, not even myself” (GS 344).  
Under this latter interpretation the unconditional will to truth is a ban on deceit, and 
with the claim “I will not deceive, not even myself” Nietzsche tells us we stand on 
moral ground.  The unconditional value of truth, understood in this way, is a moral 
valuation which has its origins in the Christian value of truthfulness. Nietzsche puts 
the point this way: 
…those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is 
presupposed by the faith in science, thus affirm another world than the world  
of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this ‘other world’—look, 
must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our 
world?…it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—
that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians 
still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years   66 
old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, 
that truth is divine (GS 344). 
 
Here Nietzsche demonstrates that the unconditional will to truth, which is manifested 
in scientism’s commitment to the unconditional value of truth, is actually the latest 
manifestation of a metaphysical faith.  It is not anti-Christian, as it maintains, but 
rather the latest and most mendacious form of “faith.” As Nietzsche states it in the 
Genealogy: “it is precisely in their faith in truth that its adherents are more rigid and 
unconditional than anyone” (GM III 24).  Nietzsche reveals that behind the atheistic 
demands of scientism lurks a fundamental faith: a faith in the unconditional value of 
truth, which is a moral commitment.  
Science does not create values:  “Strictly speaking,” Nietzsche writes, “there is 
no such thing as science ‘without any presuppositions’…a philosophy, a ‘faith,’ must 
always be there first of all, so that science can acquire a direction, a meaning, a limit, 
a method, a right to exist” (GM III 24).  Science is parasitic upon a system of 
purposes for its valuation, and, as such, scientism, coupled with its commitment to the 
unconditional value of truth, represents a faith in the ascetic ideal. So, in this way, 
Nietzsche argues that “science is not…self-sufficient…it first requires in every 
respect an ideal of value, a value-creating power…[science] never creates values” 
(GM III 24). As such the scientist’s devotion to the unconditional value of truth is 
rendered problematic. Nietzsche exposes that such a commitment to the unconditional 
will to truth is a moral imperative, grounded on the Christian virtue of truthfulness, 
which is “the faith in a metaphysical value,” a faith that the scientist ostensibly rejects 
(GM III 24).  The scientist cannot legitimately be dedicated to “unconditional honest 
atheism” and the unconditional value of truth because these two beliefs are in conflict. 
  Nietzsche unsettles the scientist’s faith in the unconditional value of truth by 
demonstrating that this faith depends upon the Christian faith, “which is also the faith 
of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine” (GS 344). Moreover, insofar as the 
scientist is committed to “unconditional and honest atheism,” the foundation for his 
belief in the unconditional will to truth is rendered problematic, as Nietzsche reveals 
that it is based upon a moral imperative, and hence a Christian obligation (GS 344).  
Thus, the scientist is offered reasons immanent to his system of purposes to forsake 
his faith in the unconditional value of truth.  Accordingly, I turn now to examine the   67 
relationship between the three types of faith elucidated above and the immanence of 
critique. 
  
4. Conclusion: “Faith” and the Immanence of Critique 
   
In this chapter I have argued in support of two claims: (1) Nietzsche’s 
genealogical methodology functions as an immanent critique of morality, by which he 
attempts to expose the inconsistencies of particular paradigms. And (2) Nietzsche 
offers such critiques to at least three distinct groups of interlocutors.  In so doing, I 
argued that he provides an account of the commitments immanent to a particular 
system of purposes in order to expose a set of problematic assumptions, which could, 
if the assumptions are sufficiently motivating, serve to disrupt the interlocutors faith 
in morality.  So, in each case, the “faithful” are offered internal reasons that may 
prompt them to give up their respective “faith.”  Nietzsche’s razor perception is that 
the faithful remain devoted to their respective beliefs because they are thoughtlessly 
held captive by the allure of their faith.  Nietzsche slices away the appeal of a 
hegemonic perspective by demonstrating that each group of devotees possesses 
internal reasons, reasons immanent to their system of purposes, to abandon their faith. 
And in claiming that Nietzsche offers an immanent critique of morality to at least 
three distinct sets of interlocutors, I also claimed that the target audience of 
Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry captures in its net a wider set of 
interlocutors than many scholars have noted.   
  Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry may serve to prompt the faithful to 
re-evaluate their commitments, and this, it is worth noting, serves another function.  
Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry may also awaken the “intellectual 
conscience.” Nietzsche, in Daybreak, ties these two points together. I quote the 
passage in its entirety:  
The need for little deviant acts.— Sometimes to act against one’s better 
judgment when it comes to questions of custom; to give way in practice while 
keeping one’s reservations to oneself; to do as everyone does and thus to show 
them consideration as it were in compensation for our deviant opinions:—
many tolerably free-minded people regard this, not merely as unobjectionable, 
but as ‘honest,’ ‘humane,’ ‘tolerant,’ ‘not being pedantic,’ and whatever else 
those pretty words may be with which the intellectual conscience is lulled to 
sleep: and thus this person takes his child for Christian baptism though he is an 
atheist; and that person serves in the army as all the world does, however   68 
much he may execrate hatred between nations; and a third marries his wife in 
church because her relatives are pious and is not ashamed to repeat vows 
before a priest. ‘It doesn’t really matter if people like us also do what 
everyone does and always has done’—this is the thoughtless prejudice! The 
thoughtless error! For nothing matters more than that an already mighty, 
anciently established and irrationally recognized custom should be once more 
confirmed by a person recognized as rational: it thereby acquires in the eyes of 
all who come to hear of it the sanction of rationality itself! All respect to your 
opinions! But little deviant acts are worth more! (D 149) 
 
Each brand of faith discussed above represents a fundamental discord or disconnect 
between one’s stated principles and one’s actions. One could be intellectually honest 
in terms of forsaking one of the three forms of faith elucidated, and yet nevertheless 
be intellectually dishonest in terms of failing to act accordingly.  That is, one may, 
under the guise of being “humane, tolerant” or “not being pedantic,” act as if they 
retain a “faith” they have otherwise abandoned (D 149). Nietzsche provides us with a 
set of striking cases within which this may occur, none more so than the example of a 
“person who takes his child for Christian baptism though he is an atheist” (D 149).  
For Nietzsche, it is not enough for one to abandon one’s faith, privately, as it were.  
For in imitating a person of faith, one, at the same time, lends credence to the custom, 
and in so doing provides the custom with the sanction of “rationality.” This reveals 
Nietzsche’s commitment to sketching a connection between theory and practice.  
  There is one further point worth making here.  If Nietzsche through his 
genealogical mode of inquiry seeks to trace the sidelined and overlooked features of a 
past, which is immanent to a system of purposes, then the methodology, in some 
sense, must rely upon the tracking of the living crystallizations which make up the 
particular system of purposes under analysis.  Yet, Nietzsche informs us, in The Anti-
Christ, that men of conviction, men of faith, by virtue of being held captive by a 
particular perspective cannot see behind or beneath their respective conviction.  He 
puts the point in this way:  
Men of conviction simply do not come into consideration where the 
fundamentals of value and disvalue are concerned.  Convictions are prisons.  
They do not see far enough, the do not see things beneath them: but to be 
permitted to speak about value and disvalue one must see five hundred 
convictions beneath one — behind one…The man of faith, the ‘believer’ of 
every sort is necessarily a dependent man — such as cannot out of himself 
posit ends at all.  The ‘believer’ does not belong to himself, he can be only a 
means, he has to be used, he needs someone who will use him…Conviction is 
the backbone of the man of conviction.  Not to see many things, not to be 
impartial to anything, to be party through and through, to view all values from   69 
a strict and necessary perspective — this alone is the condition under which 
such a man exits at all (AC 54). 
 
Nietzsche is clear: Convictions are prisons and one that possesses a “faith” is 
necessarily myopic. According to Nietzsche, when one is held captive by a particular 
perspective, one “does not see far enough,” one gazes upon all things from a “strict 
and necessary perspective.” When one is held captive by a particular system of 
purposes, one is, according to Nietzsche, excluded from discussions of value and 
disvalue. The predicament of captivity, of being imprisoned by a particular 
perspective, is also diagnosed here; for Nietzsche claims that the man of faith is 
“necessarily a dependent man,” a man that does not belong to himself, but is in the 
service of his conviction.  In diagnosing the predicament of the man of faith, 
Nietzsche additionally offers a remedy.  The remedy for myopia is seeing “beneath” 
and “behind” one’s convictions.  In other words, according to Nietzsche, one must 
first “see five hundred convictions,” that is, one must see the manner in which varying 
systems of purposes frame themselves and justify themselves, in order to then 
compare the value or disvalue of their competing claims. This, for Nietzsche, requires 
a certain kind of historical knowledge.  In order to be freed from faith and conviction 
one requires historical knowledge, which facilitates the remedy for myopia. For the 
correct use of history allows us to tease out the living crystallizations of a system of 
purposes through which people have genuinely made sense of themselves, and it 
allows us to call into question claims immanent to that particular system of purposes.  
Robert Guay puts the point in this way:  “Nietzsche’s genealogy, then, does not 
purport to offer historical facts with inherent normative implications, but the 
functional assessment of ideals in terms of their own internal standards.”
122  So, 
Nietzsche’s genealogical mode of inquiry requires a particular kind of historical 
knowledge in order to facilitate the “assessment of ideals in terms of their own 
internal standards.”   
Yet, this is a grand claim. For as I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, 
scholarly opinion here is sharply divided: there are scholars who claim that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology is nothing more than the correct practice of 
history, and there are scholars who claim that the genealogical method, of which the 
Genealogy is a demonstration, is nothing more than the development of a fictional 
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account which is intended to free us from our faith, our conviction that one mode of 
morality is universally binding.  Accordingly in the chapters that follow, I will broach 
the vexed topic in Nietzsche scholarship surrounding the role of history in Nietzsche’s 
genealogical methodology beginning with an examination of Nietzsche’s turn to 
“historical philosophy.” 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 Nietzsche’s Historical Philosophy 
 
 
In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche writes: “…what is needed from now on 
is historical philosophizing, and with it the virtue of modesty” (HH 2). Further, he 
claims that “historical philosophy [is] the youngest of all philosophical methods.” 
Historical philosophy, as a methodology, facilitates the questioning of grand and 
entrenched narratives, and is a method that came to fruition in On the Genealogy of 
Morals.
123  Despite Nietzsche’s continued insistence upon the methodological 
importance of “historical philosophy,” his employment of the methodology has not 
been adequately explored within the secondary literature. However, what is 
commonplace is the simple equation of genealogy and history.  For example, 
Raymond Geuss argues:  “Alexander Nehamas is doubtlessly right to claim that for 
Nietzsche ‘genealogy’ is not some particular kind of method or special approach, 
rather it ‘simply is history correctly practiced.’  So ‘Why do genealogy’ means ‘Why 
do history?’”
124 Brian Leiter, too, substantiates Nehamas’ assertion in arguing that:  
“The Genealogy employs the genealogical method—history rightly practiced—in 
order to criticize morality in the pejorative sense.”
125 And furthermore, Leiter suggests 
that:  “Foucault draws a false distinction between Historie and Genealogie, when, in 
fact, Nietzsche uses the terms interchangeably.”
126 Yet, as Christopher Janaway has 
recently noted: “…this formulation [that genealogy is history, correctly practiced] 
may run the risk of being uninformative: there are notable differences between 
genealogy and other forms of history.”
127  The objective of this chapter is to begin 
shape the boundary by which the equation of genealogy with history becomes 
instructive. 
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It is well known that the second of the Untimely Meditations, “On the Uses 
and Disadvantages of History for Life,” represents Nietzsche’s most sustained 
discussion on the topic of history, and as such marks the most reasonable place to 
begin to tease out Nietzsche’s thoughts on the topic of history.  The second of the 
Untimely Meditations provides an answer to one of Nietzsche’s principal concerns:  
What is the value of history and of historical studies?  There, Nietzsche identifies 
three modes of history:  the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical; if used 
correctly, these modes can create a viable way of relating to the past otherwise not 
evident in 19
th Century historicism. Yet, only to add to the uncertainty surrounding 
Nietzsche’s use of history, Thomas Brobjer argues that the second of the Untimely 
Meditations is “not representative of Nietzsche’s view of the value of historical 
studies and methods,” and “shortly after having written the book, Nietzsche changed 
his views on history, and for the rest of his active life his views were rather different 
from the ones put forth in the second Untimely Meditation.” 
128  I argue that this 
understanding of the role of Nietzsche’s meditation of history is misleading and, in 
due course, I treat Brobjer’s objection with a careful analysis.    
Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows.  First, I unearth two 
formulations of history that Nietzsche opposes: the Augustinian and the Kantian 
teleological conception of history and Hegel’s philosophy of history. This serves to 
provide the shape of Nietzsche’s positive views on the topic of history. Second, I 
present a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s modes of history: the antiquarian, the 
monumental and the critical. Third, I broach the topic of the value of history by 
reconstructing a position I have labeled “Nietzsche’s pharmacy.”  There, I treat 
Nietzsche’s use of the concept of “historical sickness” as well as the antidotes he 
suggests as a means to alleviate our affliction. Fourth, I argue that Brobjer’s 
evaluation of Nietzsche’s inquiry into the uses and disadvantages of history for life is 
confused and as such we can employ the second of the Untimely Meditations to 
unpack Nietzsche’s thoughts on history.  Lastly, I argue that genealogy is best seen as 
an example of the critical mode of history first elucidated in the second of the 
Untimely Meditations.  These reconstructions and reflections will serve to provide an 
answer to the question:  What, for Nietzsche, is history correctly practiced? The 
overarching objective of this chapter is to begin to morph the, at present, 
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uninformative proclamation: “genealogy is history correctly practiced,” into an 
informative one. 
 
1. Nietzsche’s Critique of Teleological Conceptions of History   
 
The teleological conception of history is paradigmatic of the kind of history 
conducted in the medieval and early modern periods. For, as Richard Evans argues:   
In the medieval and modern times, many historians saw their function as 
chronicling the working-out of God’s purpose in the world.  Things happened, 
ultimately, because God willed them to happen; human history was the 
playground of supernatural forces of Good and Evil.
129   
 
The teleological formulation of human history purports to trace the essence behind 
historical epochs and to, accordingly, determine the course of historical development.  
Thus, the Augustinian formulation of historiography, which charts the divinely 
scripted narrative, and the Kantian formulation of historiography, which charts the 
progression of reason, both represent an excellent example of the kind of 
historiography that Nietzsche’s historical philosophy opposes.   
Prado describes the Augustinian formulation of history as follows: 
Augustine’s linear conception of history was a consolidated, teleological 
sequence of events set in motion and supervised by God; for Augustine, 
history is an unfolding story with a beginning (the Creation), a middle (the 
Incarnation) and an eventual (the Last Judgment).
130  
 
The Augustinian historiographer charts and chronicles the divinely sanctioned 
narrative, and flags the purposes of God in the course of human events. In The 
Antichrist Nietzsche provides a critique of the “imaginary explanations” at work in 
this form of historiography.  It is worth quoting at some length: 
In Christianity neither morality nor religion come into contact with reality at 
any point.  Nothing but imaginary causes (‘God,’ ‘soul,’ ‘ego,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘free 
will’—or ‘unfree will’): nothing but imaginary effects (‘sin,’ ‘redemption,’ 
‘grace,’ ‘punishment,’ ‘forgiveness of sins’).  A traffic between imaginary 
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beings (‘God,’ ‘spirits,’ ‘souls,’); and imaginary natural science…an 
imaginary psychology…an imaginary teleology (‘the kingdom of God,’ ‘the 
Last Judgment,’ ‘eternal life’)—This purely fictitious world is distinguished 
from the actual world of dreams, very much to its disadvantage, by the fact 
that the latter mirrors actuality, which the former falsifies, disvalues and 
denies actuality (AC 15). 
 
Augustinian historiography shapes the happenings in the kingdom of God, which 
culminate in the Last Judgment and in the possibility of eternal life.  Nietzsche argues 
that this form of historiography has the effect of falsifying, disvaluing and denying 
human history. It is predicated upon the Christian worldview in which the ultimate 
purpose, or telos, of human history is to be found in the traffic between fictional 
dogmas. Teleological historiography presents us with a paradoxical account of human 
history:  The goal, the purpose, or the telos of human history is to be found in 
disvaluing and denying the temporal world, which is to deny that the events of human 
history are significant.  In other words, the teleological formulation of history finds 
the purpose of human history outside of human history in the divine. This mode of 
historiography stands squarely in the “shadow of God.”   
For Nietzsche, the teleological formulation of history is clearly problematic 
and so too is the role of the historian within this conception of historiography.  Prado 
puts the point this way:  “under this [Augustinian] conception the historian’s task is to 
integrate what are apparently unconnected events and discern, behind the resulting 
integration, the hand of God.”
131  Within this mode of historiography the historian 
shapes and forms the events of human history in accordance with a grand narrative 
and as such is precluded from offering alternative versions of a particular historical 
event.  As a result the historian working within this mode of historiography is forced 
to map out a linear development in which the only events of consequence are those 
that flag the inevitable progression towards the Last Judgment, towards eternal life.  
Nietzsche’s formulation of historiography, by contrast, provides three distinct modes 
of history by which the historian can shape and form the events of human history.  
Thus, on Nietzsche’s account the historian is not wedded to one univocal conception 
of an event.  Rather, the historian can view the event as something to be emulated or 
as something to be revered.  Additionally, Nietzsche’s conception of historiography 
affords the historian with the ability to view subsequent entrenched narratives 
scrupulously.  As such, Nietzsche’s conception of historiography marks a departure 
                                                 
131  Prado, C.G. (1995) p. 33   75 
from the teleological historiography insofar as the historian, when writing history, is 
garnished with the responsibility of discerning which mode of history is appropriate 
for his purposes.  
It should be noted that the Augustinian picture of history is not radically 
distinct from the Kantian conception of history. Immanuel Kant also presents a 
teleological formulation of history and in “The Idea of a Universal History from a 
Cosmopolitan Intent,” where he elucidates his objectives as follows:   
…to try to discover whether there is some natural objective in this senseless 
course of human affairs, from which it may be possible to produce a history of 
creatures who proceed without a plan of their own but in conformity with 
some definite plan of nature’s…we want to see if we can succeed in finding a 
guiding thread in for such a history.
132   
 
In the essay, Kant presents nine theses that serve the function of sketching the manner 
in which the “guiding thread” in history, namely, reason, is manifested. Yet for our 
purposes an exploration of the first two theses shall suffice. 
Accordingly, the first thesis states: “All natural capacities of a creature are 
destined to evolve completely to their natural end.” Moreover, Kant writes: “In the 
teleological theory of nature…an organization that does not achieve its end, is a 
contradiction.”
133 If we deny this fundamental principle then, “we no longer have a 
lawful but an aimlessly playing nature and hopeless chance takes the place of reason’s 
guiding thread.”
134  As such, the consequence of not viewing ourselves, qua humans, 
as guided by a teleological principle is to see human history ruled by chaos and 
hopelessness.  Thus, the Kantian conception of history aims to circumvent these 
implications by elucidating the guiding thread in human history. 
The second thesis states:  “In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those 
natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed 
only in the race, not in the individual.” Kant’s worry is that human beings, taken 
individually, do not seem to be pursuing rational ends. Rather, individual human 
actions seem to be motivated out of “folly, and childish vanity and often even childish 
malice and destructiveness.” Thus, Kant concludes that only in viewing the human 
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species as a whole can we tease out the guiding principle of history.
135  Kant explicitly 
makes this point in what follows: 
…Each individual man would have to live excessively long if he were to make 
complete use of all his natural capacities…[nature] requires a perhaps 
incalculable sequence of generations, each passing on its enlightenment to the 
next, to bring its seeds in our species to the stage of development that 
completely fulfils nature’s objective.  And the goal of his efforts must be that 
point in time, at least among the ideas of men, since the natural capacities 
must otherwise be regarded as in large part purposeless and vain.
136    
 
To avoid the unsatisfactory conclusion that human actions are purposeless and 
ultimately conducted in vain, Kant urges us to view human actions within the schema 
of the advancement of the species, which is to view individual human actions in 
accordance with the guiding thread of reason.  As a result, we can view what appears 
superficially as purposeless as actually contributing the fulfilment of “nature’s 
objective,” and as such as rational. 
Nietzsche’s objection to the Kantian formulation of history is that it basks in 
the “shadow of God.” Teleological explanations represent a deification of nature 
insofar as they presuppose a grand narrative in which all human actions are rendered 
meaningful.  In encouraging the de-deification of nature Nietzsche writes:  “Let us 
beware of saying that there are laws in nature…Once you know that there are no 
purposes you know that there is no accident; for it is only beside a world of purpose 
that the word ‘accident’ has meaning” (GS 109).  Nietzsche here is articulating his 
commitment to naturalism, and to additionally rebuffing the ambitions of teleological 
explanations that purport to deduce and to illuminate the universal objectives, or 
purposes, of human history. Nietzsche’s critique of the Kantian formulation of 
historiography parallels his critique of the Augustinian formulation of history.  
Teleological historiography, of both the Augustinian and Kantian variety, represent 
the deification of nature insofar as they profess to elucidate the over-arching goal of 
human history from a singular guiding thread.   
There is one additional picture of history which Nietzsche goes to lengths to 
repudiate.  It is to Nietzsche’s critique the Hegelian formulation of history that I now 
turn.     
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1.1 Nietzsche’s Critique of Hegelian Historiography 
 
Nietzsche’s critique of Hegelian historiography permeates his reflections on 
the uses and disadvantages of history for life.  I will begin by presenting Hegel’s 
conception of historiography as found within Reason and History: A General 
Introduction to the Philosophy of History before turning to elucidate Nietzsche’s 
evaluation of the Hegelian position.   
Hegel presents “three modes of history:” original history, reflective history, 
and philosophic history, as methods for the writing of history.  These modes are 
hierarchical, with philosophic history representing the pinnacle of historiography. The 
first mode of historiography is original history.  This form of historiography is the 
mode of Herodotus and Thucydides “and other historians of the same order, whose 
descriptions are for the most part limited to deeds, events, and states of society, which 
they had before their eyes, and whose spirit they shared.”
137 The original historian 
depends upon their first person perspective concerning the events in question.  Hegel 
argues that:  “the author's spirit, and that of the actions he narrates, is one and the 
same. He describes scenes in which he himself has been an actor, or at any rate an 
interested spectator.”
138 The original historian does not create a theoretical 
interpretation out of their historical surroundings. Rather, for Hegel:  “what the 
[original] historian puts into their mouths is no supposititious system of ideas, but an 
uncorrupted transcript of their intellectual and moral habitudes.”
139 
The second mode of history, reflective history, has three sub-categories: 
universal history, practical history and critical history. Universal history has as its 
object the vast expanse of an entire civilization, and as such this mode of history 
“aspires to traverse long periods of time, or to be universal, [and, as a result] must 
indeed forego the attempt to give individual representations of the past as it actually 
existed.”
140 Given the object of universal history a particular historical event “no 
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longer maintains its original proportions, but is put off with a bare mention.”
141   In 
contrast to universal history, practical history draws upon a particular historical event 
in order to “take the occurrence out of the category of the Past and makes it virtually 
present.” 
142 Practical history sketches connections between past events and our 
present circumstances in order “enliven” our resolve. The final sub-category of 
reflective history is critical history, and Hegel argues that it is “properly designated as 
a History of History; a criticism of historical narratives and an investigation of their 
truth and credibility.”
143 Additionally, for Hegel, viewing historical narratives 
critically provides the groundwork for the transition from reflective historiography to 
philosophic history.   
Philosophic history draws upon reason, and Hegel argues that “The only 
Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the 
simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the 
history of the world therefore, presents us with a rational process.”
144  The progress of 
reason is actual and, so too, is philosophic history.  This is to say, for Hegel through 
the use of philosophic history reason is manifested in the world.   Or as Hegel puts the 
point: “to him who looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn, presents a 
rational aspect. The relation is mutual.”
145  And, philosophic historiography for Hegel 
contributes to the final stage of history insofar as it represents the manifestation of 
reason.  
  Nietzsche is critical of the Hegelian formulation of history, and in the second 
of the Untimely Meditations he argues that: 
History understood in this Hegelian fashion has been mockingly called God’s 
sojourn on earth, though the god referred to has been created only by history.  
This god, however, became transparent and comprehensible to himself within 
the Hegelian craniums and has already ascended all the dialectically possible 
steps of his evolution up to this self-revelation:  so that for Hegel the climax 
and terminus of the world-process coincided with his own existence in Berlin.  
Indeed, he ought to have said that everything that came after him was properly 
to be considered merely as a musical coda to the world-historical rondo or, 
even more properly, as superfluous (HL VIII 104).  
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Though Nietzsche is skeptical of the privileged position that Hegel ascribes to himself 
in the process of history, Nietzsche’s central criticism is that the Hegelian formulation 
renders current events and actions superfluous to the world-process.  Such events are 
superfluous when understood against the backdrop of philosophic history and as such 
under the Hegelian formulation of history we can only view ourselves as epigones.  
Nietzsche writes: 
The belief that one is a latecomer of the age is, in any case, paralyzing and 
depressing:  but it must appear dreadful and devastating when such a belief 
one day by a bold inversion raises this latecomer to godhead as the true 
meaning and goal of all previous events, when his miserable condition is 
equated with a completion of world-history (HL VIII104). 
 
The Hegelian conception of philosophic history, Nietzsche contends, fails to offer the 
modern man anything other than the feeling he is a latecomer, ushering in the 
completion of “world-history.”  In response to the stunting effects of Hegel’s 
philosophy of history, Nietzsche provides us with a possible alternative by which we 
can view the actions of our predecessors in a manner that is heartening. Accordingly, 
Nietzsche writes: 
What I mean by this—and it is all that I mean—is that the thought of being 
epigones, which can often be a painful thought, is also capable of evoking 
great effects and grand hopes for the future in both an individual and a nation, 
provided we regard ourselves as heirs and successors of the astonishing 
powers of antiquity and see in this honour and our spur.  What I do not mean, 
therefore, is that we should live as pale and stunted late descendants of strong 
races coldly prolonging their life as antiquarians and gravediggers (HL VIII 
103-104). 
 
Hegelian philosophic history provides a univocal account of the value of history and 
as a result historiography, so understood, culminates in the proclamation that we are 
“pale and stunted late descendants of a strong race” basking in the reflection of past 
greatness.  By contrast, Nietzsche’s historical philosophy elucidates three modes of 
history through which we can make sense of ourselves, thus overcoming the 
unsatisfactory conclusions and totalitarian effects of Hegelian historiography.  
Accordingly, I now turn to an elucidation of Nietzsche’s modes of history, and begin 
my discussion with the first form of historiography presented in his meditation on the 
uses and disadvantages of history for life. 
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2.1 Monumental History 
The first mode of history that Nietzsche presents is the monumental approach 
to the past, which is useful for the man who looks for teachers and exemplars amongst 
his contemporaries, and is left wanting. Nietzsche describes this mode of history as 
follows: 
Of what use, then, is the monumentalistic conception of the past, engagement 
with the classic and rare of earlier times, to the man of the present?  He learns 
from it that the greatness that once existed was in any event once possible and 
may thus be possible again; he goes his way with a more cheerful step, for the 
doubt which assailed him in weaker moments, whether he was not perhaps 
desiring the impossible, has now been banished (HL II 69). 
 
Nietzsche tells us that in viewing history monumentally, we can strengthen our 
resolve in knowing that exemplary actions were possible, and thus may be possible 
again.  Or as Walter Kaufmann puts the point, monumental history provides the 
horizon by which we can note: “…the fact that man is capable of greatness, 
contemporary mediocrity notwithstanding.”
146 As such noting exemplary 
achievements are crucial to formulating a monumental conception of the past, and as a 
result Nietzsche argues: 
…monumental history will have no use for absolute veracity: it will always 
have to deal in approximations and generalities, in making what is dissimilar 
look similar, it will always have to diminish the differences of motives and 
investigations so as to exhibit the effectus monumentally, that is to say 
something exemplary and worthy of imitation, at the expense of the causae… 
(HL II 70) 
 
To appreciate an individual monumentally, we must place an emphasis upon their 
exemplary achievement at the expense of their foibles, or their moments of weakness. 
An example may be useful here. Consider the actions of Rosa Parks, which led to the 
Montgomery Bus Boycotts of 1955.  Viewed monumentally, Parks’ actions are taken 
to be the impetus for the change in Alabama segregation laws. Thus, a whole host of 
other facts are obscured in drawing out the salient features of Parks’ commendable 
actions.  For example, there were two women who, prior to Parks, refused to give up 
their seats on a Montgomery Bus: Claudette Colvin and Mary Louise Smith. 
147   Yet 
both Colvin and Smith were, in the eyes of the NAACP, unsuitable candidates for 
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serving as the symbol of the momentous cause.
148  In constructing a monumental 
historical account of Parks, the historian must place an emphasis upon certain features 
at the expense of others. Thus the monumental historian highlights, for example, the 
actions of Parks, but not Colvin; the historian focuses upon Caesar’s self-control and 
self-outwitting, but not his foibles; the historian calls attention to the pyramids, but 
not the slaves. Nietzsche puts the point this way: “How much of the past would have 
to be overlooked if it was to produce that mighty effect, how violently what is 
individual in it would have to be forced into a universal mould and all its sharp 
corners and hard outlines broken up in the interest of conformity!” (HL II 69) Hence, 
this sort of assimilation, of emphasising certain aspects of the past at the expense of 
others, is necessary for the production of monumental history.   
At the same time, monumental history creates strange and unusual sorts of 
aggregates: it unfolds abstractions. Monumental history can have the effect of 
overshadowing contemporary greatness insofar as it can cause us to turn from the 
“fresh life of the present” towards a form of greatness that has already existed.  This is 
the danger of this particular mode of historiography.  However, if our understanding 
of ourselves becomes overshadowed by past greatness, Nietzsche offers alternative 
conceptions of historiography that we can employ in order to overcome these effects.  
I turn to the second mode of history elucidated in Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditation on 
history. 
 
2.2 Antiquarian History 
 
The second form of history that Nietzsche illuminates is the antiquarian mode 
of historiography, which is “usually designated as the real sense of history” (HL III 
74). In contrast to the monumental mode of history, this brand of historiography 
encourages the historian to  “…gives thanks for his existence.  By tending with care 
that which has existed from old, he wants to preserve for those who shall come into 
existence after him the conditions under which he himself came into existence—and 
thus he serves life” (HL III 72-73). As such, the antiquarian mode of history aids in 
the formulation of a cultural identity.  As Foucault puts the point:  Antiquarian history 
“seeks the continuities of soil, language, and urban life in which our present is rooted, 
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and, ‘by cultivating in a delicate manner that which existed for all time, it tries to 
conserve for posterity the conditions under which we were born.’”
149  Thus, the 
antiquarian historian preserves and reveres by meticulously collecting data, and 
as a result conserves for posterity the continuities of his culture.    
However, like each mode of history, the antiquarian mode, too, is subject to 
decay for it promotes a myopic gaze upon the past:   
The antiquarian sense of a man, a community, a whole people, always 
possesses an extremely restricted field of vision; most of what exists it does 
not perceive at all, and the little it does see it sees much too close up and 
isolated; it cannot relate what it sees to anything else and it therefore accords 
everything is sees equal importance and therefore to each individual thing too 
great importance.  There is a lack of that discrimination of value and that sense 
of proportion which would distinguish between the things of the past in a way 
that would do true justice to them; their measure and proportion is always that 
accorded them by the backward glance of the antiquarian nation or individual 
(HL III 74). 
 
The antiquarian mode of history, to a greater extent than the monumental or critical 
modes of history, glorifies the local situation and the native customs.  If unchecked by 
reflection upon why these customs should be glorified, or why it should be the case 
that a particular type of moral construct has flourished, one is left only to glorify, 
unreflectively, the customs of one’s society.  
Nietzsche, throughout the second Untimely Meditation, warns against the 
misuse of each type of history, and cautions his readers that antiquarian history may 
“grow too mighty and overpower the other modes of regarding the past” (HL III 75).   
An example may be useful here.  Bernard-Henri Lévy writes: “… it’s [the antiquarian 
mode] that the United States, with its ubiquitous halls of fame, appears to fall.  The 
museums that frenetically stock up, these places that combine everything and no 
longer discern what is worth being memorialized from what isn’t…”
150 As Lévy’s 
investigations make clear, the antiquarian mode of history has indeed overpowered 
“the other modes of regarding the past”: 
The craze for the relic, this time.  A taste for preservation and for museum, 
taken to the nth degree…even if it’s under the heading ‘fake,’  we might as 
well make a museum of everything right away.  But even more striking, more 
extravagant:  yes, everything is becoming a relic; a mere plate of cheese is 
becoming a museum piece, but the museum piece is a plate of cheese that has 
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not been eaten yet, or served—it’s a kind of antemuseum, a prerelic, and 
extension into the realm of memory of what has not yet taken place.
151  
 
Lévy’s description of the musuemification of history:   “Everything is becoming a 
relic;” everything is preserved with an antiquarian reverence, which restricts the 
ability to place a value upon that which is revered.  Or as Nietzsche puts the point: it 
is “the repulsive spectacle of a blind rage for collecting, a restless raking together of 
everything that has ever existed” (HL III 73).  Antiquarian history, if employed in this 
manner, ceases to be fruitful.   Nietzsche’s point is this: when the desire to preserve, 
come what may, outweighs the motivation to create, antiquarian history serves only to 
degenerate and stunt life.  Accordingly, Nietzsche introduces one final candidate, 
which can be employed to mitigate the precarious effects of monumental and 
antiquarian historiography. 
 
2.3 Critical History 
 
Critical history serves the particular function of assessing and evaluating 
entrenched historical narratives in order to mitigate the effects of the other modes of 
historiography. This form of historiography elucidates   
…how unjust the existence of anything—a privilege, a caste, a dynasty, for 
example—is, and how greatly this thing deserves to perish.  Then its past is 
regarded critically, then one takes the knife to its roots, then one cruelly 
tramples over every kind of piety (HL III 76).   
 
Critical history is compelled by the need for a thorough critique of entrenched 
narratives.  Such historiography tramples over the pieties of antiquarian mode of 
historiography and mitigates the elevated status of monumental narratives by bringing 
to the forefront the overlooked aspects of the past.  Thus, critical history is a 
particularly perilous form of historiography because it is difficult to “know the limit 
to the denial of the past…” (HL III 76).    
Accordingly, in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche provides us with a portrait 
or a description of the historian operating within this mode of historiography: 
Thanks to the unconquerably strong and tough virility of the great German 
philologists and critical historians (viewed properly, all of them were also 
artists of destruction and dissolution), a new concept of the German spirit 
crystallized gradually in spite of all romanticism in music and philosophy, and 
the inclination of virile scepticism became a decisive trait, now, for example, 
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as an intrepid eye, now as the courage and hardness of analysis, as the tough 
will to undertake dangerous journeys of exploration and spiritualized North 
Pole expeditions under desolate and dangerous skies.  There may be good 
reason why warmblooded and superficial humanitarians cross themselves just 
when they behold this spirit— (BGE 209)  
 
Here, the critical historian is presented as one who is sceptical of entrenched 
narratives and as one who calls into question particular interpretations of the past that 
have dominated at the expense of others. They are resolute spirits who seek out, with 
the steadiness of a surgeon’s hand, the task of opening up the past to new 
interpretations. Given that, the critical historian cannot only judge and condemn 
previous interpretations of historical events but must create out of the room thus 
liberated.  Nietzsche argues: 
If the historical drive does not also contain a drive to construct, if the purpose 
of destroying and clearing is not to allow a future already alive in anticipation 
to raise its house on the ground thus liberated, if justice alone prevails, then 
the instinct for creation will be enfeebled and discouraged (HL VII 95). 
 
If one employs critical history with the sole aim to destroy, then this mode of history 
is not used in the service of life.  Critical history, as abovementioned, must open up 
the space for new possibilities, for fresh historical interpretations because, as 
Nietzsche claims: “so many retroactive forces are still needed” (GS 34).  
 
2.4 On the Use of the Modes of History 
 
Within each mode of history, there is always the opportunity for excess and 
thus, each mode of history requires a certain “soil.”  Nietzsche maintains that using 
the wrong type of historical study for the wrong purpose will only grow a:  
…devastating weed.  If the man who wants to achieve something great has 
need of the past at all, he appropriates it by means of monumental history; he, 
on the other hand, who likes to persist in the familiar and the revered of old, 
tends the past as an antiquarian historian; and only he who is oppressed by a 
present need, and wants to throw off this burden at any cost, has need of 
critical history, that is to say a history that judges and condemns (HL II 72). 
 
Nietzsche is careful to argue that one need not take each mode of history—the 
monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical—in equal measure. As such, each mode 
of history is available for use in a particular situation or climate.  Just as a specific 
plant requires a certain soil, so too do we need a particular sort of historical   85 
investigation.  Nietzsche does not suggest that we can annul our relationship with 
history, but rather, that we can view history in proportion to our needs: by using the 
past monumentally to recall great deeds of antiquity, the antiquarian model to revere 
one’s place or origin, and the critical mode of history to challenge entrenched 
formulations of the past we have the means to use history in a manner which serves 
life. Nietzsche puts the point in this way: 
For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome 
of their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not 
possible wholly to free oneself from this chain.  If we condemn these 
aberrations and regard ourselves as free of them, this does not alter the fact 
that we originate in them.  The best that we can do is to confront our inherited 
and hereditary nature with our knowledge…It is an attempt to give oneself, as 
it were a posteriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition 
to that in which one did originate…(HL III 76) 
 
Each mode of historiography provides a unique way of forming and shaping the past 
such that we can provide ourselves with a past a porteriori.  As such, Nietzsche’s 
historical philosophy provides us with the means to shape the past such that we can 
understand where we came from, and hence, what we may become.  Yet, this is a 
particularly precarious task, and often we can be overwhelmed by our historical 
situation.  Nietzsche labels this our historical sickness, and in what follows I argue 
that he provides us with the antidotes, or the means to overcome our affliction. 
 
3. Nietzsche’s Pharmacy:  Historical Sickness and its Antidotes 
 
Up till now, I have been discussing Nietzsche’s modes of history as if aligning 
ourselves with the proper mode of history was a relatively straightforward task and as 
if our relationship to history was anodyne.  This, however, is simply not the case.  
Nietzsche suggests that our relationship to the historical is precarious, and more often 
than not, we find ourselves overwhelmed and beleaguered by an over-saturation of 
history.  This over-saturation of history is our “historical sickness,” and its most 
dramatic expression is found within Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
‘It was’—that is the name of the will’s gnashing of teeth and most secret 
melancholy.  Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator 
of all that is past.  The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot break 
time and time’s covetousness, that is the will’s loneliest melancholy (Z “On 
Redemption”).  
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 Our historical sickness is manifested in the crushing weight of the “it was,” coupled 
with the realization that the will cannot will backwards. Hence, the past is a 
particularly heavy burden, and in the second of the Untimely Meditations Nietzsche 
puts the point in this way: “…the phrase ‘it was’: that password which gives conflict, 
suffering and satiety access to man so as to remind him what his existence 
fundamentally is—an imperfect tense that can never become a perfect one” (HL I 61).  
Given that the past is regularly regarded as a burden, what then is the value of history 
and of historiography?  The value of historiography, Nietzsche argues, is its ability to 
aid us in the overcoming of such a burden.  As Nietzsche puts the point in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra:  
And how could I bear to be a man if man were not also creator and guesser of 
riddles and redeemer of accident?  To redeem those who lived in the past and 
to recreate all ‘it was’ into ‘thus I willed it!’— that alone should I call 
redemption” (Z ‘On Redemption’).  
 
To redeem the past, one must be in the position to claim: “thus I willed it.” And to 
take up this task, the task of affirming the past and concluding “thus I willed it,” 
Nietzsche, in the second of the Untimely Meditations, provides us with the following 
schema: (1) there are some who are remarkably strong, the “most powerful and 
tremendous natures,” and can incorporate all that is past, and accordingly can affirm 
all that is past without crutches of the antidotes (HL I 63); and (2) there are those who 
are sufficiently strong to recognize that they require the horizons that the antidotes of 
the supra-historical and the unhistorical perspectives provide; and (3) there are those 
who are overcome by the past, and as such cannot affirm the past even with the aid of 
the antidotes.  In the sections that follow I elucidate the first two points of this 
schema, and in so doing argue that there is a tension in Nietzsche’s thought 
concerning the plausibility of the claim that one can affirm the past without the 
crutches of the supra-historical and the unhistorical perspectives. 
 
3.1 The “Most Powerful and Tremendous Nature” 
 
In the second of the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche offers a version of the 
abovementioned schema: 
The stronger the innermost roots of a man’s nature, the more readily will he be 
able to assimilate and appropriate the things of the past; and the most powerful 
and tremendous nature would be characterized by the fact that it would know   87 
no boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it; it 
would draw to itself and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that 
most foreign to it, and as it were transform it into blood.  That which such a 
nature cannot subdue it knows how to forget; it no longer exists, the horizon is 
rounded and closed, there are people, passions, teachings, goals lying behind 
it…if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same time 
too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine 
away slowly or hasten to its timely end (HL I 62-63). 
 
Here Nietzsche is clear:  there are human beings who are sufficiently strong to 
incorporate all that is past, and transform it, as it were, into blood.  Such natures 
employ their historical sense, their “sixth sense,” and at no point are overwhelmed or 
beleaguered by the past, by the “it was” (BGE 224).  Furthermore, of these strong and 
resolved spirits, some recognize that they cannot subdue the past and accordingly that 
they require the antidotes of the unhistorical and the supra-historical perspectives.  
Thus, Nietzsche is offering two distinct versions of these strong and resolute spirits: 
(1) There are those who can face the past, all of the “it was” and affirm it, transform it 
into blood.  These natures can face the past of humanity generally, and reply: “thus I 
willed it.” (2) There are those who are sufficiently strong to realize that they cannot 
affirm all of the past, and accordingly employ the unhistorical and the supra-historical 
perspectives.  In creating such horizons, they transform the past into something that is 
affirmable. The past again becomes something that can be affirmed and such spirits 
say, “thus I willed it,” to that particular picture. Yet, is it plausible to raise as a viable 
option, as Nietzsche clearly does, the former case in which one is meant to be 
sufficiently strong to be able to incorporate all that is past, without the aids of 
forgetting or of creating new horizons and boundaries?  Henry Staten, for example, 
thinks not.  The tenability of Nietzsche’s contention is worth looking at in detail, and I 
begin by looking at Staten’s reasons for his rejection of Nietzsche’s thesis.    
  Staten’s argument takes the following form, and I quote at length: 
 …it is one thing to suffer for all humanity as for oneself, and quite another 
thing to affirm, to say ‘thus I willed it,’ to the suffering of all humanity as to 
one’s own.  If I affirm my own suffering, this may be a salutary psychological 
phenomenon; I might in this way cease to resent and struggle against the 
injuries of my past and thus take responsibility for my life in a fuller way than 
formerly.  We understand what it would mean to ‘will backwards’ in the case 
of our personal past.  But what can it mean to affirm the past of humanity?
152 
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As Staten’s argument makes clear, it may be plausible to suggest that one could be 
psychologically well disposed towards oneself, such that one could affirm one’s own 
particular past.  But this peculiar psychological phenomenon is quite distinct from the 
grander task, which is what Nietzsche’s argument requires, namely that one affirm the 
totality, all that is past, humanity as a whole.  This is to expect that which we could 
not possibly deliver.  Nietzsche’s argument is untenable insofar as we are expected to 
move from affirming the particular, our particular past, to affirming the universal, the 
whole of human history.  Staten puts the point this way: 
We can only judge history if we do not feel too vividly the reality concerning 
which we judge.  Our compassion must not become too real, we must be a bit 
obtuse or lacking in imagination.  If we were to feel in its full reality the grief 
of even one mother for the child that is slaughtered before her eyes we would 
not be able to bear it.  How infinitely less could we bear even a glimpse of all 
the enslavements and holocausts of history, to say nothing of the infinitude of 
private and domestic tragedies and the savagery of the ordinary course of 
animal nature.
153 
 
As Staten’s argument makes transparent, we understand on the personal level what it 
may look like to affirm one’s own past.  Yet, when we broaden our requirements out 
and attempt to affirm the whole of history as such, we are concurrently struck down 
by the horrors of history.  We are struck by the particular horrors of history, and as 
such cannot affirm the totality. Thus, there is a tension in Nietzsche’s thought here.  
For the demand of the resolute and strong spirit that they can transform the entirely of 
the past into blood and thus affirm the totality is on the face of it an implausible 
suggestion.  Nietzsche’s test is impassable:  One simply cannot be so well disposed to 
the totality of human history as to be able to affirm it out of hand.  A point Nietzsche 
seems to recognize in Human, All Too Human:  “He, on the other hand, who really 
could participate in them would have to despair of the value of life; if he succeeded in 
encompassing and feeling within himself the total consciousness of mankind he 
would collapse with a curse on existence…(HH 33). And he admits in The Gay 
Science, amidst a lengthy discussion of pity and human suffering: “I  know just as 
certainly that I need to expose myself to the sight of some genuine suffering and I am 
lost” (GS 338).  Nietzsche did set the bar rather high in the second of the Untimely 
Meditations; so high in fact that Nietzsche himself would not count amongst the most 
powerful and tremendous natures.  
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We are, as a result, thrust back upon Nietzsche’s second suggestion insofar as 
we can affirm the past only by adopting the perspectives of the unhistorical and the 
supra-historical.  Recall that Nietzsche states: “That which such a nature cannot 
subdue it knows how to forget; it no longer exists, the horizon is rounded and closed, 
there are people, passions, teachings, goals lying behind it…” (HL I 63).  We require 
the past to be thinned down, rounded off, and veiled.  In other words, we must reduce 
the effects of our historical sickness by employing the antidotes that these 
perspectives offer.  
 
3.2 The Antidotes: the Unhistorical and the Supra-Historical Perspectives 
 
  The unhistorical and the supra-historical perspectives provide the horizon by 
which the past is subdued, and as such are the antidotes to our historical sickness.  
These antidotes serve different functions; the former provides a horizon insofar as 
aspects of the past are forgotten, while the latter provides perspectives of art and 
religion to limit the effects of the past.  Nietzsche elucidates their function as follows:   
With the word ‘the unhistorical’ I designate the art and power of forgetting 
and of enclosing oneself within a bounded horizon; I call ‘suprahistorical’ the 
powers which lead the eye away from becoming towards that which bestows 
upon existence the character of the eternal and stable, towards art and religion 
(HL X 120).   
 
The unhistorical represents the rounding off of the historical sense, by providing a 
boundary outside of which the past is forgotten, while the suprahistorical perspective 
provides the shape and form to the historical by taking one’s gaze away from the 
transitory towards the eternal and stable powers of art and religion.  By shaping, 
bounding, and forming the past through recourse to the perspectives of the antidotes, 
we concurrently structure the past in a way that can, as a result, be affirmed.  As 
Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil the strength of one’s spirit “should be 
measured according to how much of the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure—or to 
put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, 
sweetened, blunted, falsified” (BGE 39), – that is, to what extent such a spirit requires 
the adoption of either the unhistorical or the supra-historical perspectives upon the 
past in order to thin it down, veil or sweeten it.  Nietzsche’s discussion of the   90 
application of historical sense maps onto his celebrated discussions of self-fashioning, 
which notably arises in The Gay Science:    
To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by those 
who survey all the strengths and weakness of their nature and then fit them 
into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even 
weakness delight the eye.  Here a large piece of second nature has been added; 
there a piece of original nature has been removed—both times through long 
practice and daily work at it.  Here the ugly that could not be removed is 
concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime.  Much that is 
vague and resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views; it is 
meant to beckon towards the far and immeasurable (GS 290). 
 
In order to give style to one’s character, one must employ history, as self-creation is 
not accomplished out of nothing, but rather, out of both our first nature and our 
second nature.  Yet, as abovementioned, one cannot provide style to one’s character 
by accepting all that is past, all that one is.  Rather, one must select, shape, simplify, 
and form the past and oneself, such that one provides oneself with a past a posteriori.    
Further, it is worth reiterating that it is only a strong character that can undertake such 
self-fashioning, a character that can shape the past into something that is affirmable. 
Aaron Ridley states: “Style, on this reading, is not so much a matter of opportunistic 
self-exculpation as the (honest) last resort of a soul that can face no more. (‘As an 
aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us’ (GS 107).)”
154  As Ridley 
makes clear, the incorporating of the past into something that is ultimately affirmable 
is not an opportunistic and self-indulgent enterprise, but rather an attempt to make life 
bearable, and ultimately affirmable, by providing it with a shape and form by 
rounding off our historical sense. This is the value of history.  History tells us where 
we came from, and accordingly, provides us with the perspective to see what we 
might become.      
  Yet, for most of this chapter, I have discussed Nietzsche’s meditation on history as if 
it was universally accepted as representative of his views on history.  However, as I 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter there are dissenters.  So I turn now to a 
discussion of the use of this meditation as a means to unpack Nietzsche’s sustained 
thoughts on the topic of history. 
 
4. On the Use of the Second Untimely Meditation 
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Did Nietzsche radically change his position concerning the use of history after 
the publication of the second Untimely Meditation?  Thomas Brobjer, all the while not 
denying the importance of history in Nietzsche’s mature philosophy, ultimately 
answers this question affirmatively. He finds that “historical studies and methods are 
much more important to Nietzsche than has been recognized,” and he asserts that:  
…already in the first section [of Human All Too Human] Nietzsche contrasts 
metaphysical philosophy, with its belief in opposites, to historical philosophy 
‘the youngest of all philosophical methods,’ which claims that there are no 
such opposites but only historical change…At least from this time onwards 
historical perspective will be important for determining Nietzsche’s views.
155  
 
Though Brobjer is doubtless correct to assert that historical philosophy is central to 
Nietzsche’s thought, I nevertheless suggest that concerning the value of the second 
Untimely Meditation he is mistaken.        
For example, Brobjer argues that the second of the Untimely Meditations:  
…is not representative of Nietzsche’s view of the value of historical studies 
and methods.  In 1875/1876, shortly after having written the book, Nietzsche 
changed his views on history, and for the rest of his active life his views were 
rather different from the ones he had put forward in the second Untimely 
Meditation.
156    
 
Additionally, Brobjer claims: “there are good reasons to believe that Nietzsche 
regarded this work as his least valuable book.”
157 This critical assessment rests upon 
Nietzsche’s unpublished notebook entries as well as letters, and culminates in the 
dismissal of the: “only affirmative statement regarding the second Untimely 
Meditation…found in his published books, notebooks and letters after 1874.”
158 
Accordingly, in Ecce Homo Nietzsche writes:  “In this essay the ‘historical sense’ of 
which this century is so proud was recognized for the first time as a disease, as a 
typical symptom of decay” (EH ‘Untimely’ 1).
159 Brobjer takes the import of this 
passage to be as follows:  
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…it is at least likely that the statement, at this late stage, during the last few 
months before his mental collapse, indicates that his megalomania had grown 
to such a degree that he had problems recognizing or admitting previous 
‘mistakes.’ Furthermore, considering that Nietzsche here is trying to get 
readers interested in his books, he is likely to emphasize that which he still 
finds valuable in them.
160   
 
Though Brobjer’s rendering of the Ecce Homo passage is plausible it nevertheless 
remains inconclusive. 
  Brobjer deciphers the importance of each mode of history to Nietzsche’s 
mature philosophy by examining how often Nietzsche returns to use these particular 
terms and concludes: “Nietzsche seems never again after 1874 to use the important 
concepts monumental, antiquarian, and critical history…This shows that he did not 
use his own concepts and, presumably that he himself was not persuaded by the 
argument and content of the book.”
161  Rather, I argue that Nietzsche continues to 
make these conceptual distinctions throughout his latter works. 
For example, in relation to art, in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche argues 
that poets:  “emulate the artists of earlier times who imaginatively developed the 
existing images of the gods and imaginatively develop a fair image of man;…and in 
doing so through the excitation of envy and emulation help to create the future” (H 
99).  The poet in this passage approaches his craft in the same way that the 
monumental historian approaches his.  By using the greatness of the past, the poet 
demonstrates what is possible for the future. In The Gay Science we also see 
Nietzsche employ the antiquarian and the critical modes of history first presented in 
the Second Untimely Meditation.  In The Gay Science, section 370, entitled What is 
Romanticism? Nietzsche returns to the notions implicit in the antiquarian and the 
critical modes of history: 
The will to immortalize...  It can be prompted, first, by gratitude and love; art 
with this origin will always be an art of apotheoses, perhaps dithyrambic like 
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Rubens…or bright and gracious like Goethe, spreading a Homeric light and 
glory on all things.  But it can also be the tyrannic will of one who suffers 
deeply, who struggles, is tormented, and would like to turn what is personal 
and singular, and narrow, the real idiosyncrasy of suffering, into a binding law 
and compulsion—one who, as it were, revenges himself on all things by 
forcing his own image, the image of his torture, on them, branding them with 
it (GS 370). 
 
The antiquarian mode of history is evident in Nietzsche’s treatment of Rubens and 
Goethe. Through the “gratitude and love,” and pious reverence, it is also manifested.  
Critical history is in the passage where Nietzsche’s employment of the “tyrannic will 
of one who suffers deeply,” and as a result has to force his own image, the image of 
his torture, on things.  Though Nietzsche does not return to use the particular terms 
antiquarian, monumental, and critical, it is clear that, contra Brobjer, Nietzsche has 
not given up the conceptual distinctions found within the second Untimely Meditation.  
Thus, if the conceptual distinctions first formulated in the second Untimely Meditation 
are firmly in place in Nietzsche’s later writings, then we are entitled to employ the 
three modes of history as a means of unpacking Nietzsche’s thoughts on history. 
 
5. Genealogy as Critical History 
   
  Given the foregoing we are entitled to employ Nietzsche’s meditation on 
history as a means of unpacking his thoughts on history generally.  However, which 
mode of history, if any, does Nietzsche employ in the Genealogy?  What is clear is 
that Nietzsche is not employing the antiquarian mode of historiography. For, as many 
scholars have noted, the Genealogy lacks the tones and trappings of a scholarly thesis. 
Further, Brian Leiter has quite rightly stressed the significance of the subtitle of the 
Genealogy “A Polemic,” such that the subtitle alerts us to the fact that “the tones and 
trappings of a scholarly treatise would simply be an impediment.”
162  Given that the 
objectives of the Genealogy are not fulfilled through the invocation of the antiquarian 
mode of historiography we should try to discern whether Nietzsche in the Genealogy 
employs either the monumental or the critical mode of historiography.  I argue that 
despite the apparent manifestation of the monumental form of historiography, it is 
nevertheless the critical mode of historiography which is most clearly evident 
throughout the Genealogy. 
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Monumental historiography is discernible in several places in the Genealogy.  
For example, in the First Essay Nietzsche holds up the nobles as those who are 
unreflectively “good,” “powerful” and as such the “rulers” (GM I 11).  And, in the 
Second Essay he credits the “blond beasts of prey” with the formation of the modern 
state (GM II 17).  There, Nietzsche writes: 
…some blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized 
for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws 
upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in number but still formless 
and nomad.  That is after all how the ‘state’ began on earth:  I think that 
sentimentalism which would have it begin with a ‘contract’ has been disposed 
of.  He who can command, he who is by nature ‘master,’ he who is by nature 
‘master,’ he who is violent in act or bearing—what has he to do with 
contracts! One does not reckon with such natures; they come like fate, without 
reason, consideration, pretext; they appear as lightning appears…Their work is 
an instinctive creation and imposition of forms; they are the most involuntary, 
unconscious artists there are— (GM II 17)   
    
From Nietzsche’s description here, we might be tempted to look upon the “blond 
beasts of prey” with the gaze of a monumental historian.  That is, we are tempted to 
revel in the ability of such a small number of people to impose the form of the state 
upon the chaos, the formless, and the nomad.  More pointedly, we could revel in the 
manner in which such a momentous task was accomplished:  “without reason, 
consideration, pretext” (GM II 17).  Similarly, of the nobles in the First Essay, when 
the nobles are viewed monumentally we may be prompted to admire their strength, 
vigour and their life-affirming stance, and further, to consider such a position worthy 
of imitation.  Yet, this is to miss a great deal of the salience of Nietzsche’s thought, 
for he repeatedly tells us that such nobles are unreflective.  They value the perfection 
of “unconscious instincts” at the expense of reason and cleverness (GM I 10). 
However, unreflectiveness in the manner of the noble is not a viable option for us.  
Nietzsche goes to lengths to connect the noble’s capacity for unreflectiveness with the 
fact that “the noble races…have left behind them the concept of ‘barbarian’ wherever 
they have gone…” (GM I 11). The concept of “barbarian” emerges “from a disgusting 
procession of murder, arson, rape and torture…” (GM I 11). Thus, though upon first 
glace it may appear as if Nietzsche is holding up the nobles or the “blond beasts of 
prey” as monumental figures, it nevertheless becomes clear upon further reflection 
that Nietzsche is not advocating such a picture as one that is worthy of imitation.  As 
such, I argue that critical history is Nietzsche’s modus operandi in the Genealogy.    95 
As early as 1873, in a notebook entry, Nietzsche writes:  “Christianity has 
been entirely turned over to critical history.”
163  So, as Jörg Salaquarda, for example, 
concludes:  “The genealogies of [Nietzsche’s] later writings involve what he terms 
‘critical history.’”
164   Yet this immediate inference raises two questions: (1) what 
reasons are there for interpreting Nietzsche’s Genealogy as an exercise in critical 
historiography? And (2) if there are such reasons, then how is critical history 
manifested in Nietzsche’s later writings?  I shall address these questions in turn. 
The Genealogy, Nietzsche informs us, is “a sequel to my last book, Beyond 
Good and Evil, which it is meant to supplement and clarify.”
165  And of Beyond Good 
and Evil, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes:   
…the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for the 
No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war—
conjuring up a day of decision.  This included the slow search for those related 
to me, those who, prompted by strength, would offer me their hands for 
destroying (EH ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ 1).   
 
It is in Beyond Good and Evil, according to Nietzsche, that the “No-saying, No-
doing” aspect of his re-evaluation of values commences, and he alerts us here that he 
wishes to engender others to partake in this task.  So, if the Genealogy is intended to 
supplement and clarify his previous book, then it stands to reason that the Genealogy 
in some respects must be an activity in “destroying,” in “No-saying [and] No-doing.”   
Yet, in order to engage in this activity, of “destroying,” one must first scrupulously 
examine entrenched narratives, deep-rooted evaluative frameworks, to determine, or 
“to be clear just how unjust the existence of anything—a privilege, a caste, a dynast, 
for example—is, and how greatly this thing deserves to perish” (HL III 76).  And, as 
Nietzsche makes clear in the second Untimely Meditation, this activity is the purview, 
the domain of the critical mode of historiography.  Neither the monumental mode, nor 
the antiquarian mode of historiography frames history in such a way as to engender 
this particular response; monumental historiography selects exemplary models and 
figures from the past which are worthy of imitation, whilst antiquarian historiography 
patiently and piously focuses upon that which is considered valuable.  Thus, given 
that Nietzsche describes his task as one of “No-saying [and] No-doing” and that this 
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activity is taken up through the construction of a critical history, then we can conclude 
that Nietzsche’s Genealogy is a demonstration of the critical mode of historiography.  
However, if the foregoing is persuasive, then we are still in need of an account 
of how this mode of historiography is manifested in the Genealogy. The object of 
critical history is to, as Foucault puts the point, uproot “traditional foundations and 
relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity.”
166  In the Genealogy Nietzsche takes up 
this task, the task that is of “break[ing] up and dissolv[ing] a part of the past,” by 
employing the critical mode of historiography, which is meant to “judge and 
condemn” entrenched narratives as well as the assumed stability of such accounts (HL 
III 75, 72).  I will highlight two moments in which critical history, so described, is 
manifested in the Genealogy. 
First, consider Nietzsche’s mini-genealogy of the concept of “punishment,” 
where critical history is manifested in, at least, two respects: (1) Nietzsche disrupts 
the claim, often assumed by the naïve genealogists, that the meanings of our concepts 
are stable and unchanging, and in so doing uproots the essentialist’s commitment to a 
singular meaning of a concept. And (2) in disrupting the hegemonic interpretation of 
our concepts Nietzsche demonstrates that our concepts do not represent an unbroken 
continuity, but rather a constant struggle between varying meanings which have, in 
many cases, been retrospectively united with the concept. Accordingly, critical history 
is manifested through the tracing of the sidelined or overlooked meanings that the 
concept of punishment has been made to serve, which, at the same time, serves to 
break-up and dissolve the contention that the meanings that we ascribe to concepts 
have been stable and permanent over the course of history.  
 Second, Nietzsche’s account of the slave revolt in morals can be viewed as a 
demonstration in critical historiography. Here this mode of history is manifested in 
two ways: (1) In teasing out our forgotten noble past Nietzsche disrupts the absolute 
dominance of the slave mode of evaluation.  And (2) he “takes a knife to [the slave 
mode of evaluation] roots” insofar as he demonstrates that the morality, which was 
accepted as given, as ahistorical, and as beyond all question, is a product of a 
reinterpretation.  Accordingly, slave morality loses the right to claims to absolute 
supremacy, and Nietzsche has broken up and dissolved a piece of the past in 
rendering such a claim untenable.   
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Further, it is worth noting that Nietzsche in the final section of the First Essay 
writes: “assuming that it has been abundantly clear what my aim is, what the aim of 
that dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my last book Beyond Good 
and Evil. —At least this does not mean ‘Beyond Good and Bad’” (GM I 17).  There 
are two points worth making relevant to our discussion of the critical mode of 
historiography: (1) Nietzsche’s aims in the First Essay include making sense of the 
“dangerous slogan” “beyond good and evil,” by demonstrating that the slave mode of 
valuation is a re-evaluation of another mode of valuation.  Through this demonstration 
critical history is manifested insofar as Nietzsche disrupts the assumption that there is 
only one mode of human valuation.  And (2) he raises as possibility another re-
evaluation in morals is possible.  For if a re-evaluation of the noble mode of 
evaluation was actualized by the slave mode of evaluation, then it stands to reason 
that another re-evaluation is possible (BGE 202).  Thus, the critical mode of 
historiography seeks to both liberate the ground, and to provide the impetus to create 
upon the ground thus liberated (HL VII 95).  
So, the critical mode of historiography is both discernable in the Genealogy, 
and is the mode of historiography which maps most closely onto the objectives, as 
presented in Ecce Homo, of this phase of Nietzsche’s writings, which he cashes out as 
the “No-saying, No-doing” portion of his work. For these reasons we can conclude 
that the Genealogy is an exercise, and demonstration of the critical mode of 
historiography.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Historical philosophy for Nietzsche provides an account of where we came 
from, and as such provides an explanation of how we have become held captive by a 
number of problematic assumptions.  His meditation on history provides a detailed 
account of how we can employ history to overcome such assumptions and it supplies 
a picture of the value of history generally. We can use history to shape and form our 
self-understanding. 
I stated at the beginning that my overarching objective in this Chapter is to 
provide an account of Nietzsche’s historical philosophy and in so doing, to begin to 
morph the, at present, uninformative equation of genealogy with history into an   98 
informative one.  To supply an answer to the question of what history is correctly 
practiced for Nietzsche, I accordingly began by presenting two pictures of 
historiography, which Nietzsche opposes, in order to shape his positive views 
concerning the correct use of history.  Moreover, I offered a reading of the second of 
the Untimely Meditations in order to demonstrate that history correctly practiced 
provides us with the tools to shape and form the past according to our current needs.  I 
then raised and dismissed Brobjer’s objection to the use of the meditation on history, 
before arguing that the Genealogy represents the critical mode of history.  Nietzsche’s 
use of the critical form of historiography thus represents the need to question 
entrenched narratives and provides us with an alternative picture of the past, one 
which has been obscured from sight: that our seemingly universal and binding 
conception of ourselves is itself a product of a re-evaluation, and as such, new 
interpretations are, or, at least, should be, possible.  This served to provide an answer 
to the question:  What, for Nietzsche, is history correctly practiced?  
However, before I make good on my promise, to morph the uninformative 
equation of history with genealogy into an informative one, there is a pressing 
question that requires an answer:  Does Nietzsche’s insistence upon investigating the 
“actual history of morality” represent a sustained methodological objective?  For 
many scholars have noted that the Genealogy unambiguously possesses a mythical 
and fictional quality. Thus, the question, which looms large within Nietzsche 
scholarship generally: Is the Genealogy an historical account or an interesting and 
useful fiction? is one to which I now turn.  
 
 
   99 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Genealogy as History 
 
 
  The ongoing debate in Nietzsche scholarship regarding the relationship of 
genealogy to history requires attention.  Though Nietzsche claims that “there is 
needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which [our values] grew 
under which they have evolved and changed…” many scholars have suggested that 
his genealogical accounts are best understood in fictional or mythical terms (GM P 6).  
I first examine what I will term the Williams and May objection.  This objection is 
representative of the widely held position that Nietzsche’s genealogical “stories” 
possess a “mythical quality” and that this feature precludes such accounts from being 
genuine history.
167  The worry, precisely expressed by Bergmann, is “How can one 
fathom or imagine the process through which these qualities were elevated into 
values? … In effect Nietzsche responds with a story.  He himself provides much 
evidence for it and insists on its truth, but it also has a mythical quality…”
168 What 
makes the Williams and May objection unique in the secondary scholarship is that 
both Williams and May are committed to the claim that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
narratives, despite a mythical quality, serve a useful function; this mythical quality is 
cashed out by May as fiction, and by Williams as quasi-historical.  I have joined them 
together in a single objection because the two interpretations concerning the historical 
veracity of Nietzsche’s genealogical narrative form one objection insofar as May’s 
commitments are a deeper version of Williams.’  Then I argue that the May and 
Williams objection to the historical veracity of Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts 
rests upon three errors.  Finally, I conclude that the Williams and May objection is 
unfounded and Nietzsche’s Genealogy may be understood as an exercise in the 
correct practice of history. 
   
1. Genealogy as Useful Fiction:  The May and Williams Objection   
 
                                                 
167 See, for example:  White, Richard (1994) p. 67, and Acampora, Christa Davis and Acampora, Ralph 
(2004) pp.162-163.  Also Lawrence Hatab  (2008) concludes:  “Nietzsche deploys quasi-historical, 
genealogical discussions to subvert the confidence in traditional belief systems.” p. 29 
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In Nietzsche’s Ethics and his War on Morality May unambiguously argues for 
the useful function of Nietzsche’s genealogical stories despite their unreal quality.  He 
puts the point this way:   
Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts, of which that of the masters and slaves is a 
paradigm, are best taken as fictional; but that does not prevent them from 
being valuable as ways of getting us to think, even if hypothetically, about the 
functions of our actual ethical practices and their motivations by relating them 
to possible earlier more elementary practices and motivations which are free 
of the search for ‘timeless groundings.
169  
May’s interpretation is clear: history serves essentially no function within Nietzsche’s 
genealogical account concerning the origins of morality.  Nevertheless, May is 
without question committed to the claim that though Nietzsche’s genealogical 
accounts are entirely fictional, they still perform a useful function. Similarly, in his 
article entitled “Naturalism and Genealogy” Williams argues:   
There may also be a role for imaginary history, a fictional development story, 
which helps to explain a concept or value or institution by showing ways in 
which it could have come about in a simplified environment which contains 
certain kinds of human interests or capacities, which, relative to this story, are 
taken as given.  The paradigm example is of course state of nature stories 
about the origins of the state…
170 
 
One of the advantages of a fictional genealogical narrative is that it allows us to 
examine the way a particular concept, or value may have come about.  In this sense 
the fictional genealogy displaces the privileged position afforded to the value in 
question and allows for the re-evaluation of that value.  For Williams the fictional 
genealogical narrative is especially useful for a re-evaluation of a value which one 
considered and esteemed as intrinsically valuable.
171  
The benefit of a fictional starting point is that it need not be thought of as 
historically rooted.  In this sense one can demonstrate how it was possible to 
formulate a concept, say of justice, without, at the same time, being committed to 
providing historical evidence for that particular narrative. The fictional narrative is 
intended not only to make us more comfortable with our use of a particular concept, 
but further, to demonstrate that the concept is not inexplicable or mysterious.  In this 
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sense the fictional genealogy can demonstrate that a new sort of theoretical 
explanation is possible. Within the context of a fictional genealogy, we can 
investigate the psychological processes contributing to our formulation and our 
understanding of concepts.  
I argue that three errors, or problems, lead to the conclusion that Nietzsche’s 
genealogies are best taken as useful fictions. These errors can be boiled down into the 
following three commitments: (1) Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives take place in 
“prehistory.”  (2) History correctly practiced is not “painstakingly vague” but 
“patiently documentary.” Thus Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives, if they are to be 
considered historical, must take the form of the antiquarian mode of history first 
elucidated in 1874. (3) The absence of atomic facts warrants the claim that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts possess a mythical quality.  In the following 
section I will offer useful correctives to each of these errors beginning with what I 
take to be the error of “prehistory.”  The suggestion, that I will subsequently urge us 
to resist, is that the concept of “prehistory” possesses a unique explanatory power. 
Secondly, and remaining on the textual level, I argue that by placing Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy in the context of his corpus, particularly his most sustained discussion of 
the topic of history, the second Untimely Meditation, the implicit demand to count 
“history” only as the antiquarian mode loses its force.  In so doing I argue that 
Nietzsche’s emphasis in 1874 on varying modes of history should not be precluded.  
Lastly, I will problematize the role of “facts” in historical investigations. If each of 
these three errors is overcome, then so too is the claim that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
narratives are useful fictions. 
 
2. On the Use and Abuse of the Concept of “Prehistory” 
 
The events of Nietzsche’s genealogical narrative take place in an unknown 
prehistory.  This claim permeates the scholarship on the Genealogy.  Consider two 
examples: 
“In the First Essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche clarifies this basic typology of 
masters and slaves within the context of a mythical prehistory.”
172  
  
“What Nietzsche says about prehistory in this [the second] essay follows 
unclear chronology.”
173 
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Nietzsche scholars, plainly, employ the concept of prehistory to clarify the 
proceedings and the chronology of Nietzsche’s genealogical narrative.  The use of the 
concept of prehistory, if only implicitly, suggests that Nietzsche’s narratives lack 
historical veracity, for they take place in an unrecorded and undocumented period of 
development. Thus, the use of the concept of prehistory lends credence to the thesis 
advanced by May and Williams that Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts are mythical 
fictions, bizarre, but interesting fables.   
To ward off this conclusion I present two possible ways of viewing 
Nietzsche’s use of the concept of “pre-history” as a means of unpacking the events of 
the Genealogy. The overarching objective of this discussion is to surmount the 
interpretation of the Genealogy that suggests that the totality of Nietzsche’s narrative 
charts the developments of an unknown “prehistory.”  The first option is undoubtedly 
radical in character: I argue that the concept of prehistory is both murky in nature and 
particularly unhelpful when employed to elucidate the proceedings of the Genealogy. 
By drawing on the work of Jaspers as well as the writings of Marx and Engels I 
problematize the commitment to a strict demarcation between the pre-historical and 
the historical. In so doing, I suggest that the concept of prehistory is unnecessarily 
employed by Nietzsche.
174 By contrast, the second alternative argues for the 
conservative thesis:  The concept of “pre-history” is employed by Nietzsche to 
illuminate a certain set of the proceedings of the Second Essay of the Genealogy, and, 
accordingly is a viable concept.  Nevertheless, I argue that even if we concede that 
some of the events of the Second Essay take place in “pre-history,” we still must 
account for the events of the First and Third Essays, which clearly take place in 
“history.”  Thus, by travelling down either of these paths: (1) through problematizing 
the strict demarcation between the pre-historical and the historical, and, as a result, 
concluding that the concept of pre-history does not serve an illuminating role in the 
Genealogy or (2) by conceding that a set of the events of the Second Essay take place 
in “prehistory” we arrive at a destination, which overcomes the claim tacitly assumed 
in the May and Williams objection:  all of the events of the genealogy take place in an 
unknown, undocumented, quasi-historical period. 
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2.1 On Forsaking the “Concept” of “Prehistory”  
 
To substantiate the central thesis of this section:  namely that Nietzsche 
unnecessarily employs the concept of “prehistory” to clarify the chronology of the 
Second Essay of the Genealogy, and, as a result, we should abandon our use of the 
concept as a means to unpack the proceeding of the Genealogy, I begin by charting 
the development of the concept of history to determine whether there is a strict 
demarcation between that which is considered squarely historical, and that which falls 
under the umbrella of the term “pre-history.”  Then I trace Nietzsche’s employment of 
the concept in the Second Essay of the Genealogy. I conclude by drawing on the work 
of Karl Popper as well as the work of Marx and Engels to suggest that Nietzsche need 
not employ the concept of “pre-history” and that the events of the Second Essay can 
be considered properly historical. 
The concept of history first arises out of the work of “Herodotus…who has 
remained father of Western history.”
175 Herodotus describes his work as the “activity 
of preserv[ing] that which owes its existence to men, lest it be obliterated by time, and 
to bestow upon the glorious, wondrous deeds of Greek and barbarians sufficient 
praise to assure their remembrance by posterity and thus make their glory shine 
through the centuries.”
176  Thus history, so understood, is the preservation of the 
deeds, in this case “glorious” and “wondrous,” of men such that prehistory would then 
denote everything before the work of Herodotus.  The historical on this account has 
two defining features: (1) The historical is that which begins when human beings 
begin writing about other human beings, thus precluding all that is before recorded 
history. (2) The historical is historiography concerned with preserving for posterity 
“glorious” and “wondrous” deeds of human beings.  However, it bears reflecting on 
how closely Nietzsche’s use of the concept history maps onto this commonplace 
understanding of the limits of history.  
Returning to Nietzsche’s thoughts on history generally we can, by appealing to 
the second of the Untimely Meditations, quite easily do away with the second 
criterion.  Here Nietzsche is clearly committed to the idea that history can play roles 
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other than caring for the legacy of splendid and celebrated deeds; history can also be 
critical or patiently documentary.
177  The first criterion is not so easily done away 
with. For, it seems, as many scholars have noted, the events of the Second Essay quite 
clearly take place in “prehistory.” Prehistory here is understood as that which takes 
place before recorded history. If this is indeed the case, then the Williams and May 
objection stands insofar as Nietzsche’s account of proceedings in the Second Essay 
charts an unrecorded and undocumented period, and hence possess a mythical quality.  
This is worth further investigation, for several thinkers have challenged the 
claim that history proper coincides with the advent of historiography. Jaspers, for 
example, argues that: “History extends as far back as linguistic evidence. …Nowhere 
does linguistic evidence extend further back than 3000 B.C. History has therefore 
lasted about 5,000 years.”
178 On this account history does not originate with 
historiography but rather with the advent of language and with linguistic evidence.  
Jaspers puts the point this way:  “Silence no longer reigns; men speak to one another 
in written documents, and thereby to us once we have learned to understand their 
scripts and their language; they speak in buildings, which presuppose 
organization…”
179 Accordingly, history is not limited to the particular activity of 
preserving for posterity the actions of other men through writing. Hence, prehistory, 
on this account, precludes that which takes place before linguistic communication of 
the most varying kinds and not that which takes place before the advent of 
historiography.  Thus, at least for Jaspers, history proper has lasted roughly 5,000 
years. 
Marx and Engels also problematize the strict demarcation between the 
historical and the pre-historical, albeit to a greater degree than Jaspers. Thus, they 
arrive at a more contentious and, perhaps, controversial conclusion.  Marx and Engels 
suggest:   
…men must be in a position to live in order to able to ‘make history.’ But life 
involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and 
many other things.  The first historical act is thus the production of the means 
to satisfy these needs...And indeed this is an historical act...The second point is 
that the satisfaction of this first need...leads to new needs; and this production 
of new needs is the first historical act. The third circumstance which, from the 
very outset, enters into historical development, is that men, who daily remake 
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their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation 
between man and woman, parents and children, the family.
180 
 
So as not to be misunderstood they continue: 
 
These three aspects of social activity are not of course to be taken as three 
different stages, but just as three aspects or…three ‘moments,’ which have 
existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first men…
181   
 
Historical acts on this account do not commence with historiography, nor is history 
equated with the practice of writing generally.  That is, Marx and Engels challenge the 
tidy demarcation between the pre-historical and the historical by widening the 
category of the historical to include the production of the means to satisfy our most 
basic needs: eating, drinking and habitation.
182 In addition, on Marx and Engels’ 
account, each of these historical acts takes place within the context of an established 
community and constitutes a social activity.
   
  The aim of this discussion is not to arrive at some essential demarcation 
between the historical and the pre-historical.
183 Rather, the aim is to encourage the 
abandonment of the commonplace distinction between the historical and the pre-
historical, which centers on the emergence of historiography as a means of unpacking 
each of the events of the Genealogy.   
  Nevertheless, Nietzsche does employ the concept of “pre-history” in the 
Genealogy.
184  Consider a few such instances: 
 
A) “One can well believe that the answers and methods for solving this 
primeval problem [the problem, that is, of determining a satisfactory answer to 
the question: “how can one create a memory for the human animal?] were not 
precisely gentle; perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny 
in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics” (GM II 3). 
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B) “Still retaining the criteria of prehistory (this prehistory is in any case 
present in all ages or may reappear): the community, too, stands to its 
members in the same vital basic relation, that of the creditor to his debtors” 
(GM II 9). 
 
C) “Thus one misunderstands psychology and the reality of things even as 
they apply today: how much more as they applied during the greater part of 
man’s history, his prehistory!” (GM II 14) 
 
Given Nietzsche’s use of the concept of “pre-history,” coupled with the foregoing 
discussion of the rather murky nature of the concept, the question surfaces: What 
explanatory power does the concept of “pre-history” serve in aiding us in tracing the 
chronology of the Second Essay?    The previous discussion should have already cast 
some doubt concerning Nietzsche’s use of the concept in B, above.  For if Nietzsche 
is committed to a strict demarcation between that which is properly historical and that 
which is found under the umbrella term of “pre-history,” then there seems to be little 
reason for him to claim that “this prehistory is in any case present in all ages or may 
reappear” (GM II 9).  In other words, if the concept of “pre-history” is meant to 
capture a set of events that take place in a largely undocumented period of 
development, then it seems absurd to, at the same time, suggest that such a 
mythological construct, or, at least, an undocumented feature, can be found, or traced, 
throughout all ages.  
Further, in terms of illuminating the chronology of the Second Essay, one 
could claim that Nietzsche unnecessarily employs the concept of “pre-history.” If, 
following Marx and Engels, for example, we contend that the historical captures in its 
net a wide variety of acts including, but not limited to, the production of the means to 
satisfy our most basic needs, and if we maintain that each of these acts take place 
within the context of a community and, accordingly, are social activities, then 
Nietzsche’s use of the concept of “pre-history” is objectionable. The events of the 
Second Essay, despite Nietzsche’s insistence to the contrary, take place squarely in an 
historical period.  Let us consider the first event, chronologically, of the Second Essay   107 
of the Genealogy: the internalization of our animal instincts, and the origins of bad 
conscience.  
The Second Essay, entitled “‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like,” has as 
its object of inquiry the following question: “…how did that other ‘sober thing,’ the 
consciousness of guilt, the ‘bad consciousness,’ come into the world?” (GM II 4)
185  It 
is not my intention to undertake a detailed account of the emergence of “bad 
conscience,” nor do I intend to examine the varying ramifications of this mode of 
conscience.  Rather, the objective is to determine how, according to Nietzsche, this 
form of conscience emerges, and whether or not it finds its genesis in the context of a 
community, and hence is an historical event on the account that Marx and Engels 
offer. 
The bad conscience is a mode of consciousness. Of consciousness, in The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche writes:  “consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual 
existence but rather to his social or herd nature…” (GS 354). Concerning bad 
conscience Nietzsche tells us that he regards this mode of consciousness as “… the 
serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most 
fundamental change he ever experienced—that change when he found himself finally 
enclosed within the walls of society and peace” (GM II 16).  On Nietzsche’s account, 
then, it is through the social fabric of community woven out of the disparate strands of 
custom, including the varying threads of the creditor-debtor relationship, more 
pointedly, through the complex legal, political and religious manifestations of such a 
relationship, in which the origins of bad conscience are found.
186 Hence, the first 
event, chronologically, of the Second Essay takes place within the “walls of society,” 
it represents man’s “social or herd nature,” and as a result, according to the account of 
the historical provided by Marx and Engels, is an historical event, for it constitutes a 
social activity.   
If the foregoing represents a cogent reconstruction of the first chronological 
event of the Second Essay, then we can conclude that Nietzsche’s use of the concept 
of pre-history is questionable.  It is questionable because Nietzsche is committed to 
tracking the emergence of bad consciousness in terms of society, and this implies a 
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level of cultural advancement, which his use of the notion of pre-history fails to 
capture.  Accordingly, we can call upon the work of Marx and Engels to cast doubt 
upon Nietzsche’s invocation of the concept of “pre-history,” and further we are in the 
position to make the stronger claim that Nietzsche overstates this point in claiming 
that these events take place in “pre-history.”  Thus, one way to mitigate the May and 
Williams objection is to argue that the events that Nietzsche describes as taking place 
in an unknown “pre-history,” actually take place in history, given the rather illusive 
character of charting a precise demarcation between that which is considered 
historical versus that which is deemed merely pre-historical.  
However, given the radical nature of the thesis I have been advancing, one 
could nonetheless argue that the May and Williams objection stands insofar as 
Nietzsche does employ the concept of pre-history, and our commonplace 
understanding of this concept implies an undocumented and unknown period of 
development.  And, for this reason, May and Williams are correct to conclude that 
Nietzsche’s use of the concept of pre-history warrants the claim that the Genealogy 
possesses a mythical quality, and his quality precludes the narrative from being 
genuine history.  In the section that follows I will argue for the milder thesis, which 
suggests that even if we grant that the concept of pre-history serves a function in 
illuminating a portion of chronology of the Second Essay of the Genealogy it 
nevertheless remains far from clear that the totality of the events of the Genealogy can 
be unpacked in accordance with the commonplace use of the concept of pre-history.  
That is, even if we permit a limited explanatory scope to the concept of pre-history it 
does not follow that all of the events of the Genealogy take place in such a period.  
The following section will be dedicated to substantiating this assertion. 
 
2.2 On Retaining but Limiting the Scope of the Concept of “Pre-History” 
 
Given the number of times that Nietzsche employs the concept of “pre-
history” in the Second Essay, one could argue that the narrative reconstructs events 
that took place in the prehistoric.  This is possible even if it is admitted that the 
demarcation between the pre-historical and the historical is rather blurry.  Further, one 
could similarly argue that Nietzsche appears quite committed to unpacking the events 
of the Second Essay by appealing to the concept of pre-history.  Scholars who are   109 
sympathetic to the thesis that I have been advancing, namely, that Nietzsche is 
engaged in “real history,” have made this claim. Brian Leiter, for example, writes: 
The second major event (the subject of GM II) is actually the first 
chronologically: it calls our attention to an event from prehistory...that 
creatures like us give up the outward expression of our natural aggressive and 
cruel instincts.
187  
 
While David Owen finds: 
 
…the question becomes that of how the task of ‘making man to a certain, 
necessary, uniform, and equal among equals, regular and consequently 
calculable (GM II 2) is accomplished?  Nietzsche’s hypothesis is that this is 
achieved in the prehistory of humanity…
188 
 
And, on the face of it, there are good reasons for these assessments.  After all, as both 
Leiter and Owen have pointed out, Nietzsche, in the Second Essay, claims that he is 
embarking on a discussion of how the animal-man became responsible, that is to say 
regular, uniform, and consequently calculable (GM II 2).  There Nietzsche claims that 
“this labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of 
the human race, his entire prehistoric labor, finds in this its meaning…with the aid of 
the morality of mores and the social straightjacket, man was actually made calculable 
(GM II 2). Though, on this reading, it is clear that Nietzsche understands some of the 
events of the Second Essay to have occurred in a pre-historical period of development 
this does not entail that the entirety of the Genealogy should be understood as taking 
place during an unknown prehistory.  This final claim, that in the Genealogy 
Nietzsche traces an unknown, mythological period of development, is a tacit 
assumption in the May and Williams’ objection.  
Claims of this sort are further evidenced in Richard White’s suggestion that: 
“In the First Essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche clarifies this basic typology of 
masters and slaves within the context of a mythical prehistory.”
189  Simply because 
one aspect of Nietzsche’s genealogical narrative, namely a certain set of the events of 
the Second Essay, takes place in “prehistory,” it does not follow that all of the events 
Nietzsche subsequently recounts are from the pre-historical period.  Thus, White’s 
suggestion that the events of the First Essay take place within the context of a 
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mythical prehistory simultaneously lends credence to the May and Williams’ 
objection.  For, the demand present in the May and Williams’ objection is that all of 
the events of the genealogy have a quasi-historical and mythical quality. Recall, for 
example, May’s claim: “Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts, of which that of the 
masters and slaves is a paradigm, are best taken as fictional…”
190 Here, May is 
arguing that the events of the First Essay, particularly Nietzsche’s account of the slave 
revolt in morals, has a mythical quality, and as such is best understood as a fictional 
account.  Thus, for May, Nietzsche’s “paradigmatic” genealogical narrative takes 
place in an undocumented and unrecorded period of development.  This is an example 
of the error of attempting to unpack all of the events of the Genealogy in terms of an 
unknown period of development, and hence places an extraordinary interpretative 
significance upon a pre-historical, or, at least, quasi-historical, period of development.   
 Thus, another way we can mitigate “the mythical quality” of Nietzsche’s 
genealogical accounts is to forsake the commitment to unpacking all of the events of 
the Genealogy by employing the concept of prehistory. Instead, and in accordance 
with the milder thesis, we are in the position, accordingly, to limit the scope of the 
postulates regarding the unknown or mythical aspects of Nietzsche’s Genealogy.  As 
a result, and granting the milder thesis, we can contend that the events of the First and 
the Third Essay take place in history proper, understood as that which takes place 
after the advent of historiography.  I mentioned, in the introduction to this chapter that 
there are other ways to unpack these events as well.  In the following section, I will 
highlight the problematic contention that Nietzsche’s narrative, if it is to count as 
history at all, must take the form of antiquarian history.    
   
3. Genealogy as Antiquarian History  
 
  In this section I make two claims.  The first claim is negative. I point out that 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy is taken as a mythical fiction because of an implicit 
assumption that history correctly practiced must take the form of antiquarian history. 
This, in turn, leads to my positive claim:  Nietzsche offers alternative versions of 
historiography in 1874, such that the demand that Nietzsche’s Genealogy, if it is to be 
an historical account, must take the form of antiquarian history is rendered moot.     
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  Nietzsche’s Genealogy lacks the typical trappings of a work of history, and, as 
a result, May and Williams conclude that Nietzsche’s genealogical narrative is best 
understood in mythical or quasi-historical terms.  In what follows Ken Gemes 
precisely expresses this particular worry, which is evident in the May and Williams 
objection: 
….the absence of all the scholarly apparatus typical of a historical work 
(references, footnotes and the like), the sweeping nature of Nietzsche’s various 
historical narratives, their lack of historical specificity, and the fact that he 
subtitles the his work a polemic—creates the unsettling feeling that Nietzsche 
is, despite his explicit rubric of historical interest, not really telling us about 
the history of our morality.
191  
 
Gemes’ concern is one shared by May and Williams: Nietzsche’s account is so vague 
and imprecise that one is left to conclude that the Genealogy is “a history that is not 
really a history.”
192 Thus, one way to counteract the mythical quality of Nietzsche’s 
rhetoric is to call upon the work of scholars who have toiled to provide the Genealogy 
with the appropriate facts and other evidential substantiation that it clearly lacks.  For 
example Brian Leiter, indeed, finds that “it certainly bears remarking that modern 
scholars have now largely supplied the scholarly annotations that are missing, 
demonstrating that in the Genealogy, Nietzsche did rely extensively on contemporary 
scholarship.”
193 Interpretations of this sort, however, simply reinforce the assumption 
that history correctly practiced is “patiently documentary.” This line of thought, if 
only tacitly, suggests that Nietzsche’s Genealogy is not proper history.  Therefore, we 
can provide the account with the evidential source materials that it lacks. In so doing 
we can morph what is clearly a polemic into what can be categorized as an 
appropriate historical treatise.  
   The assumption here, that real history is not “infuriatingly vague” but 
“painstakingly documentary,” is also present in the work of Williams. This point will 
become clear as we consider Williams’ take on the interpretive conundrum 
Nietzsche’s historical account in the Genealogy raises: 
[Nietzsche’s Genealogy] seems to hit on something with great exactitude, and 
at the same time of being infuriatingly vague…It has something to do with 
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history, though it is far from clear what history: there are some vaguely 
situated masters and slaves; then a historical change, which has something to 
do with the Jews or Christians; there is a process which culminates perhaps in 
the Reformation, perhaps in Kant.  It has been going for 2000 years (GM I 
7).
194 
 
Here Williams’ assessment is clear: Nietzsche’s genealogy is frustrating in its 
imprecise tracking of two millennia of history. Moreover, it is vague precisely 
because the trappings of a scholarly treatise are absent.  And this rendering leads us to 
the implicit assumption present in Williams’ argument: history correctly presented 
preserves and thus reveres through the meticulous collecting of source materials (HL 
III 74).  Nietzsche labels such historiography, which is fixatedly concerned with 
preservation, the antiquarian mode of history and he goes on to make the rather 
striking claim that this mode of history “is today usually designated as the real sense 
of history” (HL III 74). Thus, the complete version of Williams’ argument reads: if 
Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts do not take the form of antiquarian history, then 
such an account is not history proper, but an infuriatingly vague quasi-historical 
narrative.   
  The supposition that Nietzsche’s genealogy, if it is to be considered an 
historical account, must take the form of antiquarian history precludes the other 
modes of history presented in his reflections on the uses and disadvantages of history 
for life; the monumental and the critical modes of historiography. In his most 
sustained discussion of the topic of history Nietzsche tells us that the primary function 
of the antiquarian mode of history is to preserve and revere by tending to the past with 
a particular brand of piety.  Antiquarian history thus provides the justification for and 
further encourages one to “cling to one’s own environment and companions, one’s 
own toilsome customs, one’s own bare mountainside…” (HL III 73). Whereas the 
monumental and critical modes of historiography serve decidedly different functions. 
The former highlights exemplary achievements in order to demonstrate that greatness 
“was in any event once possible and may thus be possible again.” The latter serves to 
mitigate the totalitarian effects of the other forms of historiography by providing the 
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apparatus to view entrenched narratives scrupulously (HL II 69).  In light of the other 
modes of history Nietzsche presents, we should forsake the commonplace temptation 
to equate historiography proper with antiquarian history. Nietzsche, in the second of 
the Untimely Meditations, indeed warns us that the antiquarian mode of history is not 
only the mode of historiography which is most closely associated with “real history,” 
but also that this particular mode of history is precarious precisely in its presentation 
of the past as monolithic.  Nietzsche unambiguously forsakes this mode of 
historiography in the Genealogy insofar as he alerts us that his aims include shaking 
us from our “toilsome customs,” our entrenched evaluative frameworks.  David 
Allison puts the point this way: 
As [Nietzsche] describes the Genealogy in his later work, Ecce Homo, ‘The 
three inquires which constitute this Genealogy are perhaps uncannier than 
anything else written so far.’ Uncanny: the German word is unheimlich, which 
derives from the old German word for home, Heimat and its derivative 
Heimlich, homely, comfortable, at ease in familiar surroundings.  Uncanny, or 
unheimlich, thus means strange, weird, without a home.  There is neither a 
dwelling nor a resting place, no sure place to sleep and to dream of good and 
evil, much less to celebrate their homecoming.
195      
 
This should alert us that the Genealogy is not a formless, shapeless, or otherwise 
arbitrary and unsupervised historical exercise.  Rather, the historical takes shape by 
the very form Nietzsche, as historian, imposes upon it. And as indicated by Allison 
this form is designed to jolt us from our “comfortable resting place,” our entrenched 
sensibilities.  Consequently, another means of neutralizing the Williams and May 
objection is to point out the implicit demand present in their arguments.  
Furthermore the contention that antiquarian historiography is the only 
effective means to treat and discuss historical issues generates the final problem I 
mentioned in the introduction.  That is that the univocal commitment to this form of 
historiography demands a thoroughly positivistic commitment to facts, and a lot of 
them. A commitment that is decidedly un-Nietzschean in character.   
 
4. On Historical “Facts” in the Genealogy  
   
R.G. Collingwood neatly expresses the 19
th century view of the role brute 
facts play in historiography: “Each fact was to be thought of not only as independent 
of all the rest but as independent of the knower, so that all subjective elements (as 
                                                 
195 Allison, David (2001) pp. 246-247   114 
they were called) in the historian’s point of view had to be eliminated.  The historian 
must pass no judgment on the facts:  he must say what they are.”
196  Drawing on 
Collingwood’s analysis it is my claim that this particular conception of the role of 
facts in historical analysis is lurking behind the claim that Nietzsche’s genealogy is 
not an historical endeavor but a quasi-historical one.   The quasi-historical nature of 
Nietzsche’s genealogical account is evidenced by the absence of the traditional 
scholarly trappings of an historical treatise, that is, by the complete absence of 
unmitigated brute facts that can be ascertained from a neutral position.   
Nietzsche is unambiguously critical of historiographers that purport to offer 
the unmitigated brute facts of an historical event.  This commitment is expressed in an 
often overlook tirade in the Genealogy in which Nietzsche labels historians with this 
particular commitment the historical nihilists.
197  The historical nihilists claim that 
their historical investigations simply hold up a mirror.  Nietzsche insists that “[their 
methodology] rejects all teleology; it no longer wishes to ‘prove’ anything; it disdains 
to play the judge and considers this a sign of good taste—it affirms as little as it 
denies; it ascertains it describes…” (GM III 26).  Briefly, Nietzsche criticizes such 
historians for this reason: it is paradoxical to suggest that an historical inquiry can be 
conducted from such a neutral position.  Likewise Nietzsche challenges the view that 
historiography conducted from such an epistemic position yields the brute facts of an 
event.   
Historical facts, for Nietzsche, are always bound to the particular system of 
purposes which provide them meaning.  In other words historiography is always 
constrained by particular kinds of questions:  What is this fact for?  What does this 
fact serve to demonstrate?
 198  As such, historiography is bound up with the interests 
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that:   115 
of the particular historian.  Additionally, the qualitative nature of historiography 
demands the historian select some of the facts, at the expense of others, in order to be 
able tell a cogent story.
 In other words any historical account involves the selection of 
some of the facts at the expense of others.  In this the historian is much like, to use 
Howard Zinn’s analogy, a cartographer: 
It is not that the historian can avoid emphasis of some facts and not of others.  
This is as natural to him as to the mapmaker, who, in order to produce a usable 
drawing for practical purposes, must first flatten and distort the shape of the 
earth, then choose out of the bewildering mass of geographic information 
those things needed for the purpose of this or that particular map.
199   
 
Thus selection, simplification, and emphasis are interpretative necessities for the 
cartographer and the historian to produce coherent works.  Once we explicitly 
acknowledge that the historian highlights, chooses and shapes the vast collection of 
historical data we can simultaneously note that the historian imposes a particular form 
upon the facts of history. This imposition of form upon content is an inherently 
interpretive and creative endeavor capable of re-orienting our perspectives.   
In light of these considerations we can then conclude that genealogy is not a 
bizarre and interesting fable lacking the virtue of historical veracity.  The May and 
Williams’ interpretation denies the fundamentally interpretive role of the historian, 
and in so doing presupposes a static picture of historiography.  Nietzsche in the 
Genealogy selects, simplifies and places emphasis upon certain historical facts at the 
expense of others.  And in viewing Nietzsche’s role as historian in this way the 
questions concerning the lack of brute facts in the Genealogy are rendered 
superfluous. 
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                 
…the Ideal Chronicler is a coherent conception, it is nevertheless apparent that no such device 
at our dinner party could, without amendment, provide us with the story we are seeking.  This 
is for the rather obvious reason that a great many events which happened in the course of the 
evening are not relevant to that story; though they indeed did happen, they reveal nothing 
about how the dinner party turned into a fiasco.  Some such events will not figure into the 
story because they are inherently trivial—a knife or fork becoming dirty as it is used, a 
wineglass becoming wet as wine is poured into it for instance.  Other happenings, on the face 
of it trivial—nose blowings, for example, or many of the remarks made at the table—could in 
principle have been significant; a chance remark made in a sudden silence can take on 
unintended significance.  But as it turns out, none of these play a part in this particular 
story…there is even reason to suppose that even if there were an Ideal Chronicle of the dinner, 
that is, a complete record of all that happened between the beginning and the end, the vast 
majority of the events it recorded would in all likelihood be irrelevant to what concerns us—
the telling of this story. (pp.20-22) 
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In the Preface of the Genealogy Nietzsche claims:  “My desire, at any rate, 
was to point out to so sharp and disinterested an eye as [Rée’s] a better direction to 
look, in the direction of an actual history of morality…” (GM Preface 7). 
Additionally, throughout the Genealogy Nietzsche criticizes other genealogists of 
morals for lacking “knowledge or will to knowledge of the past; even less of historical 
instinct, of that ‘second sight’ needed here above all… (GM II 4).
200 Thus, it seems, 
Nietzsche clearly takes himself to be engaged in a form of historiography.  Yet, the 
rhetorical style, the lack of annotation, and the sheer vastness of the scope of the 
historical narratives presented in the Genealogy, has led to the May and Williams 
objection, which calls into question the historical veracity of the claims therein. And 
the May and Williams objection presents a serious scholarly challenge to the thesis I 
have been advancing, namely, that Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts are a 
demonstration in the correct practice of history. 
To overcome this particular challenge I have argued that three errors plague 
the May and Williams objection, and furthermore that when the implicit assumptions 
present in their objection are brought to the fore they can be overcome.  Beneath their 
contention that Nietzsche’s genealogy is best understood in mythical or quasi-
historical terms we find the following three problematic assumptions: (1) Nietzsche’s 
genealogical accounts take place in and undocumented period of development, 
commonly known as pre-history. (2) Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives are not 
presented in the mode of antiquarian history, and hence are mythical or quasi-
historical. (3) The absence of brute facts in Nietzsche’s account lends credence to the 
claim that he is offering a quasi-historical, or fictional narrative.  As we saw in the 
first section of this chapter, there are two routes available to us as a means of 
trumping the contention that Nietzsche’s Genealogy takes place in a pre-historical 
period:  we can either contend that (A) Nietzsche’s use of the concept of pre-history is 
unwarranted, and as a result, we can conclude that all of the events of the genealogy 
take place in history proper, or (B) we can argue that the concept of pre-history is 
useful as a means of unpacking a certain set of events of the Genealogy, notably those 
found in the Second Essay.  I then argued that the demand that Nietzsche’s 
genealogical accounts must take the form of antiquarian history can too be overcome 
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by placing emphasis upon the other modes of historiography Nietzsche offers in 1874: 
namely, the monumental and the critical modes.  Lastly I argued that the final 
assumption present in the May and Williams objection, namely that Nietzsche fails to 
offer the brute facts of an event, and hence that the narrative he offers is best seen as 
mythical or quasi-historical, is too overcome by placing due emphasis upon the 
qualitative nature of historiography and by noting the historian’s role in the 
production of any historical account.  Given the foregoing, the objections to viewing 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy as an exercise in historiography are overcome and, as such, 
Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts can be seen as a demonstration in the correct 
practice of historiography. We are, as it were, inching closer to morphing the 
uninformative coinage “genealogy is history correctly practiced,” into an informative 
one. Yet, at the moment, it still remains far from clear just how the Genealogy is a 
demonstration in the correct practice of history. Making this clear will be the subject 
of the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
The Art of History 
 
  The structure of this chapter is as follows.  The first section presents 
Nietzsche’s critique of “objectivity” in historiography where I argue that his central 
criticism of “objectivity” in historical inquiry is that it produces an ineffectual 
conception of historical knowledge.  The second section focuses upon his positive 
conception of historiography as methodologically and epistemologically guided by 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism:  a position I have labelled affective history.  Affective 
history maintains that the interest of an inquirer in his subject is of primary 
importance.  As a consequence, the idea of “objectivity” and “disinterestedness” as 
modes of historical inquiry is problematized.  The final section considers why 
Nietzsche finds artistry to be the most efficacious method in historiography.  I 
conclude by suggesting that artistry of the sort Nietzsche advocates in historiography 
provides a way in which we can make sense of ourselves, understood, on the one 
hand, in terms of our cultural commitments, and on the other hand, in terms of our 
personal commitments. 
   
1. Nietzsche’s Critique of “Objectivity” in Historiography   
 
It is well known that towards the end of the Third Essay of the Genealogy 
Nietzsche asks whether or not science, in its current form, offers us an alternative to 
the ascetic ideal (GM III 25). He answers negatively.  And responds with another 
question:  Does historiography, in its current guise, offer an alternative to the ascetic 
ideal? (GM III 26) Again the answer is no.  In this section I will explore Nietzsche’s 
criticisms of historiography in the Genealogy.  
It is worth noting that the relationship between science and historiography is 
not a concern isolated to the Genealogy.   In the second of the Untimely Meditations, 
Nietzsche alerts us that:  “there is indeed, rejoicing that now ‘science is beginning to 
dominate life’.” Life, thus dominated, he claims, is not of much value because “it is 
far less living” (HL IV 77). Whereas in the Genealogy Nietzsche puts the point this 
way:  “Science as a means of self-anaesthetetisation: are you acquainted with that?”   119 
(GM III 24) Nietzsche's most pressing worry, first thematized in the Untimely 
Meditations, is methodological. The concern is that historical inquiry guided by “the 
man of science [who] stands aside from life so as to know it unobstructedly” is an 
essentially ineffectual conception of historical knowledge (HL X 117). The man of 
science is guided, methodologically, by his commitments to disinterestedness, 
objectivity and selflessness in inquiry. Nietzsche's worry regarding the transformation 
of history into science is that historical inquiry will be conducted with a kind of 
“intellectual stoicism which ultimately refuses not only to affirm but also deny; that 
desire to halt before the factual” (GM III 24). 
In the Genealogy Nietzsche presents two types of “modern historiographers,” 
the “historical nihilists,” and “the contemplatives.” Both share not only this 
commitment to “objectivity,” but also his contempt:  “I do not like these weary 
played-out people who wrap themselves in wisdom and look ‘objective.’” (GM III 
26).  These two types of historiographers “wrap themselves” in objectivity in rather 
distinct ways, and this cloaking has obvious consequences for the kinds of histories 
they produce.  The “historical nihilist” accepts everything without making 
evaluations.  This mode of historiography boldly claims:  “that it is a mirror; it no 
longer wishes to ‘prove’ anything; it disdains to play the judge and considers this a 
sign of good taste—it affirms as little as it denies; it ascertains, it “describes”…(GM 
III 26).
  This type of historiographer has a particular understanding of the notion of 
“objectivity,” and this understanding, Nietzsche holds, is ascetic.  Though, upon first 
glance, it may appear that refusing to play the role of “the judge” is a far cry from a 
“denial of the sensual” Nietzsche maintains “that general renunciation of all 
interpretation (of forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, 
falsifying, and whatever else is the essence of interpreting)—all of this expresses, 
broadly speaking, as much ascetic virtue as any denial of sensuality (it is at bottom 
only a particular mode of this denial)” (GM III 24).  The abdication of judgment, 
coupled with the impetus to depict and describe manifests itself in the unconditional 
value that the historian places upon detachment from personal interest. This is an 
allegiance to the absolute value of “objectivity.” Nietzsche’s concern regarding this 
mode of historiography stretches beyond the historian's commitment to “objectivity” 
and its corollary asceticism.  Nietzsche insists that this kind of history “…is to a high 
degree ascetic; but at the same time it is to an even higher degree nihilistic, let us not   120 
deceive ourselves about that!” (GM III 26).   Nietzsche’s point is that such historians 
are “historical nihilists” because their commitment to “documenting” and to 
“describing” leads them to foreclose their interpretative and creative responsibilities. 
In forsaking such responsibilities the historian can no longer create history and is 
resigned to the position which claims that “here nothing will grow or prosper any 
longer…” (GM III 26).  
The contemplatives are those historiographers that “flirt both with life and 
with the ascetic ideal…” (GM III 26). The contemplatives, or “the objective armchair 
scholars,” “employ the word ‘artist’ as a glove.” They “have taken sole lease of the 
praise of contemplation.” Referring back to the second of the Untimely Meditations 
clarifies the manner in which such historians cover themselves in the term “artist,” as 
well as their “praise of contemplation.” There, Nietzsche draws a particularly useful 
likeness between the historian’s feigned “objectivity” and “aesthetic phenomenon of 
detachment from personal interest.”  Nietzsche writes:  “And may an illusion not 
creep into the word objectivity even in its highest interpretation?  According to this 
interpretation, the word means a condition in the historian which permits him to 
observe an event in all its motivations and consequences so purely that it has no effect 
at all on his own subjectivity:  it is analogous to that aesthetic phenomenon of 
detachment from personal interest…” (HL VI 91)  The analogy plays upon the 
inferential connection between the manner in which the artist and the historian 
methodologically approach to their respective productions.  The analogous connection 
becomes clear once it is recognized that the contemplative historians cover 
themselves in the term artist in truly Schopenhaueran fashion.  Schopenhauer, for 
example, finds: 
For this alone is of interest to the intellect as such, in other words, to the 
subject of knowing which has become free from the aims of he will and is 
therefore pure; just as for the subject, knowing as mere individual, only the 
aims and ends of the will have interest.  For this reason the result of every 
purely objective, as so of every artistic, apprehension of things is an 
expression more of the true nature of life and of existence…
201 
 
The artist’s apprehension of the true nature of life and existence depends upon the 
detachment of the will, and therefore affords pure knowledge insofar as the aims and 
interests of the subjective will have been temporarily dislodged.  Placed into 
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Schopenhauer’s schema the contemplative historian, like the Schopenhaueran artist, 
finds the momentary detachment from personal interest the route to historical 
knowledge. And Nietzsche, in the second of the Untimely Meditations, renders this 
picture of knowledge problematic by critiquing this conception of detachment and 
relating it to the illusion of objectivity.       
For Nietzsche the “illusion” that “creeps into the word objectivity” is the 
notion that the historian has the ability to analyze history from a standpoint, a point of 
view, outside of history (HL VI 91).  Nietzsche, some years later, tells us that this 
“illusion” is analogous to the “absurdity of the eye turned in no particular direction” 
(GM III 12). However in the second of the Untimely Meditations Nietzsche puts the 
point this way: 
In certain cases banality of ideas, the everyday wisdom which seems calm and 
tranquil only because it is tedious, ventures to pose as that artistic condition in 
which the subject becomes silent and wholly impenetrable.  What is preferred 
is that which produces no emotion at all and the driest phrase is the right 
phrase.  One goes so far, indeed, as to believe that he to whom a moment of 
the past means nothing at all is the proper man to describe it.  This is 
frequently the relationship between classicists and the Greeks that they study:  
they mean nothing at all to one another—a state of affairs called ‘objectivity!’ 
(HL VI 93) 
 
In other words the “objective armchair scholars,” like the “historical nihilists,” are 
committed to the mirage of “objectivity.” They deny their interpretive role in inquiry 
because their fundamental scholarly responsibility, as they (mis)understand it, is 
“objectivity,” as disinterested and detached inquiry.  In light of their unconditional 
commitment to ‘objectivity,’ they then see themselves as possessing the “proper” 
historical disposition because “the past means nothing at all” to them.  
It is worth noting that Nietzsche expresses one additional, more penetrating 
worry regarding this type of historian who hides behind the mask of objectivity and 
continues to flirt with life. This dalliance distinguishes the contemplative’s approach 
to historiography from the historical nihilist’s.  Though Nietzsche is not clear in 
articulating what this particular sort of coquetry entails we can nevertheless introduce 
a candidate that will serve to explain this flirtation. Nietzsche identifies French 
historian, Ernest Renan as a contemplative historian in his rhetorically charged attack 
in the Genealogy:   
The ‘contemplatives’ are a hundred times worse: I know of nothing that 
excites such disgust as this kind of ‘objective’ armchair scholar, this kind of   122 
scented voluptuary of history, half parson, half satyr, perfume by Renan, who 
betrays immediately with high falsetto of his applause what he lacks…(GM III 
26)   
 
This rather flippant allusion to Renan is significant when placed in the context of 
Nietzsche’s treatment of the French historian in Beyond Good and Evil.
202  There, 
Nietzsche reveals Renan as his antipode. Quoting Renan Nietzsche writes: 
So let us make bold to say that religion is a product of the normal man, that 
man is closest to the truth when he is most religious and most certain of an 
infinite destiny…It is when he is good that he wants virtue to correspond to an 
eternal order; it is when he contemplates things in a disinterested manner that 
he finds death revolting and absurd.  How can we but suppose that it is in this 
that man sees his best? (BGE 48) 
 
Nietzsche subsequently reveals Renan as his antipode in what follows: 
 
These sentences are so utterly antipodal to my ears and habits that on finding 
them my first wrath wrote on the margin ‘la niaisere religieuse par 
excellence!’  But my subsequent wrath actually took a fancy to them—these 
sentences standing truth on her head! It is so neat, so distinguished to have 
one’s own antipodes! (BGE 48) 
 
I take Renan to be Nietzsche’s antipode for two related reasons.  First, Renan stands 
“truth on her head” in so far as he is committed to the claim that disinterestedness in 
inquiry yields fundamental truths about the nature of existence: “death is revolting 
and absurd” (BGE 48).  Second, Renan’s historiography aims to offer a naturalistic 
account of the origins of Christianity all the while remaining committed to Christian 
morality. As Gary Shapiro puts the point:  
Renan, who had left seminary because he could not reconcile religion with his 
scientific knowledge, repressed religion.  His later works, no matter how 
positivistic their official ideology, disclosed a return to the repressed. [Renan] 
allowed his readers [in his History of the Origins of Christianity] to believe 
themselves scientific and even a bit skeptical, while still allowing them to 
indulge in religious sentiments, to let them become ‘voluptuous’ and ‘to 
stretch out comfortably.’”
203   
 
Thus, the contemplative brand of historiography is expressed in the feigned 
commitment to disinterested “scientific” inquiry.  In the face of this apparent 
                                                 
202 I take BGE 48 to represent Nietzsche’s most illuminating critique of the work of Renan, though it is 
worth noting that Nietzsche references the French historian several times.  See, for example, The Anti-
Christ sections 17, 29, 31 and 32, as well as Twilight of the Idols “Expeditions” sections 2, and 6.  
Renan’s work is univocally cast in a negative light.  
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methodological commitment the contemplative historian continues to ‘flirt’ with 
religious sentiments and dalliance of this sort props up Christian morality. 
Coquetry of the sort exemplified in the work of Renan then distinguishes the 
contemplative’s approach to history from the historical nihilist’s.  Recall that the 
historical nihilists are, at least, honest in their assessment of history; they make the 
claim that “nothing new will grow or prosper any longer.” The contemplatives, by 
contrast, express “lascivious historical eunuchism” (GM III 26).  The eunuch 
symbolizes the fundamental impotence of this type of history.  It is the unwillingness 
of the contemplative historian to explicitly acknowledge his underlying commitments 
that coupled with the willful “castration of the intellect,” and, despite the scholarly 
seduction of “objectivity,” is tantamount to an “aversion to life”(GM III 12, 28).
204 
The historian as eunuch can never engage in the fruitful production of history because 
his inquiry is conducted under the shroud of indifference. This indifference is clearly 
problematic for Nietzsche: “to a eunuch one woman is like another, simply a woman, 
woman in herself, the eternally unapproachable—and it is a matter of indifference 
what they do so long as history is kept nice and ‘objective,’ bearing in mind that those 
who want to keep it so are for ever incapable of making history themselves” (HL V 
86).       
We can make some further sense of Nietzsche’s polemical critique of the 
contemplatives, of their “lascivious historical eunuchism,” if we look to the second of 
the Untimely Meditations where Nietzsche considers what becomes of historical 
understanding when the “great historical world-harem” is guarded by a “race of 
eunuchs.” Nietzsche tells us: “pure objectivity would certainly characterize such a 
race.  For it almost seems that the task is to stand guard over history to see that 
nothing comes out except more history, and certainly no real events! — to take care of 
that history does not make any personality ‘free,’ that is to say truthful towards itself, 
truthful towards others, in both word and deed (HL V 84).”  Three points are worth 
making.  First, historical eunuchism is betrayed by the desire to guard history from the 
perspective of the individual historian, which is expressed in their dedication to “pure 
objectivity.”   Second, the commitment to “pure objectivity” leads such a historian to 
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is to be christened ‘beautiful!’ Oh, ye violators of noble names!” ( 'Immaculate Perception’)    124 
believe that he can document and describe the brute facts of history; he has the power 
to collect and preserve facts qua facts.
205  Third, this methodological approach lacks 
intellectual honesty insofar as it propagates a paradoxical account of historical 
knowledge (it is not “truthful to itself” or “truthful to others”).  For these reasons, 
Nietzsche tells us “the contemplative’s” conception of history: “…offends my taste; 
also my patience:  let him have patience who has nothing to lose by them—such a 
sight arouses my ire, such ‘speculators’ dispose me against the spectacle itself (the 
spectacle of history you understand)” (GM III 26).  It is the desire to be pure 
spectators, the “instruction that does not become life,” the “lost and destroyed 
instincts,” the “ostentatious indifference,” in short the passionless pursuit of historical 
understanding that provokes Nietzsche’s critique of the contemplatives.  
In sum, both the historical nihilists and the contemplative historians employ 
the concept of objectivity to the detriment of historiography. Nevertheless Nietzsche 
critiques their usages for different reasons. The historical nihilists are condemned 
because of their untenable and ultimately nihilistic commitment to abdicating 
judgment. Recall the historical nihilists’ claim that they can hold up a mirror to 
nature.  In so doing they are committed to a form of historiography that purports to 
allow the facts to speak for themselves, and Nietzsche claims that this commitment is 
not only ascetic but also nihilistic. The contemplative historians, by contrast, offer a 
more pernicious picture of historical knowledge.  Superficially they are 
methodologically committed to objectivity, and Nietzsche exposes this outward 
commitment as a façade. As Nietzsche argues in the case of Renan, the objective 
pretense conceals a more fundamental commitment, a deep-seated commitment to 
religious sentiments and Christian morality.  
Thus what is needed in historiography in light of Nietzsche’s critique of the 
historical nihilists and the contemplatives is a historian who places due emphasis upon 
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were, broadly, under the influence of positivism and the sway of this picture  “led the historian to adopt 
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Nietzsche, in light of Collingwood’s account, can be seen as critiquing the positivistic account of 
history.  Nietzsche’s point, then, is the historian laboring under the positivistic account of history can 
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the perspectival character of historical knowledge and the tremendous responsibility 
that such a commitment entails.  The good historian must greet “the great passion of 
the seeker of knowledge who lives and must live continually in the thundercloud of 
the heaviest responsibilities (by no means as an observer, outside, indifferent, secure 
and objective)” (GS 351).  That is, the good historian must engage in a kind of 
affective history.  
 
2. Affective History
206 
 
    Affective history offers an account of historical understanding that departs from 
the picture of historical knowledge painted by the historical nihilists and by the 
contemplatives. Both sets of historians, to differing degrees, maintain that historical 
knowledge is only possible through the systematic detachment of the historian from 
his historical inquiry. By valuing “objectivity,” and the corollary concepts of 
selflessness and impartiality, they construct, as Nietzsche tells us in The Gay Science, 
a fundamentally impotent conception of historical knowledge: 
‘Selflessness’ has no value either in heaven or on earth.  All great problems 
demand great love, and of that only strong, round, secure spirits who have a 
firm grip on themselves are capable.  It makes the most telling difference 
whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them 
his destiny, his distress, and his greatest happiness, or an ‘impersonal’ one, 
meaning that he can do no better than to touch them and grasp them with the 
antennae of cold, curious thought.  In the latter case nothing will come of it; 
that much one can promise in advance…(GS 345)
207 
 
Nothing will come of the methodological approach to the historical that is guided by 
the unconditional commitment to “selflessness” because the epistemological picture 
upon which it is based is fundamentally self-contradictory. Such a picture depicts “the 
victory of reason over the affects…” (D 58), of “…‘reason,’ ‘seriousness,’ [as] master 
over the affects” (GM II 4), without, at the same time, noting that the commitment to 
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207 Walter Kaufmann suggests that this section of The Gay Science as well as Nietzsche’s label of the 
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selflessness, to objectivity, or to reason, is itself an affective response to the demand 
for certainty.
208  This conception of knowledge is tantamount to “the castration of the 
intellect” because, as Aaron Ridley argues:  
among the ‘affects’ to be suspended would be the desire to know (the will to 
truth) and the desire to produce rationally acceptable explanations of the 
phenomena we know about. To suspend these would be to leave behind only 
the ‘non-sensical absurdity’ of ‘contemplation without interest,’ i.e., of 
contemplation somehow conducted in the absence even of our cognitive 
interests (in things like simplicity, explanatory power, etc.), let alone those 
other interests (in things like convenience, survival, etc.) that give us reasons 
for wanting to know anything in the first place.
209 
 
Nietzsche’s point, as Ridley makes clear, is that it is irrational to posit an account of 
knowledge that is independent of all of our affective allegiances and our cognitive 
interests because such an account demands of the inquirer an impossibility. The 
historian can never rationally contemplate history from such an epistemologically 
disinterested standpoint.    Affective history is a methodological approach to historical 
understanding that follows from Nietzsche’s epistemological doctrine of 
perspectivism and his rejection of the historical nihilist’s and the contemplative’s 
demand for interest-free inquiry.    
Given Nietzsche’s critique of “objectivity” it follows that historical inquiry, if 
it is to be correctly conducted, must be guided by the commitments and the affective 
allegiances of the historian.  In the Genealogy Nietzsche offers an example of such a 
history informed by his “major point of historical method” (GM II 12). The example 
Nietzsche employs to elucidate his major point of historical method is the “concept” 
of punishment.  The recognition that must guide historical inquiry is “the cause of the 
origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system 
of purposes, lie worlds apart” (GM II 12). Nietzsche’s reflections on historical 
methodology, here, generate his own anti-essentialist commitment that there is no 
singular, stable, enduring “concept” of punishment. Rather he suggests that our 
history of our concept of punishment includes a set of interpretations and re-
interpretations such that “the entire history of a ‘thing,’ an organ, a custom, can in this 
way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose 
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causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on the contrary, in some 
cases succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion” (GM II 12).   
In the following section of the Genealogy Nietzsche offers a nuanced 
description of his historical methodology:  “…it is assumed without further ado that 
the procedure itself will be something older, earlier than its employment in 
punishment, that the latter is projected back and interpreted into the procedure (which 
has long existed but been employed in another sense)…” (GM II 13). Nietzsche’s 
thought is threefold. In terms of his inquiry into the “concept” of punishment, the 
nuanced version suggests, for example: (1) the procedure (the technique, “the form,” 
the practice, the “act,” the “drama”) of stoning antedates the “system of purposes” 
through which the practice of stoning is given a meaning of rendering harmless. (2) 
The “meaning,” the “purpose,” in this case, of rendering harmless, “is projected back 
and interpreted into the procedure” of stoning.  (3) The procedure of stoning has long 
existed, but has “been employed in another sense” within a different “system of 
purposes.” Therefore, Nietzsche concludes, “one and the same procedure can be 
employed, interpreted, and adapted to ends that differ fundamentally.”
210   This 
suggests that “the systems of purposes,” the “patterns” of employment and 
interpretation, often provide post facto rationalizations of the procedure. 
In Daybreak Nietzsche offers an early rendition of this last, rather weighty, point:   
                                                 
210  Nietzsche provides a list, albeit “incomplete,” of the various purposes to which punishment has 
been “employed, interpreted, and adapted:”  
(1) Punishment as a means of rendering harmless, of preventing further harm. 
(2) Punishment as recompense to the injured party for the harm done, rendered in any form (even in 
that of a compensating affect.) 
(3) Punishment as the isolation of a disturbance of equilibrium, so as to guard against the spread of the 
disturbance. 
(4) Punishment as a means of inspiring fear of those who determine and execute the punishment. 
(5) Punishment as a kind of repayment for the advantages the criminal has enjoyed hitherto (for 
example, when he is employed as a slave in the mind. 
(6) Punishment as the expulsion of a degenerate element (in some cases, of an entire branch, as in 
Chinese law:  thus as a means of preserving the purity of the race or maintaining a social type). 
(7) Punishment as a festival, namely as the rape and mockery of a finally defeated enemy. 
(8) Punishment as the making of a memory, whether for him who suffers the punishment-so-called 
‘improvement’—or for those who witness its execution. 
(9) Punishment as payment of a fee stipulated by the power that protects the wrongdoer from the 
excesses of revenge. 
(10) Punishment as a compromise with revenge in its natural state when the latter is still maintained 
and claimed as a privilege by powerful clans. 
(11) Punishment as a declaration of war and a war measure against an enemy of peace, of the law, of 
order, of the authorities, whom, as a danger to the community, as one who has broken the contract that 
defines the conditions under which it exists, as a rebel, a traitor, and breaker of the peace, one opposes 
with the means of war (GM II 13).   128 
Rationality ex post facto. — Whatever lives long is gradually so saturated with 
reason that its irrational origins become improbable. Does not almost every 
accurate history of the origin of something sound paradoxical and sacrilegious to 
our feelings? Doesn’t the good historian contradict all the time? (D 1)  
 
Our “concept” of punishment, as Nietzsche argues in the Genealogy, is so saturated 
with “reason,” with post facto rationalizations, that it becomes inconceivable for us to 
appreciate that the procedure, stoning, for example, antedates the varying 
rationalizations of the procedure. This obscures the many ways in which the concept 
has been employed within a system of purposes. The good historian teases out the 
“improbable,” yet “accurate,” history of the employment of a concept.  Thus the 
concept of punishment is viewed within the most varying “systems of purposes” 
which, post facto, provide the procedure with meaning.  The good historian’s 
methodology is “paradoxical and sacrilegious to our feelings” precisely because the 
history of our concept of punishment includes rationalizations which have been 
retrospectively attributed to the procedure.  
Additionally Nietzsche’s investigation into the concept of punishment 
implicitly suggests the good historian contradicts the traditional manner in which 
philosophers, namely the naïve genealogists, understand the concept of “purpose.”  As 
previously argued Nietzsche stresses that, methodologically, the good historian would 
do well to avoid the causa fiendi error, to avoid the temptation of assuming that 
procedures are invented for a particular purpose. Here, I will discuss Nietzsche’s 
remarks on the concept of “purpose,” as presented in Book V of The Gay Science, in 
order to shed some additional light on his historical methodology. In section 360, 
Nietzsche calls for a “critique of the concept of purpose” because “people are 
accustomed to consider the goal (purposes, vocations, etc.) as the driving force, in 
keeping with a very ancient error; but it is merely the directing force; one has 
mistaken the helmsman for the steam.  And not even always the helmsman, the 
directing force” (GS 360).  The very ancient error, similar to the causa fiendi error, is 
the faulty assumption that the purpose is, ipso facto, the driving force.  The purpose is 
not the sole explanatory principle. Nietzsche continues: “Is the ‘goal,’ the ‘purpose’ 
not often enough a beautifying pretext, a self-deception of vanity after the event that 
does not want to acknowledge that the ship is following the current into which it has 
entered accidentally?” (GS 360). This question leads us to ponder the possibility that 
post facto rationalizations occur so often that it is a self-deception of vanity to suggest   129 
that the purpose is always the driving force.  Nietzsche’s treatment of the “concept” of 
punishment in the Second Essay serves to elucidate precisely this point: the naïve 
genealogists have always assumed that the purpose is the driving force due to a self-
deception of vanity. As such they assume that the purpose contains all of the 
explanatory power in our understanding of the formulation of concepts.  Nietzsche’s 
point here and in the Genealogy is this: a better historical method with a nuanced 
account of the formation of our concepts, yields not a single unchanged “purpose” of 
a “concept,” but a dynamic exchange of interpretations and re-interpretations 
containing elements that have been retrospectively attributed to the procedure.     
 Affective history is manifested in three respects given this reconstruction of 
Nietzsche’s major point of historical method as well as his study of the concept of 
punishment and the concept of purpose. First, affective history is epistemologically 
guided by Nietzsche’s perspectivism.  This claim is evidenced by Nietzsche’s careful 
analysis of the concept of punishment.  Nietzsche investigates the varying “systems of 
purposes” that have employed the “concept” of punishment and suggests that “the 
more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will 
our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be” (GM III 12). Nietzsche renders any 
disinterested knowledge claims untenable; there can be no knowledge without 
interest.  Through a historical investigation, of the sort illustrated by Nietzsche’s 
examination of the concept of punishment, we can unearth and bring to light the 
various systems of purpose within which a concept has been employed, and thus have 
a more complete understanding of the concept.  
           Second, affective history is methodologically guided by the avoidance of the 
error of positing a singular, stable, enduring concept. Rather than “seek[ing] out some 
‘purpose in punishment…[and] then guilelessly plac[ing] that purpose at the 
beginning as the causa fiendi,” the affective historian investigates the sets of 
interpretations and re-interpretations, the varying systems of purposes, within which 
the concept has been provided with a particular meaning (GM II 12). By observing 
and noting the many systems of purposes within which the concept of punishment has 
been employed, the affective historian avoids the temptation of dogmatically asserting 
“along with the popular consciousness,” that the “essential” purpose of punishment is 
to awaken the “feeling of guilt,” or whichever interpretation has gained precedence 
over the others (GM II 14).  Consequently, instead of looking for a metaphysical   130 
substratum, which is meant to ground our concepts a priori, or placing all of the 
explanatory weight on the purpose of the concept, Nietzsche’s historical methodology 
highlights the myriad interpretations that have been arbitrarily wedded together to 
comprise our present day employment of the concept.
211  
   Lastly, affective history focuses particularly on the aspects of the past that are 
“hard to disentangle” or “hard to analyze.”  In the Genealogy Nietzsche offers us a 
few examples of his commitment to this final point.  One such example is Nietzsche’s 
examination of the concept of punishment because a singular interpretation of 
punishment has precluded other possible interpretations, analysis of the concept is 
difficult. Yet, another example is found within the First Essay where Nietzsche brings 
to the fore two types of morality: a master morality and a slave morality in order to 
analyze the dominant form of morality which he identifies as slave morality.  
Nietzsche discusses slave morality as that “which has only moved out of our sight 
today because it—has been victorious” (GM I 7). History conducted in the manner 
thus elucidated facilitates an awareness of “the conditions and circumstances in which 
[our values] grew, under which they evolved and changed” (GM P 6).  Affective 
history must engage with the occluded elements of our past.  
             In spite of this, a historian thoroughly engaged in methodological anti-
essentialism could argue that objectivity and disinterestedness in inquiry remains the 
most robust means of conducting an historical investigation. Such a historian would 
concur with Nietzsche’s commitment to anti-essentialism, but nevertheless disagree 
with Nietzsche’s methodological point that the interests of the inquirer are 
indispensable for an historical investigation.  Affective history can respond to this 
particular challenge by again highlighting the point that a methodological 
commitment to disinterestedness and objectivity in inquiry yields a fundamentally 
unproductive harvest of historical understanding.   
    In several places Nietzsche makes this point clear. Yet perhaps the most 
striking example is found in the Foreword to the second of the Untimely Meditations 
where Nietzsche claims that:  
We need history, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those for     
which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it…We need it, that is to 
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conjunctions, accidental encounters, and fortuitous collisions…not the story of the unitary development 
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say, for the sake of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from 
life and action…(HL ‘Foreword’ 59)    
 
Nietzsche’s point is transparent: vigorous historical investigations are necessary to 
stimulate and hearten our understanding of ourselves.  Moreover, Nietzsche claims 
that we ought not abandon the brand of resolve that historiography of this sort 
requires by claiming that we can glean such understanding by turning “comfortably 
away from life.”  Thus, there is an indispensable connection between an affectively 
engaged historical investigation and our real needs.  A poignant example of this 
connection is found in the Second Essay of the Genealogy where Nietzsche ties his 
mini-genealogy of punishment to the emergence of bad conscience.  What appeared 
upon first glance to be a tangential historical investigation into the various meanings 
and purposes to which the concept of punishment was made to serve, ultimately finds 
grounding in what Nietzsche takes to be our real needs.  Nietzsche’s investigation into 
the concept of punishment demonstrates how we have come to incorrectly equate 
punishment with the awakening of the feeling of guilt (GM II 14).  In so doing he 
demonstrates that his genealogy of punishment has direct bearing on the moralization 
of the concept of guilt out of the non-moral concept of debt (GM II 4).
212   
      Similarly, recall Nietzsche’s claim in The Gay Science:  
  It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal 
relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his 
greatest happiness, or an ‘impersonal’ one, meaning that he can do no better 
than to touch them and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought.  
In the latter case nothing will come of it; that much one can promise in 
advance…(GS 345) 
 
The methodologically misguided substitution for an affective inquiry of a passive, 
cold and impersonal one yields a deceptive and ultimately fruitless scholarly 
production.  It is deceptive for this reason: a historian can only feign a commitment to 
neutrality for he must all the while select and highlight particular historical events at 
the expense of others.  This process of selection is present in every interpretation (GM 
III 24). Thus, affective history, with the methodological commitment to exposing the 
historian’s interests in an inquiry, exhibits intellectual honesty insofar as the affective 
historian can make transparent his reasons for opting to draw attention to certain 
aspects of the past while neglecting others.  In other words, if Nietzsche is correct in 
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Aaron Ridley (1998).   132 
asserting that selection is present in every process of interpretation, then the historian 
simulating impartiality can only maintain a fundamentally paradoxical position.  That 
is to say, such a historian must, at once, hold two opposing methodological 
commitments: (1) the methodological commitment to neutrality in inquiry and (2) the 
methodological commitment to the highlighting of particular events at the expense of 
others.  Consequently, the objection to affective history on the grounds that one can 
be committed to both anti-essentialism and impartiality in inquiry fails for it is 
methodologically paradoxical. 
     I should note, before moving on, that history conducted affectively serves to 
further demarcate Nietzsche’s approach to history from the “man of science who halts 
before the factual,” the man who methodologically aims to let the facts speak for 
themselves.  In contrast to the methodological picture presented by the “man of 
science,” Nietzsche, as early as his investigation into the uses and disadvantages of 
history for life, offers another conception of historical inquiry that is rooted, as I will 
argue, in this epistemological and methodological commitment to “affective history.”  
 
3. The Art of History 
 
In the second of his Untimely Meditations Nietzsche remarks that: “…only if 
history can endure to be transformed into a work of art will it perhaps preserve 
instincts or even evoke them” (HL VII 95-96).  To make sense of this rather enigmatic 
claim, I will argue in this section that we should look to Human All Too Human, 
where Nietzsche contends that the historian is an artist engaged in “the higher species 
of the art of painting” (HH 274). This idea is worth looking at in some detail, so I 
quote the passage in its entirety: 
A segment of our self as artistic object. — It is a sign of superior culture 
consciously to retain certain phases of development which lesser men live 
through almost without thinking and then wipe from the tablet of their soul, 
and to draft a faithful picture of it: for this is the higher species of the art of 
painting which only a few understand.  To this end it will be necessary 
artificially to isolate those phases.  Historical studies cultivate the ability for 
this painting, for they constantly challenge us, when faced with a piece of 
history, of the life of a nation or of a man, to conjure up a quite distinct 
horizon of ideas, a distinct strength of sensations, the predomination of this, 
the stepping-back of that.  It is in this ability rapidly to reconstruct such 
systems of ideas and sensations on any given occasion, as for example the 
impression of a temple on the basis of a few pillars and pieces of wall that 
chance to remain standing, that the historical sense consists.  The first result 
of it is that we comprehend our fellow men as being determined by such   133 
systems and representatives of different cultures, that is to say as necessary, 
but as alterable.  And conversely, that we are able to segregate parts of our 
own development and exhibit them in isolation (HH 274). 
 
Three key points are made in this rather dense passage. The first is a claim concerning 
historical methodology, history as the “higher species of the art of painting.” The 
second and third claims concern the yields of practicing history in this way.  The 
second claim focuses upon how we can come to understand the history of our culture, 
broadly construed.  The third claim regards how we can understand our own 
development as individuals.  In the pages that follow I will examine each of these 
claims in turn.          
 
3.1 The Higher Species of the Art of Painting:  A Monumentalized Past 
 
Methodologically a central feature of the “higher species of the art of 
painting” is the ability to “sketch a true picture of certain periods” by separating out 
episodes of our past artificially. The capacity to create such a painting entails that the 
historian, when examining the life of a man or of a nation, has the ability to “conjure 
up a quite distinct horizon of ideas” through an intricate process of selection. Through 
selecting, highlighting, and shaping history, by emphasizing “the predominance of 
this” or “the withdrawal of that,” the historian essentially creates a “distinct horizon.” 
In creating such a horizon the historian provides history with a form, and, as Ridley 
notes, “the imposition of form—any form—is regularly treated by Nietzsche as 
synonymous with artistry as such.”
213   
An example may be helpful to cash out what such artistry, the imposition of 
form, entails in historiography.  I will single out one of Nietzsche’s modes of history, 
monumental history, as presented in the second of the Untimely Meditations.  
Through the imposition of form, the capacity to emphasize the predominance of this 
or the withdrawal of that, the historian can chisel the monumental figure of Julius 
Caesar, for example.
214 In order to view Julius Caesar monumentally we must 
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withdraw the momentary lapses, the foibles, the oversights, the “purely human 
qualities have come together” in him in order to put emphasis upon that which is 
exemplary (HH 164).  In the case of Julius Caesar, Nietzsche tells us that it was his 
mastery of himself through “self-control” and “self-outwitting” which placed him 
among the “marvellously incomprehensible and unfathomable men” (BGE 200).
215  
Nietzsche, in viewing Caesar monumentally, conjures up “a quite distinct horizon of 
ideas.” Emphasis is placed upon his mastery of himself, his self-control, and all else is 
relegated to the background: his political ambitions, his insight that Rome was in need 
of a Constitution, his assassination on the Ides of March B.C.E. 44.
216 It is this kind of 
artistry that is what one should learn from the artist:    
Moving away from things until there is a good deal that one no longer 
sees…or seeing things around a corner and as cut out and framed; or to place 
them so that they partially conceal each other and grant us only glimpses of 
architectural perspectives; or looking at them through tinted glass or in the 
light of sunset; or giving them surface and skin that is not fully transparent— 
(GS 299). 
 
By paying close attention to how the artist makes things “beautiful, attractive, and 
desirable for us when they are not” we can learn what artistry in historiography 
involves (GS 299). In the case of monumental history, it is the ability to provide the 
past with a particular form by giving a frame through which we can view the 
exemplary figure typically obscured by the everyday character. In order to see Caesar 
as a man who achieved a kind of self-control worthy of imitation the historian must 
frame his exemplary activity by “moving away” from his all-too-human qualities or 
by looking at those all-too-human qualities in a different light. Such artistry provides 
the perspective, the horizon, and the form within which we can view Caesar as an 
exemplary figure.  Without artistry of this sort, monumental history would not be 
possible.  Such monumental figures would be “nothing but foreground” and we would 
be held captive by the perspective that Caesar’s, or any other monumental figure’s, 
purely human qualities are all that there is, “reality itself” (GS 78).   
 I argued that Nietzsche’s conception of monumental history is a form of 
artistry. The example of Caesar aids us in making sense of historiography as “the 
higher species of the art of painting.” Artistry in historiography is a matter of form-
giving, of imposing an interpretation upon the raw material where the raw material is 
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taken to be the “life of a man or a nation” (HH 274). However, there are other ways to 
interpret Nietzsche’s conception of a monumentalized past. One way is to follow 
Julian Young, amongst others, and argue that “monumental history” simply entails 
“the use of partially or wholly mythological figures as ‘exemplars of our caste,’ ideals 
on which to model our life.”
217  This is to suggest that monumental history can 
achieve its aims only “at the expense of any historical specificity; history, in effect, 
becomes mythical fiction.”
218 This is a tempting reading because it appears at first 
glance that it can answer the question: why does it matter if I find in a partially 
mythical figure, such as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, rather than an historical personage, 
the vivid description of an exemplar upon which I may model my life that I so 
desperately require? It seems at least plausible that it does not matter much. Through 
recourse to a partially mythical figure I have found my impetus.  My need of a model, 
a teacher, a comforter has been satisfied.  My desire to “transform” what I have 
“learned into a more elevated practice” has found its spur (HL II 68).   
Despite the initial allure of such a reading there are two reasons to be 
suspicious of this sort of analysis of a monumentalized past. The first reason is that 
Nietzsche appreciates that the same stimulus, the need for a model, can be derived 
from both a monumentalized past and a mythical fiction. Nietzsche writes:   
As long as the soul of historiography lies in the great stimuli that a man of 
power derives from it, as long as the past has to be described as worthy of 
imitation…it of course incurs the danger of becoming somewhat distorted, 
beautified and coming close to free poetic invention; there have been ages, 
indeed, which were quite incapable of distinguishing between a 
monumentalized past and a mythical fiction, because precisely the same 
stimuli can be derived from one world as from another (HL II 70). 
 
Though some ages have been “incapable of distinguishing between a monumentalized 
past and a mythical fiction” Nietzsche draws a distinction.  Monumental history, as he 
tells us, is not “free poetic invention,” though at certain points in history it has “come 
close.”   The second reason is that monumental history concentrates upon that which 
is “imitable and possible for a second time” (HL II 70). If such exemplary actions are 
“possible for a second time,” then by implication such an action must have been 
performed for the first time. Despite the fact that a mythical fiction and a 
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monumentalized past can serve as the same stimulus, Nietzsche here certainly wants 
to place a wedge between a monumentalized past and a mythical fiction.  
  Another argument, offered by Alexander Nehamas, in Nietzsche: Life as 
Literature, deserves some consideration, for Nehamas seems to suggest that we 
should view Nietzsche’s treatment of Julius Caesar as based upon, not the historical 
figure, but Shakespeare’s Caesar, the literary character:   
Even when [Nietzsche] praises Julius Caesar as the ‘most beautiful type’ of 
character that contains ‘inexorable and fearful instincts that provoke the 
maximum authority and discipline among themselves’ (TI IX 39), we must not 
assume without question that he is thinking of Caesar as a historical figure.  
Rather, we must recall that he writes, ‘When I seek my ultimate formula for 
Shakespeare, I only find this: he conceived of the type of Caesar’ (EH II 4), 
who therefore turns out himself to be a literary character.
219  
 
It seems to me that there are, at least, two paths of interpretation available to us here.  
The first path suggests that Nietzsche, when alluding to Caesar, is solely referring to 
Shakespeare’s Caesar, the literary character, rather than the historical figure. But this 
line of thought seems fruitless.  It is barren in the first instance because one could 
simply argue the reverse; one should not assume without question that Nietzsche is 
referencing Shakespeare’s Caesar rather than the historical figure. In the second 
instance this line of inquiry is unfruitful because it is hard to square with Nietzsche’s 
training as a philologist as well as with Duncan Large’s point that “Nietzsche’s source 
for his characterization of Caesar was the same as Shakespeare’s for his Julius 
Caesar, the Parallel Lives by the Greek biographer Plutarch.”
220  So, it seems, we 
should try to tread the second path.  
The second line of interpretation argues for a milder thesis: when Nietzsche 
alludes to Caesar he is imposing a particular form upon the historical figure and this 
sort of form giving is analogous to the playwright’s imposition of form upon his 
characters.  This path seems to me not only more productive, but perhaps also closer 
to the point Nehamas might be making by invoking the image of the literary 
character.  For example, Nehamas finds Nietzsche so enamored by characters that are 
able to totalize their drives “into a controlled and coherent whole…[that his] 
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conception is always modeled on his view of literature and the arts.  [Nietzsche] is so 
taken by this model that he even turns historical figures into literary characters so that 
he can attribute to them the unity that he finds essential for greatness.”
221  It seems 
from this that Nehamas finds Nietzsche imposing a form, a particular kind of unity 
upon the chaotic and, all too often, formless historical figures by highlighting or 
selecting certain attributes. On Nehamas’ reading this process is the transformation of 
“historical figures into literary characters” and on my reading this process is the “art 
of painting.”   
When faced with these two interpretations of Nietzsche’s use of exemplary 
figures it seems to me that there is something conspicuously inadequate about 
Nehamas’ invocation of the image of the literary character.  Such literary characters 
may be wholly mythical, or, as in the case of Shakespeare’s Caesar, an amalgamation 
of an historical figure and a fabled assemblage. Consequently, if we follow Nehamas 
in the employment of the notion of literary characters as a means to unpack 
Nietzsche’s conception of a monumentalized past, then we are again in the 
unsatisfactory position of elucidating monumental history as the use of partially or 
wholly mythical figures upon which we are to base our lives.   Thus, it seems to me, 
the most rewarding means available to us remains the “art of painting”—the art, that 
is, of imposing a particular form upon the historical by emphasizing a predominance 
of this or a withdrawal of that.       
A question still lingers:  if both the literary character and the historical figure 
can serve as the same impetus, the same stimulus, then how can we be clear as to 
which well we are drawing from?  As I will argue in the following section, 
Nietzsche’s employment of the concept of historical sense will serve to aid us in 
recognizing the source of this supply.  
  
3.1.1.  Our Historical Sense 
 
“Historical sense” is a concept that Nietzsche employs throughout his 
corpus.
222  The most obvious thing to say about it is that it captures our sense of 
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history, and this sense can be too great or too slight.
223  But we can do better; we can 
tease out the nuances of this, our “sixth sense” (BGE 224). To make a start, Nietzsche, 
tells us that: “Historical sense consists of being able, on any given occasion, to 
reconstruct quickly such systems of ideas and sensations, as for example the 
impression of a temple on the basis of a few pillars and pieces of wall that chance to 
remain standing” (HH 274). In its embryonic form, historical sense is the ability to 
reconstruct systems of purposes, or “systems of ideas” based upon the elements that 
have, by chance, remained.  So, to lay the first stone, historical sense requires some 
element of artistry, or form giving, to move, as it were, from the pillars and pieces of 
wall to the temple. 
A more fully developed account of this sense is found in Beyond Good and 
Evil: “The historical sense (or the capacity for quickly guessing the order of rank of 
the valuations according to which a people, a society, a human being has lived; the 
‘divinatory instinct’ for the relation of these valuations, for the relation of the 
authority of values to the authority of active forces)—” (BGE 224).
224  Here historical 
sense is the ability to quickly identify the “order of rank” of “valuations according to 
which a people, a society, a human has lived” where “order of rank” is understood as 
the hierarchy of values within a particular system of valuation.
225   Concerning “order 
of rank” Nietzsche tells us that “every society, every individual always has present an 
order of rank of things considered good, according to which he determines his own 
actions and judges those of others” (HH 107). By implementing our historical sense, 
we investigate the differing ways in which a people, or a society, has ranked and 
judged actions according to their system of valuation. Nietzsche makes an additional 
claim regarding the order of rank of valuations:  “The order of rank of desirable things 
itself is not erected or altered according to moral considerations; but once it has been 
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established it then determines whether an action is moral or immoral” (HH 42).  Here, 
Nietzsche is committed to the claim that any discussion regarding order of rank, 
whether an action is moral or immoral, only makes sense within a system of purposes. 
Once we identify the system of purposes we can then determine why certain actions 
are deemed moral while others are judged immoral.  To lay the second stone, 
historical sense is the ability to identify the order of rank of valuations according to 
which a people, a society, a human has lived, and the order of rank is to be found in 
the relationship between the values and the active forces.  The active forces are the 
appropriating powers; where appropriating, here, is understood by Nietzsche as the 
ability to impose or to create forms (BGE 259).  The values, then, are the expressions 
of these forms.   
An example may be useful here. In the First Essay of the Genealogy, 
Nietzsche makes use of the historical sense and explores the order of rank of values 
within two systems of valuation: master morality and slave morality.  I will not 
undertake a full analysis of the slave revolt in morals, but I will attempt to offer some 
evidence to support the claim that Nietzsche’s account of the revolt in morals is 
simultaneously a demonstration of the most salient features of our historical sense that 
I have just identified:  the ability to quickly identify the relationship between the 
active forces and the values within a particular system of valuation.  In order to 
identify the active forces and the values within varying systems of purposes, such as 
master morality and slave morality, one must have the ability  “to collect material, to 
conceptualize and arrange a vast realm of subtle feelings of value and differences of 
value which are alive, beget, grow, and perish—and perhaps attempt to present 
vividly some of the more frequent and recurring forms of such living 
crystallizations—“(BGE 186). Nietzsche provides us with a demonstration of this in 
the First Essay of the Genealogy. 
The active force, the power of appropriating, within master morality is the 
self-affirming posture of the nobles, the unreflective “triumphant affirmation of itself” 
(GM I 10).  The noble mode of valuation “acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks its 
opposite only so as to affirm itself more triumphantly,” and this provides us with the 
order of rank within the noble mode of valuation.  “The ‘good’ they say to 
themselves, this is to say, the noble, the powerful, high-stationed and high-
minded…felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first   140 
rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian” (GM I 
2).   While the active force within the slave mode of valuation is the appropriating 
force of ressentiment.  This force “becomes creative and gives birth to values” 
through an inversion of the noble mode of valuation, “the inversion of the value-
positing eye—” (GM I 10).  The “good man” within the noble mode of valuation 
becomes the “evil” man within the slave mode of valuation (GM I 11).  We can then 
determine the order of rank within the slave mode of valuation.  The reflective 
inversion of the noble mode of valuation is one in which the explanatory work is done 
by the concept of “evil.” And this is the slave’s “basic concept, from which he then 
evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a ‘good one’—himself!” (GM I 10)  This is a 
demonstration of the application the historical sense.  Nietzsche quickly charts the 
appropriating forces within two distinct systems of purposes and demonstrates how 
these forces find expression in two differing forms of valuation. 
The application of our historical sense, the ability to quickly identify the 
“living crystallizations” of a system of purposes, makes visible an often overlooked 
feature of our moral past: “the order and rank of desirable things is not firm at all 
times…” (HH 42)
226  Our historical sense alerts us, in other words, to the fact that 
“morality” “as we understand it [is] merely one type of human morality beside which, 
before which, and after which many other types…are, or ought to be, possible” (BGE 
202).  The invocation of our historical sense aids us in teasing out the “living 
crystallizations” of a variety of perspectives, a variety of systems of purposes, through 
which people have made sense of themselves.  
The issue that was left pending at the end of the last section has now been 
grounded through this discussion of Nietzsche’s conception of historical sense.  A 
central tenet of “the higher species of the art of painting” is the ability to “sketch a 
true picture of certain periods” of our development and our “historical sense” is 
concerned with ascertaining the actual systems of purposes through which people 
have genuinely made sense of themselves. So, it seems, we are in the position to 
examine the results of conducting history as “the art of painting.”      
 
3.2 The First Result 
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The first result of “the higher species of the art of painting” is that:  “we 
comprehend our fellow men as being determined by such systems, and representatives 
of various cultures, that is to say as necessary but as alterable” (HH 274). 
Historiography understood as the “art of painting” teases out the “order of rank” 
within systems of valuation. Thus historical inquiry of the sort Nietzsche advocates 
aids us in opening our eyes to the varying systems of values or of purposes that have 
dominated our culture. We can then note to what extent “our fellow men are 
determined” by, or held captive by, or entrenched within, certain modes of 
evaluation.
227  By understanding the historical establishment as well as the structure, 
or the order of rank, of the varying systems of purposes that have dominated our 
culture we can recognize to what extent we still remain entrenched within such 
systems and to what extent we are determined by such systems of valuation.  
Historiography allows us, in the first instance, to comprehend the varying systems of 
purposes within which our fellow men have made sense of themselves.  In the second 
instance, historiography creates the horizon for us to be able to distinguish between 
that which is necessary and that which is alterable.  This second point is 
methodologically important because, in “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” Nietzsche 
informs us that: “To me…the most vital questions for philosophy appear to be to what 
extent the character of the world is alterable; so as, once this question has been 
answered, to set about improving that part of it recognized as alterable with the most 
ruthless courage” (RWB III 207-208).  History practiced in the manner elucidated 
above, provides us with the means to answer “the most vital questions for 
philosophy.” For only through such an historical investigation can we recognize “the 
part of the world that is alterable,” and, once so recognized, we can begin to go to 
work “with the most ruthless courage” on those aspects of our past. 
 
3.3 The Second Result 
 
The second result of conducting historiography in this way is that “we are able 
to segregate parts of our own development and exhibit them in isolation” (HH 274).  
Nietzsche tells us that: “Direct self-observation is not nearly sufficient for us to know 
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ourselves:  we require history, for the past continues to flow within us in a hundred 
waves; we ourselves are, indeed, nothing but that which at every moment we 
experience of this continued flowing” (AOM 223).  For us to know ourselves we 
require a particular kind of historiography that allows us to determine the aspects of 
ourselves that are necessary as well as the aspects of ourselves that are alterable.  And 
this is the ability to “exhibit” aspects of ourselves in isolation—something that should 
win our gratitude:     
Only artists…have given men eyes and ears to see and hear with some 
pleasure what each man is himself, experiences himself, desires himself; only 
they have taught us to esteem the hero that is concealed in everyday 
characters; only they have taught us the art of viewing ourselves as heroes—
from a distance, and as it were, simplified and transfigured…Only in this way 
can we deal with some base details in ourselves.  Without art, we would be 
nothing but foreground and live entirely in the spell of that perspective which 
makes what is closest at hand and most vulgar appear as if it were terribly 
vast, and reality itself (GS 78). 
 
The art of history contributes to a particular kind of self-knowledge.  The art of 
history allows us to uncover and inquire into the varying systems of purposes within 
which we have made sense of ourselves. Without the ability to view ourselves from a 
distance, or as simplified and transfigured, we could be held captive by a number of 
problematic assumptions.  Thus history, as the art of painting, has direct consequences 
upon the manner in which we see ourselves, and experience ourselves. 
  If the forgoing considerations represent a cogent re-construction of 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on the art of history, then there seems to be two additional points 
worth making.  Both points are concerned with weaving together Nietzsche’s thoughts 
on the art of history and genealogy as methodology.  In the section that follows I will 
broach the first of these points guided by the question: does the art of history preclude 
the other modes of historiography Nietzsche elucidates in 1874?  Or put another way: 
given that much time in the chapter has been spent discussing the monumental mode 
of historiography, does the art of history exclude the antiquarian and the critical 
modes of historiography?  After discussing this issue, I will then turn to treat the final 
point, and offer an answer to the question: how does the art of history shed light upon 
the genealogical mode of inquiry? 
 
4. On the “Artists of Destruction and Dissolution” (BGE 209) 
     143 
In chapter three, I concluded that the genealogical mode of inquiry, as 
demonstrated in the Genealogy, is best seen as the critical mode of historiography.  
However, in this chapter much time has been spent discussing the monumental mode 
of historiography as a demonstration of the art of history. Accordingly, the question 
surfaces: does the “art of history” preclude the other modes of historiography 
elucidated in 1874?  I think not. There are two reasons for this assessment: (A) each 
mode of historiography requires a particular dimension of artistry, of shaping and 
providing the past with a particular form. And (B) each mode of historiography serves 
a particular need, such that the historian must select which of the modes of 
historiography best serves his particular purposes.   
Consider antiquarian historiography.  This mode of writing history requires 
that the historian select those instances which are worthy of reverence, those which 
may be held up and piously revered. So, the antiquarian mode of historiography 
would fail to be artistry, of the sort elucidated in this chapter, when everything 
collected is taken to be of equal value.  That is, when antiquarian history is “blind,” 
when the object of history is collecting for the sake of collecting. Nietzsche expresses 
the salience of this last point as follows: When the antiquarian mode of historiography 
degenerates,  
Then there appears the repulsive spectacle of a blind rage for collecting, a 
restless raking together of all things that has ever existed.  Man is encased in 
the stench of must and mould…[the historian] succeeds in reducing even a 
more creative disposition…to an insatiable thirst for novelty, or rather an 
antiquity for all and everything…(HL III 75). 
 
The corrosion of the antiquarian mode of historiography is signalled by the “repulsive 
spectacle of a blind rage for collecting,” the withering away of the form imposed by 
the historian, and this deterioration culminates in an “antiquity for all and everything.” 
An antiquity in which all is provided with equal value, such that the aspects of the 
past which are worthy of being piously revered are held on equal footing with the 
“dust of bibliographical minutiae” (HL III 75).  
The same holds for the critical mode of historiography.  The historian must 
select an aspect of the past, carefully examine it, and then condemn it (HL III 75-76).  
Nietzsche is clear here:  “every past, however, is worthy to be condemned—for that is 
the nature of human things: human violence and weaknesses have always played a 
mighty role in them” (HL III 76).  And this thesis can lead to the degeneration of   144 
critical history insofar as one may draw the inference that: “…all that exists is worthy 
of perishing.  So it would be better if nothing existed” (HL III 76).  If whilst 
employing the critical mode of historiography, one concludes that it would be better if 
nothing existed, then one is not, as a result, free from the aberrations condemned.  For 
condemning the aberrations of the past does not “alter the fact that we originate in 
them” (HL III 76).  Thus, this mode of historiography requires that the historian shape 
the condemnation of the past in such a way as to engender not blind acceptance of 
“human violence and weakness,” the conclusion that it would be better in nothing 
existed, but rather, enjoins us in the a posteriori attempt to provide oneself with “a 
past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did 
originate” (HL III 76).  In other words, this mode of historiography requires that the 
historian shape his condemnation of the past in such a way as to enjoin further 
creation upon the ground liberated by his critique (HL VII 95). And this, I submit, is 
the art of critical history: the art of destruction and dissolution. 
In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche describes such artistry as follows: 
Thanks to the unconquerably strong and tough virility of the great German 
philologists and critical historians (viewed properly, all of them were also 
artists of destruction and dissolution), a new concept of the German spirit 
crystallized gradually in spite of all romanticism in music and philosophy, and 
the inclination of virile scepticism became a decisive trait, now, for example, 
as an intrepid eye, now as the courage and hardness of analysis, as the tough 
will to undertake dangerous journeys of exploration and spiritualized North 
Pole expeditions under desolate and dangerous skies.  There may be good 
reason why warmblooded and superficial humanitarians cross themselves just 
when they behold this spirit— (BGE 209) 
 
The critical historian is an artist; more specifically, and when “viewed properly,” an 
artist of destruction and dissolution.  Imbued with a potent scepticism the critical 
historian breaks up the past, dissolving the most crystallized of elements with 
“courage and hardness of analysis” (BGE 209). This healthy and virile scepticism is 
the form of artistry exemplified by Nietzsche throughout the Genealogy. For his 
vivisection of morality, which culminates in the dissolution, the self-overcoming, of a 
particular picture of morality, is the project of one who is willing to “undertake 
dangerous journeys…under desolate and dangerous skies” (BGE 209).      
An example may be beneficial here. Consider the First Essay of the Genealogy 
in which Nietzsche seeks to break up the hegemonic and totalitarian command of   145 
“morality,” the slave mode of morality.  That is in First Essay, as David Owen rightly 
puts the point:   
… by presenting ‘morality’ as slave morality, as a counter-movement to, and 
re-evaluation of, noble morality, [Nietzsche] immediately and dramatically 
problematizes the presumption of his audience that ‘morality;’ is the only 
possible ethical perspective in making viable another mode of ethical 
reasoning and rhetorically situating the reader within the struggle between 
them, while also indicating that the enterprise of re-evaluation to which he 
enjoins his readers is not a novel phenomenon.
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In the First Essay, Nietzsche seeks to break up a piece of the past by demonstrating 
that the picture of morality that we assume is universally binding, and a-historical, the 
slave mode of morality, is the product of a re-evaluation of another mode of moral 
reasoning, noble morality. By offering us his intrepid eye, his vision, or his picture of 
the history of morality, Nietzsche, at the same time, seeks to dissolve the hold that the 
slave mode of morality has upon us.  Here, in the First Essay, the artistry of 
destruction and dissolution is on display.  
  If the foregoing is cogent, then it follows that artistry in historiography is not 
limited to the monumental mode of history.  Rather, when each mode of history is 
practiced in the service of life, then it is also a demonstration in the kind of artistry 
that Nietzsche envisages.   As such we are in the position to consider the manner in 
which genealogy, as methodology, is the art of history. 
 
5. Conclusion: Genealogy as the Art of History  
   
In viewing Nietzsche’s thoughts on the proper practice of historiography as 
the “art of painting” two methodological points, relevant to our discussion of 
genealogy, are brought to the fore: (1) the equation “genealogy is history correctly 
practiced” is informed by Nietzsche’s thoughts on the art of history.  That is, the 
correct practice of history, for Nietzsche, is an affectively engaged activity in which 
the historian provides that past with a particular form.  And (2) the critical component 
of the genealogical mode of inquiry is cashed out as the critical mode of 
historiography, in which (A) Nietzsche selects an aspect of the past, the slave mode of 
evaluation, which is worthy of condemnation. (B) Nietzsche carefully tracks the most 
recurrent forms of this mode of evaluation, which I have previously labelled as 
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“faith,” in order to point out that this mode of evaluation is suffering from a set of 
incurable internal contradictions.  In other words, Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate that 
the “faithful” possess reasons immanent to their system of purposes to forsake their 
unreflective faith.  (C) Nietzsche, in seeking to expose the internal contradictions of 
this mode of evaluation, seeks to build upon the ground thus liberated.  That is 
Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate that the slave mode of evaluation is but “one type of 
human morality, besides which, before which, and after which many other types, 
above all higher moralities, are, our ought to be, possible” (BGE 202).  In other 
words, critical history in the hands of Nietzsche is not simply destructive for the sake 
of being destructive.  Rather, this form of historiography is employed to demonstrate 
how we have become wedded to a particular mode of evaluation, to clarify how this 
mode of evaluation is in conflict with our other beliefs, and to demonstrate that there 
have been other ways in which human beings have evaluated themselves, through the 
noble mode of evaluation, for example, and thus a re-evaluation of our evaluative 
framework may be possible again.   
If this argument is convincing, then it has noteworthy implications for the 
formulation that “genealogy is history correctly practiced.”  The worry that the 
coinage may be uninformative has been overcome by viewing Nietzsche’s thoughts 
on the correct practice of history as an affectively engaged activity in which the past 
is provided with a particular form.  And, this serves to simultaneously make sense of 
genealogy as methodology, for it is precisely this kind of artistry.   
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CONCLUSION  
 
Every thinker paints his world in fewer colours than are actually there, and is 
blind to certain individual colours.  This is not merely a deficiency.  By virtue 
of this approximation and simplification he introduces harmonies of colours 
into the things themselves, and these harmonies possess great charm and can 
constitute an enrichment of nature (D 426). 
 
Selection, simplification, “forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, 
inventing, [and] falsifying” each represent the “essence of interpreting” (GM III 24). 
So in painting a picture for us of our past the thinker must select, for example, out of 
the vast expanse of historical data those things that are relevant to this or that story.  
In selecting certain aspects the thinker is, according to Nietzsche, “blind to certain 
particular colours;” the thinker must overlook particular facets, to play down others, 
to embellish some, and to, out of necessity, “paint with fewer colours than actually 
exist” (D 426). Yet, Nietzsche is clear, this is not merely a shortcoming, but rather it 
allows the thinker to present an account that possesses “great charm and can 
constitute an enrichment of nature.”  And, though it may seem peculiar, the 
Genealogy being described as “charming,” it nevertheless is Nietzsche’s attempt to 
demonstrate the essence of interpreting, the artistry that is the correct practice of 
history, and is his attempt to “constitute an enrichment of nature.”    
I have attempted to offer a cogent reconstruction of Nietzsche’s genealogical 
methodology, and to make sense of the methodology as carrying with it the potential 
to constitute the kind of enrichment of nature Nietzsche envisages.  I took up this task, 
in the first instance, by defending my view of the genealogical mode of inquiry, 
namely that it takes the form of an immanent critique, and that it intend to target the 
faith of at least three sets of interlocutors, against rival views.  This served to shape 
the debate in Nietzsche scholarship concerning the methodology and to provide 
answers to the questions: (1) what is the critical import of Nietzsche’s genealogical 
mode of inquiry? (2) What form of critique does it take? (3) To whom does Nietzsche 
address his reflections?  
I then turned to the vexed question in Nietzsche scholarship: what role, if any, 
does history play in Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives?  After presenting an account 
of Nietzsche’s historical philosophy I turned to examine the Williams and May 
objection.  I argued that the Williams and May objection represents a serious   148 
scholarly challenge to my argument, namely that Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives 
are historical in nature.  I contended that the Williams and May objection rests upon 
three errors, and that if these errors can be overcome, then so too is claim that 
Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives lack historical veracity.  In the final chapter I 
attempted to shape the boundary by which the adage “genealogy is history correctly 
practiced” becomes instructive.  There I maintained that the correct practice of 
history, for Nietzsche, is an affectively engaged activity in which the genealogist 
provides history with a particular form. And accordingly, that the correct practice of 
history is a kind of artistry.  This served to concurrently make sense of the 
genealogical method as this form of artistry.  
If the foregoing has been persuasive, then there is an additional point worth 
making here, which was first raised by Bernard Williams: 
Nietzsche diagnosed the condition of modernity as one in which we, at once, 
have a morality which is seriously unstable under genealogical explanation; 
are committed (by that very morality, among other things) to transparency; 
and find very little to hand in the way of an alternative…Whether there is an 
alternative is not something that will be obvious to us…The question is, 
whether some other ways of living, something which includes other ways of 
thinking abut living, will help us, or human beings who follow us, to live, and 
one of Nietzsche’s most important lessons is that this consideration does not 
function as a criterion…It is a matter of whether it will indeed help us to live, 
and whether it will have done so is something that can only be recognized first 
in the sense that we are managing to live, and at a more reflective level, 
perhaps with the help of renewed genealogical explanation.
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The form of life-enhancement Nietzsche envisages, one that constitutes an enrichment 
of nature, cannot be prescribed.  Rather, genealogy as artistry must be practiced, and 
the customs and norms by which we frame ourselves must be scrupulously examined 
and, if necessary, re-evaluated.  This is not, as Williams makes clear, a purely 
intellectual exercise, for genealogy as methodology is concerned with how we 
actually live, and how we actually make sense of ourselves.  The genealogical method 
is the art of history, and of history in 1874 Nietzsche tells us “we need it, that is to say 
for the sake of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life and 
action” (HL Foreword 59).  Accordingly, we may employ the form of artistry 
Nietzsche demonstrates in the Genealogy.  Whether this methodology is successful or 
not is a question that can only find its answer after we have begun to live “beyond 
                                                 
229 Williams, Bernard (2000) pp. 160-161   149 
good and evil,” and perhaps with the help of an additional genealogical narrative.  150 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PRIMARY TEXTS: FREIDRICH NIETZSCHE 
 
The Antichrist, translated by R.J. Hollingdale London: Penguin Books, 1968. 
Beyond Good and Evil, translated by W.  Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1966. 
The Birth of Tragedy, translated by W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1966. 
The Case of Wagner: A Musicians Problem, translated by Judith Norman, edited by  
A. Ridley and J.  Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudice of Morality, translated by R.J. Hollingdale,  
edited by M. Clark and B. Leiter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
1997. 
Ecce Homo:  How to Become What You Are, translated W. Kaufmann, New York:  
Vintage, 1966. 
The Gay Science, translated by W.  Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1974. 
On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, edited  
by W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1966. 
Human, All-too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, translated by R.J. Hollingdale,  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Nietzsche contra Wagner: From the Files of a Psychologist translated by Judith  
Norman, edited by A. Ridley and J.  Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Philosophy and Truth:  Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s,  
edited and translated by D.  Breazeale, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities 
Press, 1979. 
The Portable Nietzsche, edited and translated by W.  Kaufmann, New York: Viking,  
1954. 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by W. Kaufmann New York: Penguin Books,  
1966. 
Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer, translated R.J.  
Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 1968.  
Unpublished Writings From the Period of the Unfashionable Observations, translated    151 
by Richard T. Grey Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1995. 
Untimely Meditations, translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 1983. 
The Will to Power, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, New York:  
Vintage, 1968. 
 
Secondary Literature 
 
Abbey, Ruth (2000), Nietzsche’s Middle Period, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
Acampora, Christa Davis (2006), (ed.) Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals  
Critical Essays, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 
Acampora, Christa Davis, and Acampora, Ralph (2004) Nietzsche Bestiary: Becoming  
Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Allison, David B. (1977), (ed.) The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of  
Interpretation, New York:  Dell.  
Ansell-Pearson, Keith (2006), (ed.) A Companion to Nietzsche Oxford:  Blackwell  
Publishing Ltd. 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith and Caygill, Howard (1993), The Fate of the New Nietzsche  
Aldershot: Avebury Series in Philosophy. 
–— (ed.) (2006), A Companion to Nietzsche Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Arendt, Hannah (1992), Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy Chicago: University  
of Chicago Press. 
Aron, Raymond (1948), Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the  
Limits of Historical Objectivity, translated by George J. Irwin, London:  
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Bergmann, Frithjof (1998), “Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality,” in R.C. Solomon and  
K. Higgins (eds.) Reading Nietzsche Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berkowitz, Peter (1994), “Nietzsche’s Ethics of History,” in Review of Politics 56, 5- 
27. 
Bermúdez, José Luis and Gardner, Sebastian (1997), (eds.) Art and Morality London:  
Routledge 
Branch, Taylor (1988), Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963,  
New York:  A Touchstone Book, Simon and Schuster Inc.   152 
Breazeale, Daniel (1997), (ed.) Introduction.  In Untimely Meditations, by Friedrich  
Nietzsche, vii-xxxii.  Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press.  
Brobjer, Thomas H. (2004), “Nietzsche’s View of the Value of Historical Studies and  
Methods” Journal of the History of Ideas 65:2 301-322. 
Clark, Maudemarie (1990), Nietzsche Truth and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Collingwood, R.G. (1999), The Idea of History, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
Conway, Daniel (1984), “Genealogy and Critical Method” in Schacht, Richard (ed.)  
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, 
Berkeley:  University of California Press. 
–— (2008), Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, London: Continuum  
International Publishing Company. 
Cox, Christoph (1997), “The ‘Subject’ of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism” Journal of the  
History of Philosophy 35:2 pp. 269-291. 
–— (1999), Nietzsche Naturalism and Interpretation Berkeley:  University of  
California Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles (2000), Nietzsche and Philosophy London: Continuum International  
Publishing Company. 
Evans, Richard J. (1997), In Defence of History London: Granta Books. 
Foucault, Michel (1971), “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” In Language, Counter- 
Memory, Practice, translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
–— (1997), “What is Critique?” trans.  Kevin Paul Geiman, in James Smith (ed.),  
What is Enlightenment?, Berkeley:  University of California Press, pp. 382-
398. 
–— (2003), “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975- 
75, Translated by David Macey, London: Penguin Books.  
Gemes, Ken (1992), “Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth,” Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research 52:  47-65. 
–— (2006), “We Remain of Necessity Strangers to Ourselves:  The Key  
Message of Nietzsche’s Genealogy” in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of 
Morals Critical Essays (ed) Christa Davis Acampora Oxford:  Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc. pp. 191-208.   153 
Geuss, Raymond (1981), The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt  
School, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
–— (1994), “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” European Journal of Philosophy 2: 275-92. 
–— (1997), “Nietzsche and Morality,” European Journal of Philosophy 5: 1-20. 
–— (1999), Morality, Culture, History, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
Graham, Gordon (1997), The Shape of the Past: A Philosophical Approach to History  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Green, Michael Stevens (2000), Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition Chicago:  
University of Illinois Press. 
Gillham, Simon (2004), “‘An Impossible Virtue’ Heraclitean Justice and Nietzsche’s  
Second Untimely Meditation” in Nietzsche and Antiquity: His Reaction and 
Response to the Classical Tradition (ed.) Bishop, Paul New York: Camden 
House. 
Guay, Robert (2006), “The Philosophical Function of Genealogy” in Ansell-Pearson,  
Keith (ed.) A Companion to Nietzsche Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing Ltd.   
Haar, Michel (1985) “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language” in Allison, David B  
(ed.) The New Nietzsche Contemporary Styles of Interpretation Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  MIT Press. 
Harcourt, Edward (2000), (ed.) Morality, Reflection and Ideology Oxford:  Oxford  
University Press. 
Hatab, Lawrence (2008), Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: An Introduction  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Havas, Randall (1994), Nietzsche’s Genealogy:  Nihilism and the Will to Knowledge    
Ithaca:  Cornell University Press. 
Hegel, G.W.F (1861), Introduction to the Philosophy of History, translated by Robert  
S. Hartman, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 
–— (1997) Reason in History A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History  
translated by Hartman, Robert S. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Heidegger, Martin (1981), Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art translated by  
Krell, David Farrell London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Hoy, David (1994), “Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method” in Schacht (ed.)  
Nietzsche,Genealogy and Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy 
of Morals Berkeley: University of California Press.   154 
Janaway, Christopher (1997), “Nietzsche’s Illustration of the Art of Exegesis” in Art  
and Morality (eds.) José Luis Bermúdez and Sebastian Gardner, London: 
Routledge. 
–— (1998), Willing and Nothingness:  Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator,  
Oxford:  Clarendon. 
–— (2006), “Naturalism and Genealogy” in Ansell-Pearson, Keith (ed.) A Companion  
to Nietzsche Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing Ltd.   
–— (2007), Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
Jaspers, Karl (1965), Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His  
Philosophical Activity, translated by C. Wallraff and F. Schmitz, Chicago:  
Regnery.  
Kant, Immanuel (1929), Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp Smith  
Bedford: Macmillian & Co., Ltd.  
–—  (1983), Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics, History and  
Morals tranlated by Ted Humhrey Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
–—  (1987), Critique of Judgment translated by Werner S. Pluhar Indianapolis:  
Hackett Publishing Company. 
Kaufmann, Walter (1974), Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4
th  
Edition, Princeton:  Princeton University Press. 
Krupp, Tyler (2008), “Genealogy as Critique?” In Journal of the Philosophy of  
History 2: pp. 315-337. 
Lange, Duncan (1998), “Introduction and Explanatory Notes” to Twilight of the Idols 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leiter, B. (2000), “Nietzsche’s Metaethics: Against the Privilege Readings.”  
     European Journal of Philosophy 8: 277-297.  
–—  (2001), “The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche,” reprinted in J.  
Richardson and B. Leiter (eds.), Nietzsche. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
–—  (2002), Nietzsche on Morality, London:  Routledge. 
Lévy, Bernard-Henri (2006), American Vertigo: Traveling America in the Footsteps  
of Tocqueville  (trans. Mandell Charlotte) Random House Publishing Group.  
Magnus, Bernd (1986), “Nietzsche’s Philosophy in 1888: The Will to Power and the    155 
Übermensch” in Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 pp.79-98 
Magnus, Bernd, and Kathleen Higgins (1996), The Cambridge Companion to  
Nietzsche, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.  
Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick (1978), The Marx-Engels Reader translated and  
edited by Tucker, Robert C. New York: W.M. Norton & Company. 
May, Simon (1999), Nietzsche’s Ethics and his ‘War on Morality’, Oxford: Clarendon  
Press. 
Merrow, Kathleen (2004), “‘In the Name of…’ Rousseau in Nietzsche’s Texts, Or,  
How to Make a Revolution Not Happen” in Rethinking History 8:2 pp. 223 
245 
Moore, Gregory and Brobjer, Thomas H. (eds.) (2004), Nietzsche and Science  
Hampshire, England: Ashgate. 
Nehamas, Alexander (1985), Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, Mass.:  
Harvard University Press. 
–— (1994), “The Genealogy of Genealogy Interpretation in Nietzsche’s Second  
Untimely Meditation and in On the Genealogy of Morals” in R. Schacht (ed.)  
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality:  Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals,  
Berkeley:  University of California Press. 
Owen, David (1994), Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity: A Critique of Liberal Reason  
London: Sage. 
–—  (2002a), “Criticism and Captivity:  On Genealogy and Critical Theory” in  
European Journal of Philosophy” 10:2 216-230. 
–—  (2002b), “Nietzsche’s Event:  Genealogy and the Death of God” in Theory and  
Event 6:3  
–—  (2003a), “The Contest of Enlightenment: An Essay on Critique and  
Genealogy” in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 25 35-57. 
–— (2003b), “Nietzsche, Re-evaluation and the Turn to Genealogy” in European  
Journal of Philosophy 11:3 249-272. 
–— (2007), Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality McGill-Queen’s Press. 
Pappas, Nickolas (2005), The Nietzsche Disappointment:  Reckoning with Nietzsche’s  
Unkept Promises on Origins and Outcomes Lanham:  Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers Inc.   
Pippin, Robert (2006), “Agent and Deed in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals” in    156 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith (ed.) A Companion to Nietzsche Oxford:  Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. 
Poellner, Peter (1995), Nietzsche and Metaphysics, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
Prado, C. G. (1995), Starting with Foucault:  An Introduction in Genealogy, Oxford:   
Westview Press. 
Reginster, Bernard (2006), The Affirmation of Life, Cambridge: Harvard University  
Press. 
Richardson, John (1996), Nietzsche’s System, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
Richardson, John and Leiter, Brian (eds.) (2001), Nietzsche, Oxford: Oxford  
University Press.  
Ridley, Aaron (1998), Nietzsche’s Conscience:  Six Character Studies from the  
Genealogy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
–—(2000), “Science in Service of Life” in The Proper Ambition of Science, M.W.F.  
Stone and J Wolff (eds.),  London: Routledge 91-101. 
–—(2007), “Art and Freedom” in European Journal of Philosophy Vol.15.2,  
pp. 204-24 
Saar, Martin (2002), “Genealogy and Subjectivity” in European Journal of  
Philosophy 10:2 pp. 231-245 
Sax, Benjamin (1989), “Foucault , Nietzsche, History:  Two Modes of the  
Genealogical Method” in Journal of European Ideas 1 769-781. 
Schacht, Richard (1983), Nietzsche London:  Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
–— (1994), (ed.) Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s  
Genealogy of Morals, Berkeley:  University of California Press. 
Schrift, Alan D. (1990), Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation:  Between  
Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, New York:  Routledge. 
–— (2000), (ed.) Why Nietzsche Still: Reflections on Drama, Culture, Politics,  
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Shapiro, Gary (1982), “Nietzsche Contra Renan” in History and Theory, Vol. 21, no 2
   pp. 192-222. 
Skorupski, John (1989) John Stuart Mill London: Routledge 
Small, Robin (2004), Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship Oxford:  Oxford  
University Press. 
Solomon, Robert C. and Higgins, Kathleen (1998), (eds.) Reading Nietzsche, Oxford:  
Oxford University Press.    157 
Solomon, Robert C. (2003), Living With Nietzsche:  What the Great “Immoralist”  
Has to Teach us, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
Staten, Henry (1990), Nietzsche’s Voice.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Strong, Tracy B. (2000), Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration  
Chicago:  University of Illinois Press. 
Tanner, Michael (1994), Nietzsche:  A Very Short Introduction Oxford:  Oxford  
University Press.  
White, Richard (1994), “The Return of the Master: An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s  
Genealogy of Morals” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality ed. Schacht, Richard 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
–— (1997), Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty Illinois:  University of Illinois  
Press. 
Williams, Bernard (2000), “Naturalism and Genealogy” in Morality, Reflection and  
Ideology (ed.) Harcourt, Edward Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
–— (2002), Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, Princeton:   
Princeton University Press. 
Young, Julian (1992), Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
–—(2003), The Death of God and the Meaning of Life, London:  Routledge. 
 
–—(2006), Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion Cambridge:  Cambridge University  
Press. 
Zinn, Howard (2005) A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present New  
York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 